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policy REVIEW

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Robert Bork's America
Gordon Jackson

Seventy Years of Evil
Michael Johns

Nuclear Age Miseducation
Keith B. Payne and Jill Coleman

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Laughable trade measures

We have argued long and loudly in this space that protectionism, in the long run, is economic folly. But two amendments in the Senate trade bill—itself a largely protectionist document—are so illogical as to go beyond folly into an area that can only be defined as absurdity.

One amendment would add a new dimension to the argument over what constitutes an unfair trade practice—the issue of worldwide supply and demand. Under that amendment, if there is surplus worldwide capacity to produce a commodity—or if somebody's crystal ball says there will be a future surplus—governments that encourage the production of those commodities could trigger retaliation by the U.S. The other amendment zeros in on agricultural products, minerals and chemicals, and seeks to apply a similar supply-demand test as a criterion for loans by multilateral lending agencies.

Taken together, the potential impact of these amendments is sublimely ridiculous. For example:

- There's currently excess worldwide capacity to produce oil and natural gas, and the surplus is expected to remain a fact of life well into the future. Most of the surplus capacity happens to be in the OPEC countries. Even so, these amendments would seek to bar countries like Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, and Brazil from encouraging the search for any more oil and gas. If the U.S. were the target of such legislation elsewhere, America could be barred from producing new domestic reserves. Now that, we submit, is patently an absurd position for any oil-importing country, including the U.S.
- Since when does the capacity to produce an item—even excess capacity—assure that the item is readily available to consumers all over the world? Certainly price is a factor, and transportation costs, as just one example, help determine price. If capacity were the proper yardstick, there would be no hunger in Africa, because there's plenty of worldwide grain capacity these days. It's absurd to use capacity as a determining element.
- We suggest that there might be a hypocrisy factor at work here Much capacity to manufacture any product might well be obsolete and inefficient, and require great doses of capital to modernize (just ask domestic steelmakers about that). Yet, other countries might be kept from building modern plants by the amendments, while, presumably, the U.S. could go ahead and build. Won't our trading partners laugh the U.S. delegates right out of the GATT negotiating rooms if these amendments become law?
- Who can tell whether surpluses are temporary or permanent? Are they the result of the overhang from a recent cyclical turndown in a particular industry? Will new capacity be needed during the next upturn? In our view the best regulator of capacity is the marketplace. Any artificial restraint on the market could only create shortages and price fluctuations—and these are hardly a laughing matter.
- Finally, we see the amendments as clearly discriminatory. Developing countries, by definition, are the last to install production capacity for basic commodities. Does the U.S. Senate have the right to shut them out of the industrialization process because others have installed plant and equipment before them? And how can developing countries handle their debt load if they aren't allowed to enter the economic arena?

World trade and American trade policies are serious matters. But too many aspects of the House and Senate trade bills lend themselves to parody and burlesque. We seriously urge the Senators and Representatives who will soon meet in conference to write a final bill which eliminates blatant protectionist measures. The last thing America needs is economic funny business.

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THE GATHERING STORM

Are the Soviets Preparing for World War III?

REPRESENTATIVE JIM COURTER

Justly celebrated for his warnings about the Nazis, Winston Churchill is less well remembered for those he made about Soviet power and expansionism. One of his most astute and vivid predictions came as early as March 14, 1919, at a time when many observers believed the Bolsheviks could not even govern Moscow, let alone reforge an empire from the ruins of Russia. To his friend and prime minister, Lloyd George, Churchill penned this warning against withdrawing British help for non-Communist forces in the Russian civil war:

> When the Bolshevik frontier in Siberia is limited only by whatever line the Japanese choose to keep for themselves, when the whole of the Caucasus and Trans-Caspia have fallen into Bolshevik power, when their armies are menacing Persia and Afghanistan and their missionaries are at the gates of India, when one after another the Border States in the West have been undermined by want and propaganda or overborne by criminal violence, not only the League of Nations but the British Empire, with which we are particularly concerned, will wake up to the fact that Russia is not a negligible factor in world politics.

Japan, which had destroyed the Russian navy in 1895 at Tsushima Straits, is all but undefended today; its meager military resources could be crippled by Soviet air attack. Because Persia (Iran) cannot even defeat small and war-weary Iraq, much less resist a Soviet invasion, it is extremely vulnerable, and is said to be contemplating the suffocating embrace of a "Friendship Treaty." Afghanistan, while not entirely controlled, has been smashed and occupied. The border states in Eastern Europe were indeed undermined and, where necessary, overborne by criminal violence. Terrorism has been used continuously against the new border states, those of Western Europe. The Marxist missionaries are only at the gates of India, but thousands of their technicians and military experts, together with all their tanks and advanced fighter aircraft, have long since passed inside, where they enjoy influence so great that it has effectively compromised Indian sovereignty.

The Soviet military presence became truly global in the 1970s, as American power around the world receded. Americans, even President Jimmy Carter, began to awake to the dangerous new correlation of forces in 1979, a disastrous year that saw the fall of Afghanistan and the hasty escape of a powerful pro-Western dictator from Iran, the construction of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba (which received two diesel submarines for its own navy as well), and the replacement of a pro-American regime by a Soviet proxy in Nicaragua.

American senators learned that year that a Red Army combat brigade was resident in Cuba. Soviet client state Vietnam used the world's fourth largest army to consolidate its occupation of Cambodia (begun in December 1978); Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam soon provided the Soviet empire its long-coveted warm water ports. Out-of-area ship days for the Soviets' expanding Pacific fleet jumped from 5,800 a year to 8,550, while in the Mediterranean, two new carriers, the *Kiev* and the *Minsk*, exercised for the first time. Also that year, for the first time Soviet arms transfers to the non-Communist Third World exceeded those of the United States, as they have in subsequent years.

Reagan's Insufficient Buildup

The brazen invasion of Afghanistan signaled Soviet recognition of declining American preparedness and of the irresolution of our leadership. The concern caused by these events was in part what swept President Carter from office. The electorate replaced him with a man who promised, and undertook, to rebuild American military strength.

But seven years into the Reagan administration, the United States still clearly lacks the capability to defeat the Soviet Union if the USSR should begin a war. Victory over the aggressor is not even a stated American objective. Our national objective, formally stated, is to terminate hostilities on favorable terms. Those are the U.S. Armed Forces' orders. Whether we have given our forces the material resources to carry out those orders remains highly questionable.

The first term of the Reagan administration saw substan-

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AP/Wide World Photos

These goose-steppers in Berlin are Soviets, not Nazis.

tial improvements in American armed forces—in the modernization of our strategic missile forces, in troop readiness and morale, in the procurement of weapons platforms, in the marked upgrading of our National Guard and Reserves. Today's American forces could easily prevail over the U.S. forces of 1980. Unfortunately, the enemy is not our old selves, but a Soviet military that is itself vastly improved.

The Reagan buildup created a wave of optimism about our capabilities and an illusion, shared by admirers and critics of the president alike, that America has been restored to her greatness. We are said to be "standing tall." Liberal members of Congress, eager to cut the defense budget, were given unwitting support by conservatives' premature declarations of martial recovery. What only recently was a national consensus for increased defense spending has disappeared. Actual outlays have been quietly falling: down 4 percent in fiscal year 1986, down 2.5 percent in 1987, and, if the Senate takes the advice of the House this year, down another 5 percent in 1988.

Moscow's Next Meal

The Reagan Doctrine of promoting democratic resistance movements around the world has also been oversold. The history books will recall the foundation of this U.S. aid program as both moral and strategically useful to the cause of democracy. But pronouncements by the administration about "having the Soviets on the run" are totally unwarranted. None of the targeted Communist regimes is closer to defeat now than it was three years ago, and all continue to receive massive Soviet military aid.

To be sure, no new country has been engulfed by Communism on this president's watch. But an empire—even an empire that spans 12 time zones from the River Elbe to the Sea of Japan and the Bering Straits—expands only in stages. It will expand again when it is ready. It will expand again unless it is defeated. The 1980s must assimilate the enormous gains of the 1970s. As Winston Churchill said of the pause that followed Hitler's swallowing of Austria and preceded his dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, "After the boa constrictor has devoured its prey, it often has a considerable digestive spell." Then its appetite returns. It does no good for us to boast about every sign that the beast is in discomfort after devouring so many different foreign foods; it is wiser to contemplate whence his next meal comes.

Unless the politicians in this country do their constitutional duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and provide for the common defense, and point to the perils we now face; unless lovers of freedom lose their complacency about the size of the defense buildup; unless the country shakes itself and, taking new notice of the enemy's programs and plans, returns to national defense the emphasis it once had and still requires; then the dangers

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to democracy will redouble as our hard-won improvements are undone.

Stalin's Heartland

In a landmark study of geopolitics published two years before World War I, Halford J. Mackinder wrote that the focal point of world strategic power lay in "The World Heartland," the greater, northern part of Asia, extending as far west as the Baltic Sea. Mackinder believed that this region could determine world history. And of course, the borders of the USSR subsequently and swiftly encompassed the entire Heartland. Mackinder claimed that he "who rules East Europe"—the broad, low plain giving access to Russia—"commands the Heartland." Though Germany tried and failed twice to seize both Europe and the Heartland, after 1945 it was the Heartland, the Soviet Union, that seized and held the East European border states one by one. Over four subsequent decades these border states' human and material resources have supplied the frame and musculature of the Soviet empire.

Seven years into the Reagan administration, the United States still clearly lacks the capability to defeat the Soviet Union if the Soviets should begin a war.

While American optimists wait for a democratic uprising in Poland, Polish shipyards and farms yield amphibious landing craft and trainloads of food for Soviet citizens. While our professors and defense analysts expatiate upon the potential for East German noncooperation in a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, East Germany already hosts 19 Soviet divisions, and more than 2,300 East German military experts as well as large numbers of intelligence and police advisors carry out "proletarian internationalist duties" in a dozen countries and a half-dozen guerrilla wars. Romania, the Warsaw Pact member credited with "an independent foreign policy," remains a producer of modern tanks for the Warsaw Pact and an important political link to socialist countries such as China. Hungary, interwoven in the Soviet economic net, would provide the Warsaw Pact with ample supplies of corn and wheat in event of war. Czechoslovak industry helps supply Soviet foreign economic and military aid to Cuba and Southeast Asia, and Czech explosives have been found in terrorist arsenals and bomb sites in Europe and the Middle East. The Bulgars, feared by empire builders of older times, are so slavishly obedient to the Kremlin that they may anticipate, rather than merely follow, its commands.

Today, 2.7 million Warsaw Pact troops are ranged across the East European approaches to Mackinder's Heartland. Their cooperation with, if not their affection for, the Soviet master is guaranteed by countless intelligence and police agents and the other painful realities of totalitarian life. Enrolled in the Soviet armed forces alone are 5.8 million men. There are another 9 million in the reserve system who have been on active duty within the past five years.

At the disposal of these forces is an immense conventional arsenal, the product of the largest peacetime military buildup in history. Available to the Pact are some 54,000 armored personnel carriers, 42,000 artillery tubes, 52,000 main battle tanks, many hundreds of bombers, almost 700 reconnaissance aircraft, 2,800 fighter interceptors and almost as many interceptors for strategic air defense, 2,600 fighter-bomber and ground attack aircraft, and 970 attack helicopters. In all but the last two of these categories, American and NATO forces are outnumbered, often several times over.

The Widening Gap

Little wonder that General Bernard Rogers, who just retired as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has characterized a treaty proposing the withdrawal of intermediate-range U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe as an act that would make Europe safe for conventional war. There is no solace to be had in Rogers' declaration that his views do not differ from those of any other commander in any NATO country. In the meantime, as the storm gathers, the defense budget cuts continue in Britain and Belgium. The latter is letting its air defenses wither with age. There is not even fuel for the adequate training of Belgian pilots, or adequate practice ammunition and warm uniforms for Belgian troops in Germany. Canada, though it commits a small force to Europe, spends so little for defense that its own territories are vulnerable to a very limited Soviet attack. The overall picture is as General Rogers recently painted it: the gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact "grows wider each year."

Behind the Iron Curtain and afloat at sea is a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force that grew by more than 3,000 missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) between 1975 and 1986. We deactivated 50 of our most powerful ICBMs during that same period, unilaterally withdrew some 2,400 nuclear weapons from Europe, modernized some missile forces, and built 10 new ICBMs and more than 800 SLBMs. Today we have fewer nuclear weapons than at any time in the last two-and-a-half decades, and their total megatonnage is smaller than at any time since 1955. And yet the Soviet stockpile continues to grow. Last year the Soviets deployed new missiles of intercontinental range, impressive accuracy, and, because they are mobile, decreasing vulnerability.

At sea, a Soviet navy that long was little more than a large coast guard has evolved into a wide-ranging, blue water power. Operating from new Soviet bases (like those in the Kola Peninsula and from foreign bases and ports in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, southern Africa, and now Central America and the Caribbean), Warsaw Pact naval forces have proven retired Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's 1968 prediction that "sooner or later, the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas." By 1981, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged that we had lost our maritime superiority.

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Perhaps the most satisfying attainment of this administration's defense efforts is the rebuilding of a 600-ship navy. We will have it soon. The Soviets already deploy that many active, major warships and submarines, and have 1,200 other combat ships and 300 auxiliaries as well. In the Soviet Pacific fleet there are almost as many ships as we have in our entire navy. The Soviet merchant marine, a useful auxiliary in peacetime and a necessary one in war, contains more than 7,000 ships. More aircraft—over 1,600—are attached to Soviet naval forces than there are in most of the world's air forces. These craft enjoy the use of the Kremlin's new airfields in Cambodia, Angola, and other distant countries.

Gorbachev's Iron Teeth

The Kremlin is not satisfied with the strategic revolution it has worked. When he came to power 27 months ago, Mikhail Gorbachev was approvingly depicted by a Kremlin associate as possessed of "a nice smile but iron teeth." Some people immediately forgot the second half of that remark. But the evidence is unmistakable: the new emperor is pressing ahead with the Soviets' old agenda. The Afghan war is being prosecuted with grim determination. A much-heralded troop withdrawal of last October was only an elaborate fraud. New counterinsurgency tactics have made brutalities against the unarmed very common. Bombings in public places in western Pakistan over the past year by the KGB-trained Afghan secret police, or KhAD, highlight a new dimension of an enduring Soviet policy of using terror as a strategic tool.

Conventional wisdom in the West has it that the work force and infrastructure of the Communist bloc are exhausted. Nevertheless, under Gorbachev the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies continue to pump billions of dollars of economic and military aid into Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Indochina. Nicaragua alone has received more than one billion dollars in Soviet bloc weaponry since Gorbachev took power. Domestic economic reform may indeed be a priority, but the Kremlin never echoes the Westerners who say that reform will decrease "proletarian internationalism."

Under Gorbachev, Soviet war production is pushing on at its usual high pace. *Jane's Fighting Ships* noted several years ago that the new powers of the Red Banner Navy had already surpassed what considerations of defense could possibly require. In March 1985, as Gorbachev took power, Admiral Gorshkov declared that the fleet had enough weaponry to wipe out enemy targets on a global scale. Four months later he said that the Soviet navy's submarine and aviation forces were expanding. Today the Warsaw Pact still outproduces NATO in combat ships.

Our Defense Department forecasts that the number of Soviet nuclear weapons will continue to grow, from 10,000 now to 12,000 in 1990. The Warsaw Pact produces approximately 3,700 tanks per year, almost four times as many as NATO does. Soviet-bloc bomber and fighter-bomber production remains greater than our own even now as our supersonic B-1 bomber has begun to roll off production lines. We turn out 25 anti-aircraft artillery guns in one year and none in another, while the Pact builds more than 300 annually. Two hundred fifty to 300 units of self-propelled artillery is a good year for NATO; our enemies routinely turn out four times as many.

It would be easy to focus American attention on such production rates if they reflected dramatic increases or feverish preparation for war. Everyone would take notice if the chart lines were shooting upward at 25 percent a year. Instead, Soviet military production is pressed forward quietly over many years. Then one finds—if it occurs to one to look—that in the past decade America only produced 43 submarines to track the Soviets' 90 new attack and missile submarines, or that we made 16,200 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for theatre and tactical use, no insignificant number, while the Soviets built 140,000 SAMs over the same period. The Kremlin's spending does not frighten because the annual increases are small. What we forget is that these expenditures are additions to a production base so enormous that the factories' annual yield is already shockingly large.

The Soviets may intend war and complete victory. They may prefer to seek the fruits of war without risking the cost of full-scale conflict. They may continue as they are, fighting fierce local wars for one country at a time. What we must consider is that the choice is theirs.

The Soviets would not be building so many strategic and tactical forces, in the face of all their well-known economic constraints, if their goal was simply to achieve parity with the United States. They achieved that many years ago; they said so; they behave accordingly; and they continue to build. They want, and are achieving, unquestioned superiority. They may intend war and complete victory. They may prefer to seek the fruits of war without risking the cost of full-scale conflict. They may continue as they are, fighting fierce local wars for one country at a time. What we must consider is that the choice is theirs.

Preparing for Surprise Attack

The Soviets may be steady in the buildup of their forces, but their military doctrine reflects an obsession with surprise. General S. P. Ivanov wrote in *The Initial Period of War* that victory can be won by "using such factors as surprise attack [and] superiority in forces and weapons" to overwhelm the first echelons, and then through speedy offensives proceed "into the depth of the territory to complete the defeat of the enemy before he would be able to mobilize and utilize his military potential and economic

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capabilities." Similarly, the monthly *Soviet Military Review* published an article last year on "The Formula for Victory," which stated that surprise and "time discipline" have become essential to modern combat, and much rests upon the ability to "know what weapons the enemy has," where they are located and how they will be used, and to develop "an original combat plan" to "inflict a surprise blow at the most vulnerable place."

At sea, surprise would mean sudden attack upon U.S. naval assets, especially missile-bearing submarines. The USSR has three times as many attack subs as does the United States. American subs are quieter, and thus less detectable. Their technological edge is disappearing, though, a consequence of the John Walker spy ring and the Soviet habit of pilfering and exploiting the technical achievements of the West. This April, well before the Toshiba scandal exposed direct Japanese and Norwegian sales of special propeller milling technology to Soviet submakers, then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said that the new generation of Soviet subs poses the biggest single threat to the Navy. Today the Kremlin is producing or testing nine classes of submarines, most of them nuclear powered.

Warsaw Pact naval forces have proven retired Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's 1968 prediction that "sooner or later, the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas."

Our submarines constitute the least vulnerable leg of the American strategic triad. If they can be defeated under the sea or bombed in their bases and repair yards, America will be in grave danger. It is already well known that our land-based ICBMs, being immobile, are vulnerable to a crippling first strike by ever more accurate Soviet ICBMs. And it should be known, if it is not already, that our fleets of aging B-52 bombers with their nuclear cruise missiles could be targeted as they lay at rest on their airfields by preemptive strikes from submarine-launched cruise missiles or by bombers, perhaps with cruise missiles, flying on short notice over the Arctic, from Cuba, or elsewhere.

Surprise in a European land war would mean the swift occupation of neutral nations and the underequipped NATO countries, whose geographical position makes them inevitable victims. In the last world war, even after repeated warnings, Norway mobilized 48 hours *after* the Nazis invaded, and her defenses were subdued in a matter of weeks. Norway could be overwhelmed in as little time today by the numerous Soviet, East German, and Polish amphibious and airborne forces. Modest amounts of prepositioned supplies and a U.S. commitment will not prevent the aggression; U.S. troops may arrive too late, and if friendly forces do not control the air corridors they may not arrive at all. Norway's 10 minesweepers date almost to the last world war; its coastal defense artillery *does* date to the war, though it is at last being replaced. *Jane's Fighting Ships* finds that the 1,500 men spread out in defense of the northeastern border are insufficient, and that the nearby British Royal Marines, while magnificently trained, lack sufficient sea transport to come to Norway's defense.

Both Norway and Sweden have suffered incursions by hostile submarines. The interest shown by the Pact in Sweden is nothing less than extraordinary. Both large submarines and the midget varieties capable of infiltrating frogmen have been found repeatedly in Swedish waters during this decade. In 1983, Swedish officials complained of these "preparatory phases of military operations." This August, the head of the intelligence and security section of Stockholm's coastal defenses was silenced by his superior after declaring that during ice-free months as many as 10 Soviet incursions take place *each day*. Swedish pilots and officials from civilian and military air services find that Warsaw Pact pilots are in a heightened state of readiness, going so far as to lock their radars for live anti-aircraft missiles onto passing tourist flights.

Bridges to War

There are other indications of Soviet offensive intentions and capability to effect surprise attack in Europe:

(1) The stockpiling of 27,000 meters of bridging equipment. The Pact has displayed ingenuity and ability in the design and production of mobile bridge-building equipment, little or none of which would be necessary in defending the homeland.

(2) Introduction of pipeline-laying vehicles. These can lay down 50 miles of pipe per day, or nearly enough to sustain the daily military advance of 60 miles called for by the Soviet doctrine of the offensive. Some 9,000 miles of reserve pipe are available for the European theatre.

(3) Motor transport units that are kept loaded with ammunition and fuel during peacetime.

(4) More than 3 million metric tons of ammunition that have been pre-stocked in the Warsaw Pact's Western theatre—a poor place to store it if attack by, rather than on, NATO were expected. There are also millions of tons of fuel, oil, and lubricants.

(5) Seven air assault brigades that have been formed.

(6) Some 30 unmanned mobilization divisions that the Soviets have staffed at very low levels and provided with certain equipment, making them more ready for rapid mobilization.

(7) Production of biological and chemical weapons, as well as the deployment of some 60,000 Soviet Chemical Troops in all echelons. These have no relation to offensive U.S. chemical capabilities, which barely exist. U.S. defenses, where they are available, are known to be so inadequate that it is assumed that 50 percent of the troops wearing protective suits would perish or be incapacitated.

(8) Meticulous plans for overland invasion. Each year in the normal course of commerce, 350,000 trucks from Warsaw Pact countries make their way into Western Europe. Drivers have been sighted measuring the gauge of

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

AP/Wide World Photos

This Soviet missile frigate was spotted 80 miles off Key West.

bridges, exploring roads off their routes, photographing military installations, and performing other varieties of reconnaissance. There is also a discernible rise in truck and canal traffic from Eastern Europe to the West during large-scale Pact exercises, suggesting coordination between the Pact's conventional forces and spies or special forces doing reconnaissance under cover of trade. During one 1985 exercise, the West German Defense Military actually intercepted radio communications that showed a Soviet tank division using the undisguised names of West German cities and towns in a simulated sweep into the West.

Spetsnaz Terror

A final element of surprise would come by land, by sea, and by air, before and during the battle. They are *Spetsnaz,* Soviet special forces that operate under the command of military intelligence, and they have increased in numbers and become more arrogant about operations in Europe in peacetime. At present there are 20,000 to 30,000 of these experts, all highly trained in remote regions of the Soviet interior in skills ranging from parachute jumping to demolition to foreign languages. Their missions are not confined to wartime, and encompass assassination; abduction; disruption of the enemy's rear areas, lines of communication, and command and control centers; and demolition of military targets and public utility grids. *Spetsnaz* work at the beginning of war bears remarkable resemblances to what terrorists do in peacetime, a fact that students of terrorism and its Soviet-bloc ties have too long overlooked.

The most important *Spetsnaz* mission is suggested by the literature on surprise: the destruction of the Allies' nuclear weapons and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in their storage areas before they can be deployed and used. *Spetsnaz* are already being used in Afghanistan to infiltrate critical targets and implant passive radar receivers that guide PGMs launched by Soviet aircraft. According to *Jane's Defense Weekly,* elaborate information from defectors and intelligence officials points to a regular rotation of female *Spetsnaz* agents through the protesters at Britain's Greenham Commons cruise missile sites. The testimony of one defector, Oleg Lyalin, has already led to the arrest, trial, and conviction by British courts of Soviet clandestine agents with special operations assignments.

Without suggesting that proof is available, it would make no sense to dismiss the thought that *Spetsnaz* troops may be among the aforementioned trans-European truck drivers. They may be behind the "pollsters" and "art salesmen" who turn up more regularly at the doors of Swedish active and reservist pilots than they do at the average Swede's home. They could be responsible for the disappearance of a Swedish scientist, Svante Oden, who was conducting classified work on submarine detection. His boat was found stripped of its sensitive equipment. *Spetsnaz* may have had a role in the deaths, disappearances, and unexpected suicides during the past year of British scientists doing classified work on underwater warfare or strategic defense.

No Escape from Grim Realities

Escape for those who seek to avoid these grim realities takes many intellectual forms. The invasion of Afghanistan ruined the once-common refrain that "Whatever the Soviets may do, they have at least remained within their post-war borders." But other excuses for inaction remain and proffer comfort. Three will be mentioned here. The first is in a maxim, said to be venerated by strategists, that an aggressor requires a two, three, or even five to one advantage to successfully wage the offensive. This maxim implies that the frightening imbalance on the NATO/Pact front is no cause for alarm after all.

Unfortunately this maxim is more reassuring than it is true. At the beginning of World War II, the French and Allied forces of 3.4 million men and 3,373 tanks were enveloped and smashed by a Nazi force of three million men and 2,445 tanks. The Nazis suffered from distinct numerical *disadvantages* in almost every military category except air power, and yet prevailed easily. History offers many similar examples, including the battles of Hannibal and Napoleon. So if the untutored citizen's imagination should reel at the thought of trying to protect Europe with

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20,000 tanks when the Warsaw Pact has more than twice as many, with 280 anti-tank guns when the Pact has 1,550, and with 1,800 anti-tank missiles as against 3,500, he does not deserve patronizing reassurance from an expert on "the unfavorable force ratios associated with the attack."

Soviet Technical Capabilities

The second form of escapism is the idea that the West enjoys a considerable technological edge over its totalitarian adversary. Indeed we do. But the Soviet bloc, especially the satellite states of Eastern Europe, has become especially adept at stealing or buying our scientists' inventions. Aggressive deployment of these acquisitions keeps the Soviets abreast, or even ahead, of us in many areas. "Reactive armor," which makes many of our anti-tank weapons obsolete, may have been developed in the West, but it was the Soviets who put it to use. Many of the Soviet tanks in East Germany now have this equipment, leaving American designers rushing to redesign, manufacture, and deploy a successor to the TOW anti-tank missile.

The Soviets already deploy the world's only functional anti-satellite system and protect their capital with land-based strategic defense missiles.

And the Pact has immense and original technological capabilities of its own. According to the Defense Department's 1987 book *Soviet Military Power,* the USSR has the largest national research and development resource base in the world, spending half of all its R&D investment on military projects. The Soviet aircraft industry "is in the midst of a technological revolution." Improved range, payload, and avionics capacities have dramatically improved Soviet air defense capabilities. The Halo helicopter is the world's largest for combat, and carries 85 troops. The new Hokum attack craft is a double-rotor machine with no Western equivalent, capable of speeds of 350 miles per hour, 50 mph faster than our Apache. The Soviet Union carries out an average of 10 times as many space launches as we do each year, most of them for military purposes.

The Soviets already deploy the world's only functional anti-satellite system, and protect their capital with land-based strategic defense missiles. They spend a billion dollars a year on laser research and have developed a ground-based beam that may already be capable of interfering with our satellites. The Soviets lead the world in the production and utilization of military air-cushion vehicles. Their artillery is newer, primarily self-propelled, and enjoys improved range, warhead lethality, and survivability. The Kremlin fields an anti-aircraft gun, the ZSU 23, that is the envy of American battlefield commanders. *Jane's Fighting Ships* has published a capsule history of Western criticism of the Soviets' titanium hull submarines that makes the critics look foolish and the submarines very good, indeed. It is delusory to think that Communists are second-rate engineers, just as it was delusory before World War II to imagine that the Japanese were not inventors and that they poorly understood what they copied.

The Illusion of a Short War

The third illusion that has made it seem safe to leave Western Europe underdefended is the belief that any war will be short, fast, and nuclear. Reactive armor, radical imbalances in weaponry, and other elements of Soviet conventional superiority are therefore thought to be almost irrelevant. But this could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If we do not build a proper conventional defense, then the first sweeping advance by Pact armor will present us with only two alternatives: abandon Europe in a Dunkirk-style retreat, or escalate to nuclear weapons, after which the Soviets would incinerate the cities of Western Europe (if they had not already done so). It has never been U.S. policy to take a retreat or a holocaust for granted. We have relied instead upon "Flexible Response," a ladder of escalation by which retaliation is promised against each greater level of aggression.

The notion of a short war has covered for innumerable sins. While it is common knowledge that NATO has too few soldiers in the lines to turn back a Warsaw Pact attack, it is less well known that the scandalous ammunition shortages of 1979 and 1980 are still being redressed. The United States had then, and has now, only three to four weeks' worth of munitions at best. In some categories there is far less. This is true both on land and at sea. Nor can our forces rely upon Europe; some of our NATO allies literally have only a few-days supply of common munitions. Gearing up the munitions factories and filling the pipeline with their products takes nine to 12 months. For that reason we had a nine-month reserve in the 1950s. The effect of the current shortfall could be decisive in wartime.

Other problems of "sustainability"—or ability to carry on fighting after the initial days of combat—remain unaddressed in 1987. Ironically, some of these were important to candidate Reagan in 1980 and President Reagan in 1981. Our mineral stockpiles, necessary for the surge of production in the first weeks of war, are wholly insufficient. Initially, President Reagan made modest additions to the reserve: cobalt, bauxite, beryllium, iridium, nickel, titanium, etc. Then, like past presidents, he stole the savings for general revenues. Budget Director David Stockman was prepared, in part because of a "short war" scenario obtained from the National Security Council, to sell almost everything. The reserve is now worth approximately $8 billion. Its insufficiency can be judged by the fact that during a peacetime year like 1984 we required $253 billion worth of minerals in various forms for manufacturing.

Our Vanishing Merchant Marine

Another account that candidate Ronald Reagan promised to square was our endangered merchant marine fleet, the only viable means of moving supplies to Europe for the fourth, fifth, sixth, and subsequent weeks of full-scale war. Mr. Reagan expressed concern in September 1980 because

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we had only 524 active deep-sea ships; as of March 1987 we have 164 *fewer* capable merchant ships. It is worth recalling that in the first seven months of 1942 alone the Allies lost 624 merchant ships to far fewer submarines than the Soviets possess today.

Even if we had enough ships, we could not gather the necessary skilled crews, who have drifted into other work as the industry declines. If we resolved tomorrow to train crews and to build the necessary ships, we would initially lack the necessary industrial base: One-third of our building and repair yards closed between 1982 and 1986, affecting 24 percent of the country's skilled ship workers. Subsequently, another yard, employing 500, ceased operation, and five more filed under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.

Of course, even if we had the ships and the crews, we still would have to get them to Europe. Today, without the aid of several allies, we cannot even keep clear of mines certain parts of a relatively small body of water named the Persian Gulf. Yet the Soviet Union has stockpiled some 350,000 mines. If cut off from its European allies, the United States would not even be able to clear its own home waters. In all of NATO there are barely 200 minesweeping vessels, as well as small numbers of helicopters. Yet in 1942, 804 minesweepers were required merely to keep open the seas around the British Isles.

Minimum Requirements for Deterrence

Such wartime realities as these, rather than pleasing illusions about the enemy's disinclination to use his powers, are the only basis for sound planning. We must choose whether to allow the Soviets to enjoy world military supremacy, with all the frightening consequences for liberty that would bring. Only the strong leadership of a strong democratic world can make a barrier too formidable for Soviet commanders and commissars to surmount. To ensure our freedom, the United States, at the bare minimum, needs to immediately:

- Commence work on a serious air defense of the American homeland against bomber and fighter-bomber attack by building surface-to-air missile sites in the United States, beginning in Alaska and the northeastern and southeastern United States. Increase continental U.S. deployments of our "look-down-shoot-down" radar-equipped F-15s, our finest air defense interceptor.
- Deploy strategic defense (SDI) technologies already at hand like Lockheed's ERIS interceptors. Even initial SDI defenses would complicate Soviet targeting and increase the survivability of U.S. vital facilities and nearby population centers. We must press forward simultaneously with work on a more comprehensive, multilayered system that could render senseless a plan to stage a nuclear strike against us.
- Develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile defense for our forces and allies in Europe, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. Such defenses could radically decrease the utility of Soviet shorter-range missiles of various types and warheads and concomitantly increase the security of our allies.
- Obtain a commitment from Congress to double the budget for munitions in the next year, and not by bleeding other areas of the defense budget.
- Build a much larger strategic minerals reserve, making the acquisitions necessary for our security at favorable times and prices.
- Obtain new funds to increase the Operations and Maintenance budget, which is the financial basis for our forces' readiness. We *still* experience spare parts shortages and we *still* cannibalize aircraft, and the problem will only get worse when our expensive and complex new weapons platforms begin to age.

More than 3 million metric tons of ammunition have been pre-stocked in the Warsaw Pact's Western theatre—a poor place to store it if attack by, rather than on, NATO is expected.

- Turn over the regular distribution of aid to democratic resistance movements to the Department of Defense. This would remove the Central Intelligence Agency from control of the operational roles it dislikes and for which it is institutionally unsuited. It is the necessary first step for institutionalizing the Reagan Doctrine.
- Double aid to the Nicaraguan resistance and, where possible, provide more assistance to the Indochinese, Angolan, and Afghan movements. President Reagan was absolutely correct when he declared that "Their fight is our fight." We choose not to commit troops to these battles for national independence and democracy, but it makes eminent strategic sense to supply generously those who do.
- Develop a tough, coherent policy to address Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties and to assure that violations of present and future treaties will be addressed in a militarily significant manner. Britain's dismissal of Nazi violations of security and arms control treaties now appears as folly, and folly of the most dangerous kind. How will our own acts of dismissal appear under the lamp of history?
- Present to the American people, as the Reagan administration formerly did with a conviction merited by the facts, the patterns of Soviet and East European sponsorship of terrorism. Cease the naive practice of sharing intelligence on terrorism and narcotics trafficking with Communist governments.

After all, you can't expect the American taxpayer to make the sacrifices necessary for defense if you pretend the enemy has gone into hibernation.

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SEVENTY YEARS OF EVIL

Soviet Crimes from Lenin to Gorbachev

MICHAEL JOHNS

Seventy years ago this November, Vladimir Lenin created the modern totalitarian state, transforming simpler forms of tyranny into history's most sophisticated apparatus of rule by terror.

During previous centuries, kings, despots, religious crusaders, and conquistadors committed unspeakable crimes against man and God, but never before 1917 were fear and mass murder elevated to a theoretical science. With the Bolshevik Revolution, complete and utter lawlessness—the ideology of inevitable class warfare—was wedded to the institution of the absolute state, resulting in the liquidation of entire nations and classes of people.

The Leninist technology of social control—a ruthlessly organized secret police; mastery of propaganda; the destruction of independent churches, trade unions, political parties, and other social institutions; and the repeated use of merciless mass terror to obliterate perceived resistance—eventually became the model for Nazi Germany. And it is this technology that continues to guide the Soviet leadership to this day.

Gorbachev's Soviet Union is less bloody than Lenin's and Stalin's, but in almost every respect his nation is still the house that Lenin built. The Communist Party exercises dictatorial power in the name of a proletariat that has no voice in choosing it. KGB networks of informers keep control in every neighborhood and workplace; no Soviet citizen gets a job or apartment he wants unless he toes the party line. It is a crime to teach religion to children, to hire employees privately, or to publicly call on Soviet authorities to comply with human rights treaties they have signed. In Ethiopia and Afghanistan, Communist governments are following Lenin's and Stalin's man-made famine tactics with Gorbachev's blessing and massive military aid. And the Soviet Union continues to work tirelessly in pursuit of Lenin's ultimate stated goal—world domination.

Today the sun does not set on the Soviet empire. With client states in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, the Soviets have been able to expand their iron fist over millions through the combined use of military might and deception—two fundamental aspects of Leninism.

The evils of the Soviet empire over the past seven decades have been well documented in works such as *Utopia in Power* by Aleksandr Nekrich and Mikhail Heller, *The Great Terror* by Robert Conquest, Nikolai Tolstoy's *Stalin's Secret War,* Hugh Thomas's *Armed Truce* on the outbreak of the cold war, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's three volumes of *Gulag Archipelago,* and human rights reports by Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, and Freedom House. The following catalogue of evil relies heavily on these sources.

No chronology of Soviet atrocities can convey the crushing of the human spirit by Lenin and his successors. But the retelling of 70 years of grisly facts leaves little doubt that what we face today in Soviet Communism is, indeed, an evil empire.

November 7, 1917—Over eight months after Russian czar overthrown by other left-wing revolutionaries, Bolshevik Party seizes power from new parliamentary regime. Setting pattern for future Communist takeovers elsewhere, Bolsheviks triumph through ruthless terror and internal discipline over larger but naive and disunited center/left-wing parties. In their power grab, the Bolsheviks are greatly influenced by Lenin's 1901 writing: "We have never rejected terror in principle, nor can we do so."

November 7, 1917—Lenin decrees: "All land . . . shall be confiscated without compensation and become the property of the whole people."

November 8, 1917—*Pravda* writes, "We are taking power alone, relying on the country's voice and counting on the friendly support of the European proletariat. But having taken power, we will punish with an iron hand the enemies of the revolution and the saboteurs. . . . "

December 20, 1917—To eliminate opposition, Lenin forms a secret police much more ruthless than the czarist Okhrana: the Cheka, now known as the KGB. Its first leader, Felix Dzerzhinsky, remarks: "We don't need justice at this point. We are engaged today in hand-to-hand combat, to the death, to the end! I propose, I demand, the organization of revolutionary annihilation against all active

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counterrevolutionaries." One of Moscow's most important public squares is now named after Dzerzhinsky.

January 4, 1918—Lenin outlaws Russian Constitutional Democratic Party [Cadets], labeling as "enemies of the people" this anti-Czar party committed to liberal democracy and trade union rights. Two of the party's leaders are then murdered in a hospital.

January 5, 1918—Red Guard guns down workers carrying flag of opposition Russian Social Democratic Labor party as they march toward Tauride Palace in Petrograd.

January 5, 1918—Democracy lasts less than 24 hours, as Bolshevik militia, under Lenin's orders, closes the Constituent Assembly on same day it convenes. Assembly had been elected in only free elections in Soviet history. Bolsheviks won only 24 percent of the seats, while Social Revolutionaries took 40.4 percent.

January 13, 1918—A decree denies churches all property and legal rights, in effect outlawing their existence. Soon after, religious marriage is abolished and the family is declared obsolete. Family is criticized for preventing women from doing work useful to the state and declared irrelevant, since state will gradually take over childrearing. Zlata Lilina, director of public education in Petrograd, calls for "nationalization" of all children and their removal from the oppressive influences of their families, because children "like wax, are highly impressionable" and "good, true Communists" can be made out of them.

June 11, 1918—In face of failing economy, Lenin announces there are "two ways to fight hunger, a capitalist one and a socialist one. The first consists of free trade. . . . Our path is that of grain monopoly." To accomplish this goal, the Cheka and Lenin's "poor peasant committees" begin seizing all agricultural land and setting up roadblocks to close black market. Food is rationed.

July 1918—Soviet constitution strips rights from all *lishenets* [disenfranchised persons], including tradesmen, religious officials, former police collaborators, members of imperial household, and "persons who hire labor with the aim of extracting a profit." Five million Russians fall into this category and are stripped of all educational, political, and ration rights.

July 1918—Cheka crushes peasant uprising in Yaroslavl, executing 57 people on spot. An investigating commission then orders execution of 350 more "ringleaders" of revolt. City's residents are bombed from the air, then presented with ultimatum to leave city or be further subjected to "a merciless hurricane of fire by heavy artillery, and also chemical shells."

July 16, 1918—Presidium of Urals Regional Soviet announces: "The wife and son of [former Czar] Nicholas Romanov have been sent to a safe place." In fact, the czar, his wife, daughters, son, four doctors, a cook, and two servants were all shot.

September 5, 1918—Soviet cabinet authorizes "Red Terror," permitting Cheka to carry out "merciless mass terror" in response to assassination of chairman of Petrograd Cheka and attempted assassination of Lenin. At least 600 are massacred by Cheka forces. Lenin authorizes concentration camps for members of "bourgeoisie."

September 30, 1918—A new code on marriage and family is adopted bringing Communist class philosophies into schools, combining learning with labor. Desks, daily lessons, homework, textbooks, grades, and tests are all discarded in exchange for an educational system based on Communist indoctrination. Its chief slogan is "We do not need literacy without Communism." Schools begin to censor, distort, and manipulate history, literature, and mathematics to serve goals of international Communism.

November 1918—Lenin replaces judicial system with revolutionary tribunals that imprison people for not fulfilling "proletarian conscience and revolutionary duty." "People's commissars" roam streets shooting and arresting citizens suspected of not conforming to Bolshevik political framework. Maxim Gorky quotes an ally of Lenin as saying, "For the good of the Russian people, it would be all right to kill a million" opponents.

January 24, 1919—Organizational Bureau of Bolshevik Central Committee announces that "in view of experience with the Cossacks in civil war" the only policy is "to wage the most ruthless possible war against all Cossack upper elements, exterminating them to the last man."

February 15, 1919—Lenin orders Cheka to take hostage peasants from those localities where snow removal from railroad tracks "was not proceeding satisfactorily," and "if snow removal did not take place they were to be shot."

March 1919—Abandoning ruse of "people's power," Lenin asserts "principle of personal authority, the moral authority of one man whose decisions are accepted without lengthy discussions."

March 1919—Bolshevik magazine *Communist International* reveals global goals of Communism in its first issue: "Civil war has flared up throughout Europe. The victory of Communism in Germany is absolutely inevitable. In a year Europe will have forgotten about the fight for Communism, because all of Europe will be Communist. Then the struggle for Communism in America will begin, and possibly in Asia and other continents."

December 26, 1919—Lenin signs decree by Council of People's Commissars initiating grand campaign to combat illiteracy while indoctrinating illiterate with Leninist ideals. Refusal to participate in "literacy program" is made a crime.

1920—In *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,* Lenin writes: "We must resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers, illegal methods, evasions and subterfuge . . . to carry on Communist work."

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1920—Soviets train Indian terrorists at Tashkent, and Lenin orders them to conduct a terrorist bombing against Britain.

August 1920—Second Congress of Comintern adopts "21 conditions" for any party wishing to join its ranks. They include obligation to help Soviet Republic in its struggle against counterrevolution, employing all means legal and illegal to this end; obligation to fight against government of one's own country; and obligation to form an underground organization.

August 7, 1920—Lenin calls for revolution without frontiers in speech to French delegates at Second Congress of the Comintern: "Yes, Soviet troops are in Warsaw. Soon Germany will be ours. We will reconquer Hungary. The Balkans will rise against capitalism. Italy will tremble. Bourgeois Europe is cracking at all its seams in this storm."

September 1920—Lenin demands that independent Armenian government surrender to Soviets. However, before deadline expires, Soviet Army invades Armenian territory, forms a coalition government of Communists and non-Communist nationalists, and declares all Soviet laws binding for Armenia. Non-Communists are later expelled from the government and suppressed.

October 2, 1920—Lenin defines "Communist ethics" in opposition to morality of "bourgeoisie, who declared that ethics were God's commandments. We . . . do not believe in God. . . . We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . For the Communist, morality consists entirely of compact united discipline and conscious mass struggle against the exploiters."

November 26, 1920—Lenin lays groundwork for Soviet foreign policy: "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet republic or over world capitalism." Predicting which system he thinks will triumph, Lenin remarks: "As soon as we are strong enough to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall take it by the scruff of the neck."

December 14, 1920—Nikolai Bukharin, a member of Politburo, boasts that Bolsheviks had come to power "by marching over corpses." He adds: "Yes, we will produce standardized intellectuals, produce them as though in a factory."

1921—In memorandum to Foreign Affairs Commissar Grigory Chicherin, Lenin writes: "Telling the truth is a bourgeois prejudice. Deception, on the other hand, is often justified by the goal."

1921—Soviet agricultural policies of forced labor, collectivization, and redistribution lead to mass famine killing millions and, as described by Russian writer Mikhail Osorgin, cannibalism: "People mainly ate members of their own families as they died, feeding on the older children, but not sparing newborn infants either, those who had hardly had the chance to live, despite the fact that there wasn't much to them. People ate off to themselves, not sitting together at a table, and no one talked about it."

January 1921—Politburo passes resolution calling for overthrow of independent Georgian government. As Soviet army crosses border, violating diplomatic and consular agreement reached in 1920, Britain denies Georgia's appeals for assistance. On March 18, Georgian government surrenders and Soviets take control.

August 21, 1921—United States, under auspices of American Relief Administration (ARA), starts sending famine relief to USSR. In May 1922, *Pravda* acknowledges that ARA had fed over 7 million people. However, once famine is conquered, Soviets maintain ARA was merely a vehicle for United States to find "outlets for American goods" and "engage in espionage and subversion and support counterrevolutionary elements."

1922—To eliminate rival left-wing organizations, Lenin arrests most Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries not already in prison. Martyn Latsis, a Cheka official, remarks: "People of this sort are more than a mere hindrance to us. That is why we remove them from our path, so they won't get under our feet. . . . We put them away in a secluded, cozy place, in the Butyrki [prison], and we are going to keep them there until the struggle between capital and labor comes to an end."

1922—Atheist publishing house begins operations along with weekly newspaper of same name. By 1923, monthly Soviet magazine, *The Godless at the Workplace,* begins publishing crude anti-Semitic cartoons later used by the Nazis.

1922—Soviet Central Statistical Bureau concedes that over five million died in man-made famine of 1921-22. Total casualties of Bolshevik Revolution, including those killed during civil war of 1918-1920: over 15 million dead, or 10 percent of Russian population.

1922—Maxim Gorky articulates Leninist vision of breeding a "new Communist man" when he tells Berlin interviewer: "The half-savage, stupid, difficult people of the Russian villages will die out . . . and their place will be taken by a new tribe of the literate, the intelligent, the vigorous."

February 26, 1922—Government decree orders that all church valuables be confiscated, resulting in over 1,400 recorded bloody clashes between church people and government troops. Hearing of the resistance, Lenin orders that as many "representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie and reactionary clergy" as possible be arrested, placed on public trial, and shot. During 1922, some 8,100 priests, monks, and nuns are executed.

March 1, 1922—Cheka is officially dissolved and its duties transferred to State Political Administration, the GPU. One

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AP/Wide World Photos

Vladimir Lenin:
Inventor of the modern totalitarian state

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

Felix Dzerzhinsky founded the Cheka, now the KGB. Under Gorbachev, he's still a hero.

of GPU's first assignments is assassination of poets and scholars accused of "counterrevolutionary" activities. Lenin urges that "the paragraph of terror must be formulated as widely as possible, since only revolutionary consciousness of justice can determine the conditions of its application." Like Nazi SS, GPU has self-purging mechanism to remove those who lose their sense of total commitment.

October 1925—Politburo orders Mikhail Frunze, Commissar of War and political rival of Joseph Stalin, to undergo surgery for an ulcer. The surgery is unnecessary and Frunze dies on operating table, first in pattern of mysterious deaths of Stalin's political opponents.

November 28, 1925—Poet Sergei Esenin commits suicide after his writings are censored and he is attacked by *On Guard*, the equivalent of a literary Cheka.

May 6, 1926—Soviet agents execute three officials of the Commissariat of Finance "for speculation in gold, foreign currency, and government bonds."

1928—To build massive gold reserves, Stalin arrests thousands of citizens on trumped-up charges and sends them to slave labor camps in the Kolyma gold mining region. Anyone suspected of concealing a gold watch or wedding ring is tortured until gold is turned over.

1928—Still another new family and marriage code is adopted with intention of revolutionizing and destroying traditional marriages. Under new code, either husband or wife can dissolve a marriage without informing spouse. A postcard to registry office is all that is required. Mikhail Koltsov writes in *Pravda:* "A divorce now costs three rubles. No more formalities, no papers, no summons, not even the need to inform in advance the persons you are divorcing. Subscribing to a magazine is harder. . . . For three rubles why not indulge yourself?"

May 1928—American, German, and Polish police uncover Soviet counterfeiting operation in which millions of fake hundred-dollar bills are deposited in Western banks.

May 18, 1928—Stalin's use of public trials begins as 53 employees of the coal mines in Shakhty are accused of sabotage and espionage; many sign confessions under torture, the only evidence used against them. By summer of 1928, Soviet media are hyping these "class" trials into major hate campaigns including one in which a 12-year-old son asked that his father be shot.

1929—In "workers paradise," workers are forced to labor seven days a week in horrendous conditions. A GPU agent reported workers' complaints about factory canteens: "In the so-called soup it is hard to find pieces of anything. It is not soup, but vegetable water; there is no fat, and the meat is not always washed sufficiently. . . . [In some cases] little worms were found in the lunch."

April 1929—Sixteenth Party Conference calls for major purge of all party members who support opposition platform against Stalin.

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May 22, 1929—Amendment to the Soviet constitution—"the law on religious cults"—officially declares propagation of religion a crime against the state. Children of priests are forced to renounce their fathers to receive food rations and educational benefits.

December 27, 1929—Stalin announces new offensive toward collectivization including "liquidation" of the more enterprising peasants: "After a policy that consisted in limiting the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks, we have switched to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class."

April 14, 1930—Suicide of futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovksy, who in 1917 proclaimed "long live art free of politics," symbolizes futility of his dream under Stalin.

August 1930—A group of bacteriologists is accused of infecting horses with the plague, convicted at closed trial, and sentenced to be shot.

September 1930—Forty-eight food industry officials are accused of organizing Russian famine, convicted at closed trial, and sentenced to be shot.

November 15, 1930—*Pravda* and *Izvestia* publish Gorky's article, "If the Enemy Does Not Surrender, He Must Be Destroyed."

December 13, 1931—Stalin tells German writer Emil Ludwig: "Everyone knows that we Bolsheviks do not limit ourselves to intimidation; we go much farther, to the point of liquidating this bourgeois segment."

1932—Class war is carried into arts as magazine *Worker and Theater* denounces composers who "master the creative method of Beethoven" instead of "the method of dialectical materialism."

1932—Stalin's collectivization policy results in resistance from the peasantry, leading to famine even more severe than that of 1921-22. This time seven to eight million starve to death, mostly in agriculturally rich Ukraine, where Stalin uses starvation as weapon to break peasant opposition. Western journalists, most prominently Walter Duranty of *New York Times*, cooperate with Soviet disinformation campaign denying famine's existence.

1932—Stalin introduces South African-style internal passports to prevent workers from shifting residence or employment without permission.

May 15, 1932—A five-year anti-religion plan proclaims: "By the first of May 1937 not a single house of prayer will be needed any longer in any territory of the Soviet Union, and the very notion of God will be expunged as a survival of the Middle Ages and an instrument for holding down the working masses."

August 1932—New law enforces state ownership of all land through "the supreme measure of social defense: execution by shooting, with confiscation of all property."

November 21, 1933—Though Soviets assure President Roosevelt that they will not disseminate Communist propaganda in the United States, Communist Party USA passes platform announcing that "the Communist International acting upon Russian territory and controlled by the Soviet Union has . . . directed the Communist Party of the United States and the Young Communist League of America to use every available means to prepare for the forceful overthrow of our [the United States] Government, by propaganda and the organization of revolutionary trade unions, leagues, committees, and groups, and for the substitution in its place of a Soviet form of government to be affiliated with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

1934—Stalin orders arrests and executions of historians, microbiologists, agronomists, physiologists, aircraft designers, and other scholars. Professor S. Pisarev, for example, threatened with murder of his children, is forced to sign denunciation of his friend Nikolai Vavilov, a prominent plant geneticist who is killed in 1940. Poet Osip Mandelstam is arrested and later dies in prison camp.

1934—To complete the elimination of "kulak" class, Stalin ships hundreds of thousands in unheated boxcars to remote parts of the Urals, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. Walter Krivitsky, head of Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe before his defection to West, described the scene: "In the waiting area there were nearly 600 peasants—men, women, and children—being driven from one camp to another like cattle. . . . Many were lying down, almost naked, on the cold floor. Others were obviously dying of typhoid fever. Hunger, torment, and despair were written on every face."

December 1, 1934—Sergei Kirov, member of Politburo, is murdered in Leningrad on Stalin's orders.

March 1935—Stalin urges Nazi Germany to break Versailles Treaty when he tells Anthony Eden: "Sooner or later the German people are bound to free themselves from the chains of Versailles. . . . "

April 8, 1935—Stalin introduces "law on children" holding children 12 years and older accountable for failure to denounce "treason" by their parents. Nazis pass similar law in 1944.

July 4, 1936—Central Committee eliminates entire science of "so-called pedology" because it is based on "pseudo-scientific, anti-Marxist assumptions." This paves way for future elimination of genetics, sociology, psychoanalysis, cybernetics, and other academic disciplines. Academy of Sciences passes resolution declaring: "We will resolve all problems that arise before us with the only scientific method, the method of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."

August 19-24, 1936—In first of four Moscow purge trials, Grigory Zinoviev, Sergei Kamenev, and 14 "accomplices" are sentenced to death in the "trial of sixteen." In following two-and-a-half years, Stalin purges 850,000 party members, one-third of entire party, and kills more than three

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Without the Stalin-Hitler Pact, Nazi Germany could never have started World War II.

million Soviet citizens. Endless trials are held, both private and public, charging hundreds of thousands with imaginary crimes and frequently sentencing them to death.

November 25, 1936—Stalin remarks: "The landlord class . . . the capitalist class . . . the kulak class . . . and the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have all ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting class have now been liquidated."

1937—Stalin holds magnificent banquet in Kremlin to celebrate theft by Soviet agents of entire Spanish gold reserve, which was secretly shipped to Moscow.

1937—Quotas are set for arbitrary arrests of individuals labeled "enemies of the people." Vladimir Petrov, an employee in cryptography division of Soviet secret police in Moscow, recalls texts sent to regional and district secret police urging extermination of "10,000 enemies of the people."

January 23-30, 1937—Second public purge trial in Moscow tries Yuri Pyatakov, and 16 others in "trial of seventeen"; 13 are executed.

May 1937—Stalin intensifies mass purges within Red Army, eliminating nearly half the regimental commanders, nearly all brigade commanders, and all commanders of army corps and military districts, as well as military councils and heads of political directorates in military districts. Defectors testify that Stalin openly welcomes assistance of Hitler's Gestapo in carrying out purges. Stalin authorizes execution of tens of thousands and manipulates "confessions" of victims to implicate others he wants tortured and executed.

June 13, 1937—Commissariat of Defense arrests top military advisors, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, on trumped-up charges, and orders that they all be shot in third Stalin purge.

1938—In *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps,* Elinor Lipper describes Vladivostok transit camp in 1938, where prisoners are gathered before being sent to brutal Kolyma gold field for slave labor: "The camp infirmary was so crowded with the sick, who lay on every cot and along all the floors of the wards and corridors, that any kind of care was impossible. Some of the women from our barrack were called in to act as nurses. Their chief occupation was counting the dead who had escaped the misery of the gold mines which awaited the others. In silence we stared through the barbed wire at the hearses which drove out the camp every night. Piled high with naked bodies, the load tied on with cord and covered with canvas, the trucks drove out, carrying the victims to eternal freedom."

March 1938—In fourth public purge trial in Moscow—the "trial of twenty-one"—Aleksei Rykov, Nikolai Bukha-

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rin, Cristian Rakovsky, Genrikh Yagoda, and 17 other Communist leaders face charges. Eighteen are executed.

1939—Western researchers conservatively estimate that Stalin has jailed eight million as of 1939; those jailed in 1937 and 1938 begin to die as a result of harsh concentration camp conditions. Robert Conquest, a scholar of the Stalin age and Soviet prison camps, whose figures are "based on conservative assumptions at every point," has arrived at total death toll in the Kolyma prison camp alone of three million. Using the same cautious principle, he estimates 12 million died throughout gulag system.

March 10, 1939—At Eighteenth Party Congress, Stalin connects "democracy," Soviet-style, to mass terror: "In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held. In these elections, 98.6 percent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet government. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengolts, Rykov, Bukharin, and other monsters were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the supreme soviets of the union republics were held. In these elections 99.4 percent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet government."

April 17, 1939—Soviet ambassador in Berlin tells German Foreign Ministry he sees no obstacles to improvement in Nazi-Soviet relations.

May 3, 1939—In a move applauded in Berlin, the Soviets dismiss Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, a Jew and frequent target of Nazi propaganda, and replace him with Vyacheslav Molotov.

August 23, 1939—Soviets sign nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, paving way for Hitler's and Stalin's invasion of Poland and allowing Germany to attack Britain and France without fear of an eastern front. Stalin-Hitler treaty violates earlier nonaggression treaty Stalin signed with France, promising that in event of aggressive war against France by a third nation, Soviet Union would not "give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor."

September 1, 1939—One week after Stalin-Hitler pact, and as a direct result of its signing, Nazis invade Poland, officially commencing World War II.

September 17, 1939—Soviets invade Poland, violating Treaty of Riga between Warsaw and Moscow. Soviets then sign secret agreement with Nazis establishing Soviet and Nazi spheres of influence. Each nation agrees to inform other about "Polish agitation," guaranteeing mutual cooperation in the extermination of Polish resistance. Molotov goes on to denounce British and French: "It is not only absurd, it is criminal to wage a war to 'smash Hitlerism,' under the false slogan of a war for democracy." Soviets begin sending nearly half a million Poles to slave labor camps in Siberia and Urals.

October 1939—Soviets propose that Nazis build naval base just northwest of Murmansk for use in German attack on Norway. Commander-in-chief of Nazi navy, Admiral Raeder, thanks Soviet government for its help, and Soviets reply they were pleased to be of assistance.

November 1-2, 1939—Soviets annex western Ukraine and western Byelorusia from Poland. To combat Ukrainian resistance, Soviets begin mass deportations to Siberia, relocations of entire villages to eastern Ukraine, and political indoctrination of citizens; they also shoot some 10,000 suspected opponents.

November 30, 1939—Soviets begin aggression against Finland, violating Treaty of Dorpat. As pretext, Stalin orders military command in Leningrad to shell Soviet village of Mainila, then blames it on Finns. Soviet press responds with calls for retaliation and Soviet divisions roll across the Finnish border. As a result, Soviets are expelled from League of Nations.

December 25, 1939—In reply to birthday greetings from Hitler, Stalin cables the Nazi dictator: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm."

February 10, 1940—Soviets sign second major trade agreement with Nazis, sending substantial quantities of raw materials crucial to Nazi military buildup.

April 8-11, 1940—Soviets murder 15,000 Polish officers in Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, in first of many efforts to destroy Poland's nationalist and non-Communist leadership. Over 4,500 buried corpses are later found, many with bullet holes in back of head. At Potsdam in 1945, Truman asks Stalin what happened to officers, and Stalin replies, "They went away."

June 1940—Molotov conveys warmest congratulations to German ambassador in Moscow on Nazis' "brilliant successes" in defeat of France.

June 1940—Soviets invade and occupy the sovereign countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, violating nonaggression treaties signed with each nation. Each nation is subsequently incorporated into Soviet empire. Cultural and political elite of each nation is killed by Soviets; thousands are deported to Siberia.

June 26, 1940—Worker absenteeism and tardiness are made criminal offenses and changes of employment are disallowed without express permission of management.

June 27, 1940—With their invasion of Romania, the Soviets violate both Kellogg-Briand Pact and Pact of Paris for sixth time in less than a year. Previous invasions include Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

June 28, 1940—Soviets capture Bessarabia and annex Northern Bukovina from Romania, violating Pact of Paris and the nonaggression treaty of 1933.

August 20, 1940—Soviet agent in Mexico assassinates

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Leon Trotsky, driving an ice ax through back of his head. Kremlin awards assassin title of "Hero of the Soviet Union" and *Pravda* hails action.

November 12, 1940—Molotov arrives in Berlin to discuss Soviet-Nazi relations. German minutes reveal that Molotov receives plan for division of world between Germany, Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and Japan. Twelve days later, Soviets send Hitler letter agreeing to plan with certain territorial qualifications.

1941—Slave labor force in Soviet Union tops 6.5 million.

June 21, 1941—General Semen Timoshenko warns commanders of border regions of imminent Nazi attack, but continues Soviet policy of alignment with Nazi interests, remarking: "The task of our troops is to resist any provocation which could lead to major complications."

August 1941—Soviets abolish autonomous republics of Volga Germans, deporting its inhabitants to north and east. The German settlers, who came to region two centuries earlier, are accused without evidence of collaborating with Nazis. This action paves the way for later Soviet deportation of over one million civilians of autonomous Northern Caucasus regions. In most cases, they are shipped in cattlecars to "special settlements" in Siberia and Urals where tens of thousands die of starvation and disease.

November 1941—Soviet government rejects offer from International Red Cross to exchange lists of Nazi and Soviet prisoners, guaranteeing execution of millions of Russian soldiers.

April 8, 1942—Soviets imprison American bomber crew from B-52 that participated in "Doolittle's Raid" on Japan, and then made a crash landing in Vladivostok.

November 1943—Soviets dissolve Karachai Autonomous Region and deport Karachais to eastern parts of USSR. In coming months, Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush, and Crimean Tatar Republics are all dissolved and their inhabitants sent to east, where they have been forced to remain to this day—a Soviet version of South African apartheid.

August 1944—During uprising against Nazis by residents of Warsaw, Soviet army enters eastern suburbs of Polish capital, but stops its advance there, standing idle as Germans massacre the Polish resistance. Soviets subsequently take over Nazi concentration camps in Poland, using many of them, such as Maidanak, to jail members of the Polish Home Army.

August 31, 1944—After King Michael is pressured by Soviets to oust Romanian dictator Antonescou, Soviet tanks roll into Bucharest and Soviets install their own cronies. Occupying Soviet army and new Romanian dictator later turn the nation into Soviet satellite, in violation of Yalta agreement.

September 9, 1944—With Soviet support, veterans of Comintern come to power in Bulgaria, executing over 2,000 in first six months alone.



UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

The Soviets murdered over 15,000 Polish officers in Katyn Forest.

October 2, 1944—Violating a defense alliance agreement with Britain, Soviets deny Britain and United States the use of shuttle bases in Ukraine to drop supplies for Polish Home Army fighting Nazis. Refusal paves way for slaughter of 200,000 non-Communist resistance fighters.

1945—Soviets murder or send to labor camp most of 3 million prisoners of war returned from Germany by British and Americans.

February 1945—British Special Operations Executive report describes Soviet army in Poland as "plundering the population in an alarming manner . . . stripping the people of provisions, taking watches and valuables, and raping women."

March 1945—Soviet military authorities lure chiefs of Polish resistance into believing Soviets want to negotiate. As 16 resistance leaders arrive for "negotiations," they are arrested, taken to Moscow, and tried. All but one are sentenced to Soviet prison camps.

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April 1945—Soviets capture and imprison Raoul Wallenberg, an official in Swedish embassy in Budapest responsible for saving over 20,000 Jews from Nazis.

April 1945—Red Army rolls into Austria. Over 87,000 women are raped by Soviet soldiers within first three weeks while other Austrians are kidnaped for forced labor in Soviet Union. Soviets confiscate household goods including furniture, watches, clothing, and silverware.

April 11, 1945—Soviet secret police arrest entire hierarchy of Catholic church, plus hundreds of clergy and lay leaders. Out of 3,600 priests and monks, only 216 remain.

June 29, 1945—In violation of a friendship agreement signed between two countries, Czechoslovakia is forced to cede Carpatho-Ukraine to Soviets.

August 9, 1945—Six days before surrender of Japan, Soviets invade Japanese-controlled Manchuria, confiscating food and other stockpiles, removing machinery and equipment, and seizing $3 billion worth of gold stocks and half billion yuan from Manchurian banks.

November 1945—Soviet troops in Iran refuse to depart, and support short-lived Communist revolts in northern regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Revolts later crumble because of U.S. support for Iran.

November 1945—Stalin masses Soviet troops along Bulgarian-Turkish border, demanding territorial concessions from Turkey that would guarantee Soviet access to Mediterranean.

1946—After promising free and open elections in Poland at Tehran and Yalta conferences, Stalin sets up provisional government that never holds the promised elections and turns Poland into a Soviet satellite.

February 9, 1946—In speech before Supreme Soviet, Stalin takes all credit for victory in World War II and suggests the war was "an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism."

June 14, 1946—Violating nonaggression pact between Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Soviets force Afghanistan to cede territory of Kushka.

1947—Famine again sweeps Ukraine and most of European Russia as Kremlin demands that farmers reach unrealistic production quotas. Thousands die of starvation, but Stalin rejects a request by Ukrainians that they be allowed to retain some of their produce to feed their population.

January 13, 1948—Chairman of Jewish Antifascist Committee, Solomon Mikhoels, is assassinated by Soviet secret police agents. After killing, agents arrange for truck to run over his corpse to make assassination look like an accident. Two weeks later, an anti-Semitic campaign is initiated in culture and science under auspices of combating "rootless cosmopolitanism." By 1952, almost all members of Jewish Antifascist Committee are executed.

February 25, 1948—Soviets interfere in Czechoslovakia, supporting overthrow of democratically elected President Edvard Benes and takeover by Soviet puppet Klement Gottwald. As Red Army masses along Czech border, Gottwald demands and receives resignation of all non-Communists in cabinet, threatening to "eliminate" several hundred politicians if they do not step down. Two days later, Benes is forced into exile; Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk falls to death from a window in a "suicide."

July 2, 1948—In violation of agreements with United States, Britain, and France, Soviets blockade West Berlin for almost one year, attempting to force city under Soviet control. Truman orders airlift to save city.

August 1948—Stalin's favorite agrobiologist Trofim Lysenko calls for a debate with his opponents on topic of heredity in the origin of species. Not knowing that Lysenko had just succeeded in convincing Central Committee to deny existence of genes and theory of heredity, the scientists are forced to recant their views.

1950—In Czechoslovakia, secret police instructed by Soviet advisors begin mass arrests of priests and parish workers for "deception." By 1951, 6,174 monks and nuns are imprisoned. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia carries out its own Stalinist purge, executing 278 senior party officials.

1950—Prisoners are mass executed in camps of Gulag.

June 25, 1950—North Korea invades South Korea with encouragement and significant economic and military support from Soviet Union.

August 15, 1950—British government reports to U.N. Economic and Social Council that 10 million Russians are currently performing forced labor.

1951—In effort to destroy Uniate church, a denomination affiliated with Roman Catholicism, Soviets assassinate Bishop Romsha of Transcarpathia.

January 1951—At a Kremlin conference for leaders of socialist countries, Stalin argues that time is right for an offensive against capitalist Europe. Following this speech, military spending in eastern Europe increases dramatically, as high as 40 percent in some nations.

1952—Stalin launches his second great purge, but this time includes Eastern bloc. Trials are held for Communist leaders considered too independent or guided by "Titoism." In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, accused are tortured, then executed or sentenced to long prison terms. Stalin also steps up domestic anti-Semitic activities.

August 12, 1952—A dozen leading Jewish intellectuals are executed, including Yiddish novelist David Bergelson and Yiddish poets Itzik Feffer and Peretz Markish.

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UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

The limits of "de-Stalinization": Khrushchev and Andropov crush Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956.

January 13, 1953—Ranking officials of the Ministry of State Security torture Kremlin's Jewish doctors until they confess to a plot to murder Soviet leaders through improper medical treatment. One doctor, Y.G. Etinger, dies under interrogation. The rest are scheduled for execution, saved only by Stalin's death.

June 17, 1953—Soviet tanks roll over protesting workers in East Berlin, killing 500. While protests are spontaneous, calling for lower production quotas and lower prices combined with a reunification of Germany and free elections, Soviets portray their own actions as crushing of fascist rebellion.

February 1954—Nikolai Khoklov, Soviet secret police agent, defects to West revealing Soviet plan to assassinate Georgi Sergeevich Okolovich, head of a Russian emigre organization in Germany.

June 26, 1954—On orders of Moscow, 3,000 soldiers armed in tanks crush a revolt of political and other prisoners at Kengir and Dzhezkazgan prison camps.

July 7, 1955—In violation of agreement signed in Geneva guaranteeing independence of Indochina nations and prohibiting introduction of foreign troops and armaments in region, Soviets ship weapons to Communist Viet Minh forces in South Vietnam.

1956—A student group called Freedom of Speech is founded in Siberia; all its members are arrested within the year.

February 24, 1956—At Twentieth Party Congress, Nikita Khrushchev vows to carry on Stalin's legacy of terror, remarking: "The questioning of Stalin's terror, in turn, may lead to the questioning of terror in general. But Bolshevism believes in the use of terror. Lenin held that no one was worthy of the name Communist who did not believe in terror. . . ."

June 28, 1956—A demonstration of Polish workers calling for "Bread" and "Soviet Troops out of Poland" is met with Soviet tanks. Tanks are not removed until Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish leader, assures Soviet leaders he will cultivate friendly relations with Soviet Union.

July 1956—With Soviet support, Egypt's Colonel Nasser seizes Suez Canal from British and French. Further Soviet offensive military weapons and advisors arrive in Egypt for Nasser, leading directly to armed confrontation with Israel in 1967 and again in 1973.

October 23, 1956—Khrushchev sends 3,000 Soviet tanks to crush democratic uprising in Hungary. To camouflage Soviet military preparations, Soviet ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, invites Hungarian Defense Minister

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Pal Maleter to dinner, presumably to discuss removal of Soviet troops; however, during dinner Soviet secret police storm in, arrest Maleter, and drag him away to be shot. After two weeks of brave struggle by Hungarian resistance, unaided by the West, Soviets finally crush freedom fighters, overthrow nationalist leader Imre Nagy, and begin mass executions and deportations. Soviet action violates 1948 Soviet-Hungarian alliance treaty, 1955 Warsaw Pact, and United Nations Charter.

November 22, 1956—Upon leaving Yugoslav embassy in Budapest on Soviet promise of safe passage, former Hungarian leader Nagy is kidnaped by Soviet officers, deported to Romania, and murdered.

1957—Soviet agents in West Germany assassinate Lev Rebet, a leader of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

1957—Khrushchev launches campaign against so-called parasites. While campaign is initially intended to combat "speculators, alcoholics, and hooligans," it quickly turns into a campaign to terrorize those in unregulated professions such as writers and poets. Many are arrested and sent to live in remote regions of Soviet Union.

October 23, 1958—At urging of party, Soviet writers union calls for deportation of Boris Pasternak, winner of Nobel Literature Prize for *Doctor Zhivago,* a novel published initially in Italy about persecution of the intelligentsia after the Bolshevik Revolution. Pasternak is forced to write a letter of apology to *Pravda*. Later Pasternak writes a poem about his persecution: "I am caught like a beast at bay. Somewhere are people, freedom, light, but all I hear is the baying of the pack. There is no way out for me." He dies two years later.

1959—Soviet agents in West Germany assassinate Stepan Bandera, leader of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. His KGB assassin, Bohdan Stashinsky, later defects to West: "I did not want to go on being used on murder assignments. I wanted to warn all those who live in danger of being liquidated . . . to take precautions."

July 6, 1960—Khrushchev proclaims his desire for global conquest: "In the short time I have to live, I would like to see the day when the Communist flag flies over the world."

August 15, 1961—Soviets erect Berlin wall, dividing free Berlin from its enslaved Eastern half. The wall eventually contains trip wires and electronic gear that open fire on anyone attempting to cross to other side.

September 1961—Khrushchev violates his commitment to comply with the 1958 moratorium on nuclear testing, exploding dozens of tests including a 58 megaton bomb, the largest nuclear explosion ever conducted.

June 1, 1962—Soviet police shoot directly into crowds that are protesting higher meat and butter prices and lower wages in Novocherkassk. Several hundred villagers are killed.

October 1962—American U-2 plane discovers that, contrary to repeated assurances from Moscow, Soviets have deployed surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Missiles have a range of 1,000 miles and are capable of killing 80 million Americans. Attorney General Robert Kennedy says Khrushchev's words "had all been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies."

1964—The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences begins circulating anti-Semitic book titled *Judaism Without Embellishment*. Many illustrations are reprinted from Nazi periodical *Der Sturmer*. This is followed by racist propaganda offensive against Israel and Zionism.

May 24, 1964—KGB sets library of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences aflame, destroying cultural treasures that they feel spur Ukrainian nationalism.

October 1964—Neo-Stalinists assert influence, purging Khrushchev from his position as General Secretary. While Khrushchev's reign was fully in Leninist legacy of totalitarianism and expansionism, his removal ends hopes of any "de-Stalinization."

1965—Massive arrests are initiated in Ukraine, targeting the younger intelligentsia.

February 1966—Writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel are placed on show trial and sentenced to seven and five years in jail for writings critical of Soviet state.

1967—For his role in founding the *samizdat* magazine *Phoenix*, Aleksandr Ginzburg is arrested and sentenced to labor camp.

May 22, 1967—An independent poetry recital in Kiev is met with force as Soviet police arrest participants. When area residents protest the jailing, they are removed from their jobs.

1968—Regarding role of Soviet nuclear arsenals in global conquest, Soviet Colonel B. A. Byely writes in *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*: "On the Communist side, nuclear war will be lawful and just . . . the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism."

March-April 1968—Members of All-Russia Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, an underground group critical of totalitarian characteristics of Soviet state, are arrested and sentenced to harsh Vladimir prison.

April 21, 1968—A gathering of Crimean Tatars in Chirchik is dispersed by police and troops.

August 21, 1968—Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invade Czechoslovakia, capturing its leaders and crushing "Prague Spring," Alexander Dubcek's experiment in "socialism with a human face." Russians protesting invasion are arrested and sentenced to long terms in prison. *Pravda* de-

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UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

Petr Grigorenko: Five years in psychiatric hospital for defending rights of Crimean Tatars

AP/Wide World Photos

Anatoly Shcharansky: Eight years in prison and labor camp for advocating emigration and other human rights

fends invasion as a Soviet obligation in "class struggle." Article later becomes basis for Brezhnev Doctrine, maintaining that once a nation enters Soviet bloc, it will not be permitted to leave.

May 1969—Petr Grigorenko, a World War II hero critical of Soviet treatment of Crimean Tatars, is arrested and sent to psychiatric hospital where he is confined for five years and given large injections intended to cure him of "reformism."

1970—A group of Jews is arrested at the Leningrad airport and erroneously accused of trying to hijack an airplane in order to leave the country. Two of accused receive death sentences while the other nine receive long sentences in prison camps. The severe sentences generate global indignation, forcing Soviets to spare lives of the two.

March 30, 1971—At Twenty-fourth Party Congress, Leonid Brezhnev reiterates Leninist vision of world domination: "Total victory for the socialist cause in the entire world is inevitable. And we will not spare efforts to achieve that triumph."

January 11-15, 1972—Massive searches and arrests are initiated in Moscow in effort to stop underground publication of *Chronicle of Current Events*.

May 14, 1972—A 20-year-old Lithuanian worker, Romas Kalenta, kills himself to protest Soviet persecution of Lithuanian Catholic church. Four days later, an anti-Soviet protest at Kalenta's wake draws thousands, but is bloodily crushed by Soviet troops.

January 27, 1973—After Paris Peace Accord is signed with North Vietnam promising Vietnamese cease-fire and removal of foreign troops from South Vietnam, 145,000 North Vietnamese Army [NVA] troops refuse departure and 70,000 more are sent from North to destabilize the South. North Vietnam, urged on by Soviets, illegally funnels Soviet tanks, artillery, and other materiel to its army in the South and shoots down aircraft of international observers.

February 12, 1974—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is arrested and expelled from Soviet Union after his extraordinary recounting of Soviet prison life, *Gulag Archipelago*, is published in Paris.

November 1975—Soviets send Cuban surrogates to Angola to help Communist MPLA seize power and prevent free elections promised by Alvor Agreement between Portugal, MPLA, and anti-Communist independence movements headed by Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi.

February 1977—A year and a half after signing Helsinki agreement, Soviets arrest members of Helsinki Watch group that monitors Soviet compliance with human rights provisions.

February 3, 1977—In bloody coup supported by Moscow, Communist dictator Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam seizes power. By 1978, Mengistu launches his own "Red Terror," killing an estimated 10,000. In 1980s, as Stalinist tactics of "villagization" and forced resettlement lead to massive famine, Soviets send $4 billion in arms to Ethiopia between 1977 and 1985. Food aid has to come from United States.

March 6, 1977—Yosyp Terelia, Catholic lay leader in the Ukraine, describes government persecution against Catholics, writing on a scrap of cloth to Pope Paul VI: "Our

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priests groan in labor camps and psychiatric wards.... I live in a country in which it is a crime to be a Christian. Never before have the faithful of the Church of Christ been exposed to such persecutions as today."

March 14, 1977—Four Syrian terrorists arrested in 1975 by Dutch police admit, under questioning, that they were trained in weaponry, explosives, and propaganda in Soviet Union.

March 15, 1977—Prominent dissident Anatoly Shcharansky is arrested by Soviet secret police, charged with treason and anti-Soviet agitation, and later sentenced to prison and labor camps until his highly publicized release in 1986.

August 28, 1977—In Honolulu, World Psychiatric Congress condemns Soviets for abusing psychiatry for political purposes. Two years earlier, CBS News reports that some 7,000 lobotomies were performed on Soviet citizens to cure patients of "wrong political belief."

February 1978—Vladimir Klebanov, organizer of union of Soviet workers demanding the right of free speech, is arrested and sent to psychiatric hospital. Before incarceration, workers write open letter to "world opinion": "We believe we number in the tens of thousands, the hundreds of thousands.... We are the numerous army of the Soviet unemployed, thrown out of our jobs for demanding our right to lodge a complaint, the right to criticize, and the right to speak freely."

May 18, 1978—For his role in founding a Soviet-based Helsinki Watch Group, Yuri Orlov is sentenced to seven years in prison camp and five years in internal exile.

August 26, 1978—KGB assassinates Vladimir Kostov, prominent Bulgarian defector, in Paris. Two weeks later, Soviets assassinate another Bulgarian defector, Georgi Markov, in London.

June 1979—A disaster at an illegal Soviet bacteriological weapons factory in Sverdlovsk kills hundreds and seriously injures thousands. Soviets refuse to allow grieving relatives to view the mutilated bodies of victims, which are sealed in coffins.

December 24, 1979—Soviet troops invade Afghanistan, assassinate President Amin and his family, and commence an occupation in which over one million civilians are massacred by Soviet forces and five million are driven into exile.

January 1980—After condemning Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Andrei Sakharov is exiled to Gorky, where he is tortured and denied medical care.

1981—Kremlin intensifies efforts to sovietize Caribbean and Latin America. Grenada, led by Leninist strongman Maurice Bishop, enters into secret military agreements with Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea.

February 1981—Soviets and Vietnamese sign Labor Cooperation Treaty paving way for tens of thousands of Vietnamese to be sent to Soviet Union for slave labor in Siberia in exchange for a reduction in Vietnam's $5 billion debt with Soviets.

May 13, 1981—A drug-runner in employ of Bulgaria, Mehmet Ali Agca, shoots Pope John Paul II in Rome. Subsequent investigation reveals probable involvement of Bulgarian government, presumably with acquiescence of KGB.

September 13, 1981—In Kampuchean village, water samples reveal high levels of tricothecene mycotoxins, providing further credence to allegations that Soviets have provided illegal chemical weapons for use on populace. Strong evidence, including hundreds of pages of refugee testimony, also reveals that chemical warfare is being waged in Afghanistan and against the anti-Communist Hmong tribes in Laos. Soviets deny an impartial U.N. investigating commission access to sites of chemical attacks. As of February 1982, State Department documents over 100 chemical attacks in Laos, 28 in Kampuchea, and over 50 in Afghanistan. In Laos, the attacks are carried out by Laotian air force, directly under control of Soviets.

October 14, 1981—Akhtar Mohammed Paktiawal, former secretary of the Afghan National Commission for UNESCO, reports that following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 20,000 Afghans were buried alive by Soviet troops.

December 13, 1981—Under threat of Soviet invasion, General Wojciech Jaruzelski declares martial law in Poland, arrests tens of thousands, and suppresses 10-million-strong Solidarity movement.

1983—As Soviets carry out depopulation and scorched earth tactics in Afghanistan, number of Afghan refugees forced to abandon their homeland reaches four million, one-fourth of the entire population. The Soviets kidnap 10,000 Afghan youths, sending them to Soviet Union for indoctrination in Leninist tactics.

February 2, 1983—After extensive hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, the committee's chairman, Senator Jeremiah Denton, concludes: "The hearings... documented extensive involvement and complicity by the Soviet Union and its surrogates in a worldwide network of terrorism...."

February 9, 1983—State Department's *Report to Congress on Forced Labor in the USSR* reports that four million Soviets are performing forced labor in 1,100 camps. Percentage of Soviet population in prison is over six times higher than in United States.

March 1983—Soviet police arrest 28-year-old poet Irina Ratushinskaya for publishing poems in foreign journals. She is sentenced to seven years in strict prison camp and five years of internal exile.

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September 1, 1983—Soviet fighter jets down a Korean airliner flying from New York to Seoul over Sakhalin Island, killing 269 innocent passengers and crew members. Soviets later interfere with international efforts to find survivors and retrieve bodies from passenger plane. Soviet leaders refuse to pay compensation to victims' families and say they will shoot down any other planes that enter their airspace.

November 1, 1983—In Jamaica, four Soviet diplomats, all identified as KGB operatives, are expelled after revelation of their plot to kidnap children of a protocol officer at Jamaican Foreign Ministry, confront officer in public place, and stage a robbery during which officer would be murdered.

1984—Helsinki Watch report describes slaughter of Afghan population at hands of Soviet forces: "From throughout the country come tales of death on every scale, from thousands of civilians buried in the rubble left by fleets of bombers to a young boy's throat being dispassionately slit by a Soviet soldier."

March 24, 1985—Major Arthur Nicholson, a member of the U.S. military liaison group based in Potsdam, East Germany, is shot to death by Soviet troops. As Nicholson's bullet-ridden body lay on ground, Soviets let him bleed to death, refusing to allow medical treatment for over an hour.

March 30, 1985—*Washington Post* reports that over past week Soviet troops burned more than a dozen remote villages in Afghanistan, killing most of their inhabitants.

June 13, 1985—To provide legal framework for psychiatric torture, Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet decrees that compulsory medical treatment could be applied to any person discovered suffering from "psychiatric problems," even without a judge's order. A Freedom House report of known political prisoners in the Soviet Union given at the 1985 Helsinki follow-up conference in Ottawa reports that one in five Soviet political prisoners are sentenced to psychiatric hospitals.

November 1, 1985—Soviet forces in Afghanistan shell mosque in Herat, killing over 20 Afghans.

August 30, 1986—Nicholas Daniloff, Moscow correspondent for *U.S. News and World Report*, is arrested, charged with espionage, and thrown in Moscow's Lefortovo Prison in direct response to New York arrest of Soviet spy Gennadi Zakharov.

September 1986—After new Helsinki monitoring group in Latvia appeals to Mikhail Gorbachev for democratic reform, three of its members are arrested.

October 1986—Felix Ermacora, a jurist from Austria, states in a United Nations report that Soviet troops in Afghanistan are carrying out "indiscriminate bombing and the continued use of anti-personnel mines, including booby-trap toys, still [causing] many casualties among the civilian population."

December 1986—After nine years in Soviet prison and labor camps for co-founding the 1975 Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor human rights, Anatoly Marchenko, dies in Christopol Prison. His exposé, *My Testimony*, reveals how starvation and torture tactics pervade Soviet gulags.

March 1987—A presidential report on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements reveals the Soviets have violated every major arms control agreement they have signed. The ABM treaty is violated by the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar; the SALT I treaty by the use of SS-7 sites; the SALT II agreement by Soviet testing and deployment of SS-25 ICBMs, strategic nuclear delivery systems, encryption of ballistic missile telemetry, and concealment of missile/launcher association; the Limited Test Ban Treaty by Soviet underground nuclear test venting; and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty by Soviet nuclear testing above the 150 kiloton limit.

April 3, 1987—Agence France-Presse reports that 30,000 Vietnamese laborers have been sent to Soviet Union in exchange for economic aid to Hanoi.

May 8, 1987—In first four months of 1987 alone, U.S. Senator Gordon Humphrey reveals that Soviet and Afghan aircraft have carried out 350 air attacks against civilians in Pakistani border villages, "killing hundreds and wounding more than 1,000."

June 1987—In violation of Helsinki Agreement, Soviets redirect their jamming of foreign radio broadcasts from BBC and Voice of America to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which provide East Europeans and Soviet citizens news about their own countries. Soviets spend more on jamming American broadcasts than U.S. does in producing them.

August 23, 1987—The chief of Soviet customs control, V.N. Bazovskiy, brags in *Pravda* that in 1986 alone "430,000 copies of ideologically harmful materials" were seized from incoming visitors.

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THE COUP THAT FAILED

An Insider's Account of the Iran/Contra Hearings

DENNIS TETI

In 1877, a unanimous Congress passed a joint resolution requesting the Secretary of State to send a letter thanking two governments that had congratulated Congress on the centennial of America's independence. President Grant, ending his second term under a cloud of scandal, agreed with the sentiments in the resolution, but vetoed it on the grounds that the legislative branch had no authority over correspondence with foreign powers. The vetoed bill was returned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where it was never heard of again. Even during the age of congressional government, as Woodrow Wilson later described the second half of the 19th century, no one challenged the supremacy given by the Constitution to the president in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In the past 15 years, Congress has aggressively sought to wrest away the president's control. The War Powers Act, the Clark Amendment, the refusal to provide funds for various overseas initiatives, myriad restrictions on defense expenditures that direct the president's position in arms control talks, and the Boland Amendment in its various forms, have all been intended to restrict the ability of the executive branch to conduct the foreign affairs of this country.

The Iran/Contra committees and their joint hearings represented the pinnacle of that effort. The hearings were clearly calculated to criminalize executive foreign policies carried out without the support or knowledge of Congress. If the committees succeed in their ultimate objective, the revolution in the relations between Congress and the presidency in foreign policy will be legitimized, with profound implications for the future of our national security.

Visions of Watergate

When the Iran arms sale and Contra diversion stories first broke in November 1986, there was little doubt in Washington that another impeachment-style scandal was in the making. Both houses of Congress launched investigations and created separate committees.

The Senate committee's staff was officially nonpartisan. Chief Counsel Arthur Liman had a reputation as an effective defense lawyer whose high-powered clients included Robert Vesco, John Zaccaro, and Carl Icahn. Assistant Counsel Paul Barbadoro had worked on Warren Rudman's legal staff when the senator was New Hampshire's attorney general. The House staff, though, was separated along partisan lines; the chief counsel was John Nields, whose reputation was earned on the Ethics Committee's Koreagate investigation. The ranking Republican, Congressman Dick Cheney, chose a member of his subcommittee's legal staff, George Van Cleve, as chief minority counsel.

Eventually the two committees agreed to conduct their hearings jointly, but the differences in staff organization meant that they could not be completely merged. It is remarkable that the staffs worked together as well as they did, conducting joint interviews and depositions and sharing the fruits of their investigatory work.

The parallel investigation by the independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, did create problems, though. Walsh's purpose was to determine whether criminal prosecutions should be pursued. The committees' purpose, in response to a political crisis, was to examine the "process" of foreign policy formulation and to publicize the facts. This created conflicts between the committees' need for expedition and the special prosecutor's need for secrecy and time-consuming thoroughness.

Inevitably the conflicts arose. The independent counsel blocked the committees' access to certain Department of Justice documents. He claimed the privilege of reviewing the committees' materials but would not, or legally could not, reciprocate. Moreover, Walsh pressured the committees to delay granting "use immunity" to Oliver North, John Poindexter, and others. His confidence in the case against North could not have been high when he asked the committees in June—six months into his investigation—not to grant immunity to North at all. But to close the hearings without the key figure's testimony would have discredited the congressional examination, and Walsh was turned down.

The combined staffs, numbering over 100, were the engine of the investigation. They reviewed some 250,000

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AP/Wide World Photos

A new Great Communicator was the first in his administration to take the Contras' case to the American people.

documents and selected those needed for further examination. The counsels and staffs privately interviewed and took depositions from approximately 500 witnesses, far more than appeared on camera, and they also prepared most of the questions the members asked during the hearings. Some members seemed hardly more than mouthpieces for young, committed staffers.

The direction of the investigation was largely the responsibility of the Senate's chief counsel, assisted by the House counsel and the chairmen. A few days past the 30th anniversary of Senator Joseph McCarthy's death, his spirit seemed alive and well in the Senate's Russell caucus room. As a Harvard student in 1954, Arthur Liman had written that "... congressional investigating committees pose not just a challenge to the relatively few individuals who appear before them but to the whole concept of limited government." But in the Iran/Contra hearings, Counsel Liman began his cross-examination with a scathing attack on the first witness, General Richard Secord. The inquisitional tone of the hearings was established from the very beginning.

Questionable Tactics

General Secord, appearing voluntarily, had infuriated some senators by successfully challenging in federal court a Senate subpoena of his financial records. Senator David Boren, a frequent defender of the "rule of law," launched into a harsh interrogation designed to punish Secord, notwithstanding the Senate's loss at the bar. Boren grilled Secord about his financial interests with certain dubious individuals, and concluded by trying to embarrass Secord into signing away his rights to remaining funds in Albert Hakim's Swiss bank accounts that had been set aside for the Contra resupply operation. Secord's stout resistance to this bullying generated early public displeasure with the committees' tactics. Any pretense that the hearings were examining "process" rather than policy, airing "facts" and not criminal charges, disappeared that first day.

The committees' counsels were not above using misleading and questionable tactics against witnesses. A well-known example occurred when Senate counsel, knowing Oliver North's family has been threatened by terrorists, placed a large exhibit of a North letter before the cameras, prominently featuring his home address. A second example was Chief Counsel Liman's one-page exhibit of the Boland Amendment, which was cropped to look as if it had been signed by Ronald Reagan as a separate law. The exhibit, reminiscent of the famed "cropped photograph" of the McCarthy hearings, was reconstructed from a nearly 2,000-page appropriations bill, and Liman had to suffer the indignity of being reproved by several committee members.

Counsels' chief instrument for pinning down witnesses was the private sworn deposition. Often requiring many hours of testimony and hundreds of pages, the depositions allowed counsel to explore leads and drop them, and they were often classified. Consequently, counsels and members who reviewed them knew exactly what answers

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would be given in public to leading questions, while witnesses could not change their story without risking perjury charges. Nor could witnesses always return to the depositions of themselves or others since that testimony was sometimes classified.

Oliver North's attorney, Brendan Sullivan, brilliantly exploited the committees' manipulations by challenging their right to take North's testimony privately and then again publicly. North obtained an agreement disguised as a "letter of intention" under which the committee took a deposition from him privately on only one subject. One major reason North's public appearance was so successful was that the committees had signed away their favorite instrument and counsels did not have sufficient time to make their best case against him.

The legislature now primarily occupies itself not with making law about domestic problems but with the unending task of administrative "oversight"—a function never mentioned in the Constitution.

In a February 1987 strategy memo, Liman had proposed that, except for the policymakers, North testify last. By then the committees would have explored the Iran/Contra story's details. Of the central witness Liman wrote: "If called, Colonel North would be immunized—but not against the rigorous cross-examination he would have to undergo by the senators in full view of the American people." It is hard to resist the conclusion that North's public indictment and punishment were among the committees' aims. If so, they were usurping both executive and judicial functions and transgressed the only legitimate reason for congressional investigations—fact-finding for legislative purposes.

The clearly adversarial nature of these proceedings reflected political divisions on four different levels: a partisan division between Democrats and Republicans; the split between the Senate and the House of Representatives; the deep dispute over U.S. policy in Central America and, implicitly, around the world; and most important, the profound constitutional struggle between the legislature and the executive to dominate foreign policy.

Party Shots

The partisan division over the Iran/Contra issues was the most obvious, but also the most superficial, of the differences within the committees. Democrats wasted little time trying to exploit the Reagan administration's embarrassment over the tangled Iran/Contra initiative. The Democratic leaders—visions of Watergate dancing in their heads—insisted on the congressional investigations, believing they could once again parade a cast of Haldemans, Deans, and Liddys before the disgusted eyes of the American electorate.

While it was apparent that partisan interests underlay the demand for the investigations, the party split was at first submerged. Committee votes on substantive and procedural matters in open and closed sessions reflected no partisan division; many were unanimous. The chairmen and vice-chairmen, in each case a Democrat and a Republican respectively, cooperated and coordinated their procedures and rules without any strong disagreements.

House Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, despite strongly held neo-isolationist views, earned unanimous respect for his fair conduct of the hearings. Hamilton worked the compromise that averted a divisive committee vote and allowed Oliver North to give the spoken part of his Contra briefing on television.

When partisan differences finally came to the fore, much of the controversy centered around Senate Chairman Daniel Inouye, a Democrat from Hawaii. Inouye's reputation from Watergate days for balance and nonpartisanship was tarnished by his personal attacks on witnesses—implying that Oliver North resembled a Nazi war criminal and that he was trying to override the Constitution by requesting dispensation from a *pro forma* 48-hour committee rule on opening statements.

One example of Inouye's egregious partisanship came on a television talk program where he announced that his committee acquired a Poindexter memorandum that suggested that President Reagan might have been briefed on plans for a diversion of Iranian arms sales profits. There were two problems with Inouye's statement. First, the memo he referred to said nothing about a diversion. Second, Inouye knew at the time of his appearance that Poindexter, in his private deposition, had absolved President Reagan of such knowledge, yet Inouye misled the audience into believing the question remained in doubt.

The partisan differences crystallized when it became evident that Americans sympathized with the witnesses and began criticizing the committees for unfair treatment. The Republicans, especially from the House, became more aggressive and confrontational as public support for the cause of the Contras increased, a development that shocked the Democrats.

Hyperbolic Senate, Crisp House

Lines of division at the hearings were also clearly drawn between House and Senate. The Senate committee frequently appeared to be nonpartisan to a degree the House panel never tried to be. This was reflected in the ways in which the two committees organized their staffs. Senator Rudman, the vice-chairman, and Senators Cohen and Trible adopted the Howard Baker model of independence and distanced themselves from the White House. In questioning witnesses they were often in greater sympathy with their Senate Democratic colleagues than with White House Republicans. Senator McClure charted a course allowing him to expose Israel's involvement, while Senator Hatch, the president's most consistent defender, was usually the only Republican senator willing to risk a partisan posture. The House Republicans, on the other hand, had

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been specially chosen by Minority Leader Bob Michel for their allegiance to the president and the party's policies, and for their willingness to engage in principled combat.

The Senate-House split broke open during the long interrogation of Lt. Colonel North by the committees' counsels, a process that consumed nearly three days before members began questioning. Senator Boren, a Democrat, had complained twice on television about the excessive time the counsels were taking—North had been promised he would be off the stand after four days. When House Republicans began a similar attack on Senate Counsel Arthur Liman, Senator Cohen, a Republican, contradicted House Republicans by saying (incorrectly) that senators had not criticized House counsel John Nields during his long interrogation. The sharp ensuing debate demonstrated that the deeper split was between House and Senate rather than Republicans and Democrats.

There were clear differences in the rhetoric and attitudes of members in the two chambers. Senators, led by Warren Rudman, were more skeptical than House members of witnesses' claims to be motivated by patriotism or national interest. Whereas House members tended either to question issues of fact or to debate policy questions, particularly pushing the need for Contra support, senators of either party were less inclined to do so. Senatorial speeches often appealed to the "rule of law," arguing that once the Boland Amendment had passed the Congress, administration officials had no right to circumvent it because it was "law." Senator Mitchell was the leading proponent of the "rule of law" argument, "wise or not," as he once put it. They sometimes sounded as if they believed Congress were sovereign.

Senators seemed, or pretended, not to realize that the rule of law argument begged the question. The "supreme law," as Article VII states, is the Constitution itself. Congress' power to restrict the executive branch by law is controlled by the constitutional separation of powers. If the Boland Amendment is an unconstitutional restraint of executive prerogative, then by passing an unconstitutional measure Congress rather than the President violated the rule of law.

On the whole, the Senate adopted a sanctimonious tone that remained foreign to House members. Representative Boland, whose amendment was the proximate cause of these events, might have been forgiven had he shared the Senate's imperial "rule of law" attitude, but he chose instead to defend his problematic amendment with clear logic and careful arguments. Boland's questions could be devastating, yet Robert McFarlane praised their fairness.

Just as the Senate equated Congress with "the law," the characteristic rhetorical weakness of representatives was to equate Congress with "the people." In questioning Admiral Poindexter, for example, Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino kept reinterpreting Reagan's instruction to give the facts "to the Congress" to read "to the American people." Congress claims to speak uniquely for "the law" and "the people," and hints that the democratic foundations of the other two branches are questionable.

The contrast between the hyperbolic rhetoric of Senate members and the relative crispness typical of the House can be largely attributed to two important institutional differences. First is the six-year term, which distances senators from their constituents. House members, chosen for just two years, run for reelection continually; they are compelled to see that their constituents understand their views and support their legislative efforts. House members cannot afford to speak in vacuous pieties.

The second difference stems from the respective chambers' rules for floor debate. Senate rules encourage leisurely speeches in grand oratorical style, where House rules limit its more numerous members to brief, timed remarks. The filibuster is a Senate privilege unknown to the House. Senators far more often disregarded the best efforts of the Iran panel's chairmen to impose time constraints on their speeches and questions. House discipline discourages high rhetoric, but it forces members to debate logically and clearly. Perhaps a Webster or a Clay could not realize his full rhetorical potential in the House of Representatives, but the embarrassing "what I learned today" sermonettes for which one committee senator became famous were nearly unimaginable on the House side.

The "supreme law" is the Constitution. If the Boland Amendment is an unconstitutional restraint of executive prerogative, then by passing an unconstitutional measure Congress rather than the president violated the rule of law.

Congress' Contra Diction

The committees were also divided on the substantive issue of support for the Contras. The Iran initiative by itself would not have led to a congressional inquiry because until the so-called "diversion" of the Iranian arms profits became known, there were no "improprieties" (President Reagan's word) to be investigated. It was the diversion that revived hopes, or fears, that Americans faced another presidential scandal.

The Contra policy, centerpiece of the Reagan Doctrine of encouraging democratic liberation movements within countries under Soviet domination, has sharply divided Congress throughout Reagan's presidency. Funding for the Contras passed in some years, failed in others, was forbidden some times, and provided with strings attached at other times, depending on how firmly the president made his case to the people. The votes have usually been very close.

Senate Counsel Liman had written that congressional investigative committees are frequently created to force a policy change on the executive. The basic policy purpose behind the hearings undeniably was to weaken public sup-

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port for the Reagan policy of Contra assistance by criminalizing those who supported it after Congress' rejection.

A majority of both committees, including all the Republicans and six Democrats, had voted for Contra funding in 1986. But Democrats who had voted for Contra funds did so against their party's official position, compelled by their particular constituencies. Congressman Les Aspin's was the most interesting case. By trying to project himself as a moderate pro-defense Democrat, Aspin nearly lost the chair of the Armed Services Committee because of his 1986 vote. He barely retained it by promising liberal Democrats he would vote "no" the next time.

Democrats who support the Contras could be relieved of their colleagues' reproach if they could use the illegitimacy or criminality of Contra assistance as an excuse. The vehicle for that relief was the Boland Amendment, which, in its various versions, had the effect of prohibiting certain executive agencies from using government appropriations for Contra military assistance for two years.

But the issues involved in Boland and related legislation were highly technical and complex, and the committees never came close to agreeing on a single interpretation. One problem was that the language, deliberately or not, did not incorporate an across-the-board prohibition. As Congressman Jim Courter pointed out, the Arms Export Control Act, by contrast, says simply, "No U.S. funds shall be expended. . . ." Nor were criminal penalties attached to Boland.

Second, while the prohibition applied to "any agency or entity involved in intelligence activity," there was strong disagreement among committee members as to whether the National Security Council was covered. It was learned that within the administration, too, there was considerable disagreement, even within the Council. Robert McFarlane, NSC advisor in 1985, testified that he believed Boland did not restrict the National Security Council, but that his belief was a matter of policy, not law. Admiral Poindexter, McFarlane's successor, believed the opposite. The only White House legal document to address the issue was a memo from the president's Intelligence Oversight Board, which took the position that "the NSC was not covered by the prohibition."

Third, if the National Security Council was included within the prohibition, its status as part of the president's personal staff would raise profound constitutional difficulties regarding Congress' powers to prevent the president from using his staff to carry out foreign policy operations.

Adding to the confusion, President Reagan protested that his administration always operated within the law—implying that Boland was the law—then later asserted that he was not covered by Boland. The administration never advanced a coherent position on the amendment.

The committees claimed only to be examining the "process" of foreign policy formulation and operations within the executive branch; but committee Republicans never accepted that artificial limitation on the range of pertinent subjects. From the first witness, General Secord, to the last, the substance of the Contra support policy was kept in clear focus by the Republicans. Anti-Contra Democrats at first tried not to engage in policy debate, but the Republicans' determined pro-Contra speeches began to gain favorable public response even before Oliver North's impassioned testimony. When House Chairman Hamilton quietly inserted polling data in the record purporting to support the opponents of Contra aid, the effort to suppress the policy debate ended.

Anti-Contra members faced a difficult problem: Although the witnesses had contradicted each other on many facts, they unanimously agreed that Congress should continue the assistance that had finally been voted last year. Many took Congress to task for the two-year hiatus.

It was in this context that Senate Counsel Liman made a serious tactical blunder. Questioning Lt. Colonel North about a slide briefing he often gave in which he graphically described Sandinista oppression and the Contras' determined struggle for democracy, Liman accused him of giving a pitch in order to solicit private contributions—arguably a violation of Boland. Congressmen Hyde, Courter, Cheney, and other Republicans seized on Liman's mistake and forced Chairman Inouye to allow North to present the entire briefing in the caucus room. Though unable to use his slides, North's 20-minute verbal description, according to polling data, substantially boosted popular support for the Contras. At the end of the hearings, only Chairman Inouye, in acerbic closing remarks to North, expressed opposition to the Contra aid program.

The increase in support for the Contras' cause following the testimony of North and others was one of the ironic but genuine benefits of the much-publicized hearings, which amounted to the most extensive debate most Americans have ever heard on the issue. Although Donald Regan testified to the president's determination to "drive [the Sandinista] government out of there," the administration has never expressed that view in public. It may yet turn out that North, his "courier" Robert Owen, and former superior Admiral Poindexter, by unapologetically taking their case to the people in a way that President Reagan never did, may have twice saved the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

The War Between the Branches

On the deepest level the Iran/Contra dispute is constitutional, part of a permanent contest between Congress and the president for control over foreign policy. Again and again, committee members appealed to the image of "co-equal partners" to legitimize congressional intervention in the foreign policy "process."

Congress has a genuine but subordinate role to play in the formulation of foreign policy. Neither the intentions of the Constitution's drafters, traditional theories of democratic government, nor common sense suggest that the executive branch should be given a completely free hand in this area. But as Congress increasingly insists on the *equality* of its powers, it is forgetting the Constitution's fairly clear differentiation of *function*. Among the slogans the committees appealed to, none were more favored than "checks and balances," and the talismanic claim of "equal partners." This sloganeering begs the question of what Congress' proper role in foreign policy should be.

A close look at the Constitution shows that, while the executive branch does not possess the entirety of foreign policy power, it has most of it. Under Article II, "executive

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"Congressional investigating committees pose not just a challenge to the relatively few individuals who appear before them but to the whole concept of limited government."—Arthur Liman, 1954

power" is lodged in the president. By definition the executive power comprehends the conduct of foreign policy. The Framers found it unnecessary to define the term, but the inclusion of foreign policy under executive power is discussed at length in John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, a fundamental source for the Founders. The briefest review of legal and political documents from the late 18th century demonstrates that most political theorists of the era thought foreign policy to be executive in nature.

Where the Framers rejected absolute separation of powers, for example by giving the Senate the power of ratifying treaties and advising and consenting to executive branch appointments, and the power to declare war, they said precisely that these were *exceptions* to the general constitutional principle of separation. Where no exception is specified, the principle holds.

There are some obvious reasons why foreign policy should be lodged primarily within the executive, and they apply more forcefully in the latter 20th century than they did in the 18th. The conduct of foreign affairs often requires expeditious action around the globe. The processes of congressional deliberation, while providing useful input for the president in his formulation of long-range policy goals, are too slow and cumbersome to be of value for such decisions. Congress' inability to keep secrets was well-understood by the Founders, and the undeniable problem of congressional leaks was an important issue addressed by the hearings. Only a single executive can make foreign policy decisions swiftly and, when necessary, secretly, and he must do so within the framework of a coherent and principled foreign policy.

Almost invariably, the president will have submitted his foreign policy to the national electorate for ratification. As the architects of the Constitution expected, few congressmen run on such issues, and typically they are more sensitive in office to the local interests and needs of their constituents than to the national interest as a whole.

In the past, these reasons were enough to prevent Congress from encroaching upon executive prerogatives. For a number of reasons the traditional arguments no longer appear sufficient, but the central difficulty is Congress' concern with bureaucracy.

Congress Evades Its Duty

Bureaucratic government became a major problem for American democracy with the New Deal. The founders of the science of administration such as Woodrow Wilson acknowledged that nonpolitical bureaucracies would threaten democracy unless democratic controls were placed on the administrative agencies. That task naturally fell to the Congress, and as a result the legislature now primarily occupies itself not with making law about domestic problems but with the unending task of administrative "oversight"—a function never mentioned in the Constitution.

Congress extended its oversight claim into the foreign policy domain of the executive as that area also became bureaucratized in the State Department, the Central Intelli-

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gence Agency, the National Security Council, and other agencies. Congress' solution to foreign policy problems is typically more bureaucracy—more formal procedures, division of bureaucratic functions into separate entities, greater input and review from more agencies and divisions, and, above all, further participation in the decision-making process by Congress and the designated oversight committees.

The criminalization of foreign policy differences, which was the theme of the Iran/Contra hearings, is a further extension of Congress' longtime effort to suppress the political differences between itself and the president and to dominate another part of the federal bureaucracy.

How a Congress humbled by an Ollie North could stand up to the Gorbachevs, Castros, and Ortegas of our world was a question the hearings could not answer.

The question is, how are the chief executive and his staff to be held accountable? How are we to control the Colonel Norths and Admiral Poindexters of the future unless Congress exercises an oversight function? The Constitution provides several methods that remain valid after 200 years.

The president of the United States is the responsible officer for the executive branch. As soon as North's and Poindexter's actions were brought to light—by the attorney general, not by Congress—they were dismissed. Service at the pleasure of the president is one effective control.

Second, presidents are held accountable for their foreign policy record as well as their administrative management every four years through the fundamental democratic check of periodic elections. In addition, members of Congress have sometimes litigated their differences with presidents in the U.S. Supreme Court. Recently 107 congressmen brought suit against President Reagan to force him to invoke the War Powers Resolution as respects naval operations in the Persian Gulf.

Finally, presidents and other executive officials can be impeached by Congress for serious crimes. One of the most serious offenses against the United States is violation of the president's oath to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution, one of the important sources of the executive power over foreign policy.

Congress shrinks from its obligation to impeach executive officers because the members want at all costs to avoid a divisive vote on a president's activities. Oversight hearings by standing or select committees such as the Iran/Contra panels enable Congress to evade the duty of impeachment by attacking instead administrative processes and "rogue bureaucrats" like North and Poindexter. The obvious political desirability of avoiding impeachment proceedings is one of several important reasons why members of Congress have little incentive to weaken bureaucratic government. But the political seriousness of impeachment shows how important the Framers thought it was for the chief executive to have great latitude in the operation of foreign policy.

Disregard for the constitutional division of powers that was designed by the Framers to prevent tyranny is a deeply troubling problem for the future of democratic freedom. Congressional oversight of executive agencies within a bureaucratized government cannot be avoided. But the unprecedented problems we confront around the world make it imperative for Americans to reconsider the value of an administrative state that saps our ability to rule ourselves democratically. The micro-management of areas in which Congress cannot play more than a minimal role is fast approaching the dimensions of a constitutional crisis.

The President Who Would Not Lead

Americans expect vigorous presidential leadership and firm assertion of executive authority over foreign policy. Liman had observed in his 1954 Harvard paper about the political character of the constitutional struggle between the branches: "Whether the new investigation [the McCarthy hearings] will jeopardize the independence of the executive, and destroy the separation of powers thus seems to depend on whether the presidency will mobilize all the forces at its disposal to resist it."

Liman's observation reflects the fact that the separation and balance of powers operates dynamically, not statically. As explained in *Federalist* No. 51, the Framers expected "ambition to counteract ambition," encouraging those holding the legislative and chief executive offices to contend against each other to defend and enlarge their respective spheres of power. When Congress oversteps its function by interfering in the operation of foreign policy, and the president refuses to fight for his prerogatives as President Reagan has done, not just in the hearings but throughout his presidency, Congress acquires new powers to participate in executive functions and the foreign policy task of the next president has been made even more difficult.

The constitutional problems raised by the Iran/Contra hearings have not been resolved and may not have been recognized by the Reagan administration. Attorney General Ed Meese made a point of stating that the administration had never invoked the traditional defense of executive privilege. He was startled when one committee member suggested that the reason might have been the administration's hope for short-term political gain. Meese responded that the president did not regard his refusal as a "precedent." How could Meese and President Reagan not see that every presidential act can be used as a precedent by future congresses?

The Prosecution Folds

As soon as the members began to hear that their constituents were supporting Oliver North, the prosecutory phase of the hearings ended. Senate Counsel Liman's leonine roaring was reduced to feline purring—though no one was fooled, least of all the witness and his attorney. After

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North's impassioned defense of the Nicaraguan resistance, member after member protested support for Contra assistance. Only Congressman Jack Brooks (whose 35 years of seniority create an aura of political invulnerability) dared attack North openly; but I am certain that many, especially on the Senate side, boiled with indignation at North's bold defense of executive prerogative and legislative subordination in the foreign policy arena. Senator Rudman, for example, tried pathetically to praise Secretary of State George Shultz as "a *real* hero," implying that North's popularity was fraudulent.

The waning of the committees' hopes was symbolized when Liman, after a day's questioning of North, threw up his hands in despair and said he could not question a witness whose lawyer interrupted every question. Once Admiral Poindexter, following North, revealed publicly that he had concealed the diversion from President Reagan, the committees' long-range political intention seemed to collapse. Supported by millions of Americans, the witnesses had overwhelmed the committee.

Chairman Hamilton's concession came in his closing speech on August 3 when he said, "The solution to the problems of decision-making revealed in these hearings lies less in new structures or new laws than in proper attitudes." Had the hearings succeeded in their political and constitutional objectives, they would not have been satisfied with new "attitudes." They would have institutionalized Congress' demand to co-determine foreign policy.

At the end, the remaining witness list was drastically pared to a handful of policymakers, the questioning had attenuated, and the committees raced to complete their work and the final report. They decided to ask a number of foreign policy "wise men" to propose possible recommendations and remedies. Ultimately, then, apart from the committees' leaders, the members neither directed the investigation nor led the questioning nor controlled the evidence nor wished to create solutions to the problems the panels were established to recommend. They were intimidated by the popularity of a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who had been fired from the NSC for possible "improprieties," and hardly ventured to challenge any witness after him.

Eight months before, these same members of Congress were demanding greater say in the conduct of foreign policy. How a Congress that could not muster the courage to challenge the political standing of an Ollie North could expect to stand up to the Gorbachevs, Castros, and Ortegas of our world, was a question for which the Iran/Contra hearings offered no answer.

Constitutional Turning Point?

I believe no committee investigation has had so little public sympathy since the McCarthy hearings over 30 years ago. The failure of the hearings to generate deep anti-Reagan sentiment and support for congressionally favored isolationism could mark the beginning of Congress' retreat from its 15-year effort to seize the initiative in foreign affairs.

Yet the committees did succeed in one important objective: they intimidated President Reagan. Even as they scurried to close the hearings, the president threw olive branches to the leader of his congressional inquisitors, Speaker of the House Jim Wright, and to the Sandinista government, in the form of a "peace plan" for Central America. The Reagan-Wright initiative severely undercut public support for the Contras, which had been acquired at some political risk by the committees' pro-Contra Republicans. The negative public reaction to Reagan-Wright confused the White House, but it measured the public's increased understanding of the situation in Nicaragua, gained by the testimony of North and others.

The failure of the hearings to generate deep anti-Reagan sentiment and support for congressionally favored isolationism could mark the beginning of Congress' retreat from its 15-year effort to seize the initiative in foreign affairs.

The Framers of our Constitution designed the Congress to be the seat of cool deliberation. The calm quality of prudence that is so necessary to the art of legislation has been replaced by its opposite, heated moral indignation.

The replacement of deliberation with moral indignation is one consequence of the substitution of oversight for legislation, and it has made the consideration of rational policy alternatives difficult if not impossible. Anger is an essential support for the legal enforcement of justice in the community, but it is no substitute for clear thought in choosing the ends and means of public policy. This is not the least of reasons why, after months of televised hearings, the Iran/Contra committees failed to impress the public. The American people wait for more serious solutions to the threat posed by our implacable Communist adversaries who have never paused in their struggle to secure a beachhead on the American continent.

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Robert Bork's America

Where the People Are Sovereign

Gordon Jackson

In nominating Robert Bork to be associate justice of the Supreme Court, President Reagan has found an excellent way to focus America's attention on the meaning of the Constitution whose bicentennial we celebrate this year. No recent Supreme Court nominee has examined the great experiment in democratic government now entering its third century as carefully as has Bork. Bork's stature within the legal community, his distinguished career, the force of his intellect and personality, all are of such magnitude that the focus of this nomination has shifted largely away from the usual sideshows to issues of genuine constitutional substance.

The stakes involved are large—not so much because of the impact Bork's presence on the Court might have on public policy, as his opponents suggest, but rather because his confirmation or rejection will, in some large measure, constitute a present-day judgment on the form of representative government our Founding Fathers gave us. At issue in the Bork nomination is nothing less than the fundamental question addressed at the Constitutional Convention: Who will govern, and how?

Bork's nomination crystallizes that basic issue because his career, more than that of any other public figure, stands foursquare for the proposition that elected legislatures accountable to the people must make the laws, and judges must limit themselves to the task of interpreting those laws without infusing their own predilections and preferences. Bork sees a role for the courts in preserving the liberties that are clearly spelled out in the Constitution, but views these rights as very specific and delimited. He resists expanding them into any broad, overarching theory of justice, because to do so leaves no room for what he calls "the wholesome inconsistencies that are completely at odds with abstract generalizations about the just society." In Robert Bork's America, the people will strive to govern themselves intelligently, and often fail, but they must always have the opportunity to learn from experience and correct their mistakes. If a plethora of rules regarding the conduct of civil life is written into stone through the artful constitutional interpretations of jurists, then the people have lost much of this fundamental sovereignty.

These views were commonplaces to the Constitution's drafters, but they have been challenged by decades of judicial forays into what was once clearly viewed as the province of legislatures. It is perhaps useful here to highlight the basic argument with a concrete example. The case that causes the most clamor, the *Roe* v. *Wade* abortion decision, best illustrates what's at issue.

Until *Roe*, all 50 states regulated abortion as they saw fit, in keeping with the traditional police power of states. The policy toward abortion varied from state to state, but in each the policy evolved from the deliberations of elected representatives who settled the issues in a manner that could, if necessary, be undone simply by changing the composition of the legislature. In *Roe*, the Supreme Court took this power away from the people's elected representatives and held that the question of abortion is resolved by the Constitution—thus vesting in unelected federal judges the power to regulate or restrict in this area. Though abortion is not mentioned in the Constitution, the Justices determined that it falls under a broad right to privacy that can be traced substantively only to passages dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures, and quartering of soldiers in times of war. Using this judicially created right to privacy, the Justices, in effect, wrote a statute dealing with trimesters and human viability and then called it an interpretation of the Constitution.

Judicial activism of this sort has been going on intermittently since the late 19th century, and consistently during the past 30 years. There is no obvious way to deter a creative and linguistically gifted jurist from discovering a constitutional basis for a favored legal opinion, in part because the document's language is sometimes vague. If the people are dissatisfied with such rulings, they have no recourse to the ballot box, since federal judges, unlike those who appoint and confirm them, enjoy lifetime tenure. The only realistic check at the present time is a principled restraint within the legal profession, and Bork's consistent advocacy of that restraint is at the root of the controversy over his nomination.

Since part of the liberal political agenda—liberalized abortion law, for example—has circumvented the legislative process and been sneaked in the back door through the courts, its future becomes more precarious given a

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

Drawing by Alexander Hunter

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sufficient number of Borks on the bench. That's what all the commotion is about. The Bork vote would not invariably ratify Reagan policies, as is often asserted, but quite often it would refer liberal policies back to legislatures.

Solid Gold Resumé

Bork's apparent qualifications for the job are by now common knowledge. The resumé is solid gold. A graduate of the University of Chicago law school, he joined one of the nation's premier firms, Kirkland and Ellis, and practiced for several years. On track to become managing partner, according to one colleague, Bork nevertheless left this promising and lucrative practice to pursue his strong interest in legal theory as a professor at Yale law school. His seminars taught there with Alexander Bickel are remembered by some students as perhaps the apex of American legal education. Bork was solicitor general of the United States for four years, and for the last five years has been a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the nation's second highest court. Since joining the D.C. Circuit, he has been in the majority in 422 of 450 cases, and written the majority opinion for 106 of them. Not one of those 422 holdings has been overturned by the Supreme Court; however, the high court did overturn the majority holding in seven of the cases in which Bork dissented. Clearly in the juridical mainstream, Bork is regarded as the seminal thinker and most principled advocate of the philosophy of judicial restraint shared by Ronald Reagan and presumably ratified by a large majority of the electorate in the last election. His writing is notable within the legal community for its clarity, cogency, and wit.

He is, in short, the sort of nominee who could ordinarily expect to win speedy confirmation, as he did when the Senate reviewed his nomination to the D.C. Circuit (confirmed by a 92-0 vote). But since he is replacing Lewis Powell, the Court's swing vote on a number of controversial issues, the circumstances are not regarded as ordinary. Bork's opponents are convinced that his presence on the Court would short-circuit the expeditious enactment by the courts of their political agenda, and they are determined to defeat the nomination.

It is not clear what their long-range strategy is, if they have one. Reagan will be in office for 16 more months, and should Bork be defeated, the next nominee is hardly going to be a liberal activist. Chances are he will hold views similar to Bork's but probably would not have the same intellectual capabilities nor the same commitment to judicial restraint. And since most of the particular political controversies at issue in the nomination—homosexual rights, affirmative action, aggressive abortion policies, school prayer, and criminal rights, for example—are widely viewed as pluses for the Republicans, one would think it unwise for the Democrats to keep these matters before the public well into an election year. A vote against Bork might well be construed in '88 as a vote to unravel the social fabric.

Biden on the Offensive

But Bork's congressional opponents seem determined to go over the cliff with the flags flying on this one. Their first obstacle will be the tradition that the Senate limits its scrutiny to threshold questions of the nominee's competence, character, and integrity. Since the Senate has almost invariably so limited itself in this century, Bork opponents are going to some lengths to make the intellectual case for changing the tradition. Senator Joe Biden, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, who has pledged to lead the opposition to Bork, has enlisted constitutional scholars such as Walter Dellinger of Duke University and Laurence Tribe of Harvard in this effort. They argue that the Senate has the prerogative to reject a nominee on the basis of his judicial philosophy, or "ideology" as it's often confusingly called, if the president has taken it into account in his selection.

That seems fair enough. The Constitution says only that the Senate shall render "advice and consent." The phrase obviously is open to different interpretations, and it can reasonably be said to imply the degree of Senate scrutiny Dellinger and Tribe argue for.

Certainly there have been what were considered good and sufficient reasons for the tradition of Senate deference to the president on selection of judges, principally the fact that the president has presented his agenda to a national electorate as no senator has done, and more than likely has elaborated something of a philosophy of jurisprudence. This argument has at one time or another been endorsed by Senators Biden, Kennedy, and Metzenbaum, among others. To quote the 1979 version of Biden: "The real issue with a judicial nominee is whether he is capable of objectively reviewing questions of law and fact. To apply any other standard would be to disqualify from the judiciary virtually any public person who has been willing to take positions on judicial issues."

But leave that aside; Bork supporters should not draw the battle lines on this question, because it is altogether to the nominee's advantage that his judicial philosophy be thoroughly scrutinized, particularly in light of current alternative theories. If the nation gets a close look at Robert Bork juxtaposed against his opponents, either confirmation or Democratic political ruin in '88 is almost a certainty.

Bork's allegiance to the philosophy of judicial restraint with which his name is so readily associated has never, until recently, been called into question. He is, as Michael Barone of the *Washington Post* has noted, perhaps the most genuinely principled proponent of judicial restraint in the profession. So principled is Bork, Barone argues, that liberals should take great comfort in his ascent to the high court because they can expect substantial deference to the products of increasingly liberal state legislatures.

But out in the territory just leftward of the *Post*, no such concessions are being made. Even Bork's commitment to judicial restraint is being questioned by his distraught opponents. This is one of two directly contradictory lines of criticism being leveled against Bork. It holds that he is a results-oriented conservative activist cloaked disingenuously in the robes of restraint. He intends to advance the Reagan agenda and the fortunes of corporate fat cats at the expense of individual liberties, and he will manipulate the Constitution shamelessly to achieve these ends. The second line of criticism is the precise opposite—that he is too restrained. In this characterization, Bork is a calcified ideo-

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logue, constrained by a theory that makes him reflexively deferential to obtuse legislative majorities and insufficiently diligent in carrying out the judge's proper role. Do not be surprised to hear both views advanced by the same parties.

Bork the Conservative Activist

The argument that Bork is a conservative activist who managed to sneak onto the federal bench rests mainly on an analysis of a handful of his opinions on the D.C. Circuit done by Public Citizen Litigation Group, a Naderite organization. The study purports to show that Bork's positions are predictable on the basis of the parties involved in the lawsuit. He is accused of invariably supporting business, and upholding government against claims for the rights of individuals. Bork jurisprudence, it is suggested, differs not a whit from Reaganite policies.

Quite apart from the fact that it is a ludicrous enterprise to evaluate a judge's decisions without ever addressing the question of whether he correctly applied the law, the study is a shameless exercise in deceit. In the first place, it examines only split decisions (the D.C. Circuit usually sits in three-judge panels), which comprised only 13 percent of the total cases in which Bork has participated. Split decisions are often cutting-edge cases in which activists such as the Naderites try to stretch the boundaries of the law and the power of the courts to set aside legislative decisions. An analysis of the split decisions of an activist judge, as for example, Abner Mikva, who is sympathetic to the Naderite agenda, would probably suggest his votes are also predictable on the basis of parties to the suit.

Of the 56 cases analyzed in the study, only six found Bork declining to defer to a legislative decision. Bork was in the majority on all six of those opinions, all but one of which involved customary judicial review of the actions of an administrative agency exercising delegated powers, rather than direct challenge of duly passed legislation. In the case that did not involve agency review, *Ollman* v. *Evans*, Bork rendered an expansive interpretation of the First Amendment that has been applauded by liberals. Given the gravamen of the study—to show that Bork defers to legislatures only when it suits him—this evidence is next to nil.

It is especially enlightening to look at the case the Naderites seem to think is the most telling count in their indictment, *Jersey Central Power & Light* v. *Federal Energy Regulatory Commission*. This case is the single entry in a section that purports to show Bork's inclination to find constitutional rights for businesses. It is also the leading entry of the five cases that are supposed to demonstrate the absence of principle in Bork's pattern of deference to agencies. Let's take a look at this smoking gun.

The case involved a review of an FERC decision not to grant a rate increase to a utility, Jersey Central, that had requested it. The company presented evidence that its rates were substantially lower than those charged by utilities in neighboring areas, and were not high enough to allow access to reasonable credit terms. As was customary, the D.C. Circuit sat in review of the FERC's decision, charged with balancing the interests of the company's shareholders against those of consumers. Joining moderately liberal Judge Ruth Ginsberg in the majority, Bork determined that Jersey Central had presented sufficient evidence that its shareholders' interests were being slighted and remanded the case for a second hearing by the FERC.

Without blushing, the Naderites assert that Bork is expanding the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment by allowing Jersey Central's claim. He is doing nothing of the kind. The precedent that established the balancing test the court was required to use had long since determined that failure to grant a rate increase could, in some circumstances, be a violation of the takings clause. Bork added nothing to that holding. He was merely reviewing the facts, which yielded evidence on behalf of the utility that Judge Ginsberg also found persuasive, and then applying the balancing test required by precedent. The holding cannot reasonably be said to reflect any bias whatsoever toward business. Yet the Naderites use it as a club to beat on Bork, evidently assuming that no one will take the time to read the case.

Bork sees a role for the courts in preserving the liberties that are clearly spelled out in the Constitution, but views these rights as very specific and delimited.

They would do well to soft-pedal their sophistry. Bork has, in fact, taken pains in several of his speeches and writings, to distinguish himself from so-called judicial conservatives who wish to read expansive economic rights into the Constitution. He has cautioned, in a speech before the University of San Diego law school and elsewhere, against a reading of the due process clause that would allow the courts to review any government regulations that affect the disposition of property. Quite familiar with the limitations of judges, Bork believes it is always a difficult task for them to enforce economic rights against the government, as, for example, if a balanced budget amendment were to be put into the Constitution. In his thinking on that issue, Bork puts himself at odds with the current Reaganite catechism. While an enthusiast of free markets, Bork doesn't see them made any freer by the efforts of courts. There is absolutely no support for the contention that Bork is likely to find special succor for business in the Constitution.

Bork the Rigid Theorist

Someone should tell Public Citizen that its study is firing crosswise with some of the heavy artillery Biden & Co. have been wheeling into the Judiciary Committee. Many of the assembled scholastic eminences acknowledge that Bork is faithful to his philosophy of judicial restraint, but they argue that it renders him too rigid in his thinking and not really up to the challenges of a modern and dynamic Supreme Court.

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For some years now, a preoccupation of law professors has been the elaboration of theories that, while allowing judges to make law, can be rationalized in such a way as not to seem totally inconsistent with the premises of democratic government. This is a tall order, but it has engaged some of the finest minds of our time.

Occasionally, a whimsical textual argument for expansive interpretation of the Constitution is advanced centering on the Ninth Amendment, which asserts that the rights of citizens are not limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. As Bork has pointed out, though, there is no historical evidence whatsoever to indicate that the drafters intended this to mean that judges should have carte blanche to mint new constitutional rights. Nor would such a notion of judicial autonomy be consistent with any conceivable theory of democratic government. More often, though, the Ninth Amendment is downplayed. There seems to be a tacit agreement in constitutional scholar circles that liberals won't bring up the Ninth Amendment if conservatives will forbear from mentioning the 10th, which reserves a large sphere of power for the states.

Why shouldn't an educated elite be able to stop us when we act foolishly through our representatives?

More typically, the enterprise of judicial activism is justified with grand abstractions and metaphors. Tribe finds the Constitution to be "a living and breathing document" that must adapt itself to changing times. Professor Roger Dworkin of New York University law school sees this dynamic organism as "realizing what can sensibly be called its own ambitions." To Supreme Court Justice William Brennan the Constitution is pervasively concerned with the enhancement of human dignity.

Viewed broadly, the theories propped up by such rhetoric, fall into two categories: the concept that judges are a sort of moral vanguard, an enlightened elite that is leading an instinctively retrograde citizenry toward a heightened moral awareness; and the notion that judges are referees of the political process, protecting underrepresented groups from rampant majoritarianism. Bork is considered insufficiently attuned to these two views of the courts' function by most of his erstwhile colleagues in academe.

The right-to-privacy cases epitomize the first theory. The most significant case of this line was *Griswold* v. *Connecticut,* in which a state statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives was challenged. The Court searched the Constitution for penumbras and emanations, and found Connecticut's law in violation of the newly minted right to privacy. That case laid the theoretical groundwork for *Roe* and the overturning of abortion laws.

The paradigm for the second theory is probably the one-man, one-vote line of cases where the Court found in the 14th Amendment the mandate to oversee state elections. A latter-day application of the principle would be reading the 14th Amendment to protect quotas discriminating in favor of different groups.

Now, some of Bork's opponents, in their more candid moments, will admit that there is next to no basis in the text or history of the Constitution for such decisions. They will acknowledge that the courts are creating law rather than interpreting it. But when they really let their hair down, they will tell you that this is a good thing. After all, judges and law professors are better educated and generally more intelligent than the vast majority of the population. Typically, judges are not out for personal gain, having in most cases given up lucrative law practices for a seat on the bench out of a spirit of public service. Appointed for life, they are not subject to the same political pressures as elected representatives. They are attuned to the latest developments in moral philosophy such as John Rawls' epic work, *A Theory of Justice,* a smash hit in academic circles.

And bear in mind that legislatures can do some really dumb things. If you don't think Connecticut's contraceptive law was dumb, consider the law in question in one of the earliest right to privacy cases, *Meyer* v. *Nebraska.* That case threw out a statute, a product of World War I xenophobia, that prohibited parents from teaching their children in any language other than English. So what's the matter with giving judges a little flexibility to throw out foolish laws like these? This is the nub of the matter, the commonsense question that the issues in the Bork nomination boil down to: Why shouldn't an educated elite be able to stop us when we act foolishly through our representatives?

The most cogent answers have for years been provided by Bork. He turns all the arguments in favor of judicial activism on their heads. Judges' insulation from the political process renders them less, not more fit to make policy, because if they make bad policy they are not accountable to the electorate in any way. The mistake can be undone only with great difficulty, usually taking decades. And judges can sometimes be obtuse as well. Certainly *Roe* v. *Wade,* which many millions of people regard as morally depraved, was hardly a Solomonic decision. That judges will sometimes abuse prerogatives given them is demonstrable.

Nor does the fact that judges are a homogeneous group, with almost all of them coming from the ranks of the educated, upper-middle class, make them more fit to usher in the age of moral enlightenment, Bork argues. In fact, the current educated classes in the United States would seem to be particularly unsuited for this task since their ethos is shaped primarily by a mindless relativism that Professor Allan Bloom has recently and so successfully documented. In any event, matters of great controversy, as morals inevitably are in a pluralistic democracy, should be contested in the political processes, Bork maintains. That way, the resolution is not cast in concrete, as a constitutional decision is, and the minority at least has the opportunity to try to reshape the consensus.

Bork sees the argument that courts should intervene in the political process on behalf of underrepresented groups

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also floundering on an incorrect factual premise—that there really are groups who would benefit from the courts' intervention. Certainly the poor and minorities have been well represented in the political process in recent years, as all manner of welfare and civil rights legislation attests. True, the political process did not work well for blacks in the South until recently, but in Bork's view, state-sanctioned segregation was allowed only by a clear misreading of the Constitution, as we shall see in a moment. In that instance, the courts fell short of protecting the fundamental liberties that are spelled out in the Constitution.

On a theoretical level, the question of how to protect minorities from having their interests trampled by majorities was addressed by James Madison 200 years ago. He believed that the separation of powers in government and the interplay of competing factions would suffice to put a brake on majorities. He never envisioned courts performing that role, nor would he have dreamed of a judiciary as powerful as it has now become. Madison's resolution of the problem is not perfect, but democracy precludes perfect government. A judicial autocracy that sacrifices the integrity of separation of powers hardly seems preferable.

In line with Madison's thinking, Bork's jurisprudence pays special attention to balance of power considerations. His particular worry is that the judiciary will continue its tendency to encroach upon the other two branches of government. Toward the end of preventing that, he is most reluctant to grant standing in cases such as those brought by the Naderites representing consumers in general or some equally ill-defined group. If judges decline to decide a controversy, then it must be referred back to the political process. Bork also is careful not to embrace any judicial theory for which no clear lines can be drawn, no obvious restraints placed on judges.

No Judicial Minimalist

While Bork declines to read any abstract theories of justice into the Constitution, that is not to say that he is a judicial minimalist or a constitutional literalist. He sees plenty of work for judges to do in fulfilling their interpretative duties. They are obliged, he says, to search for the appropriate principles intended by the Constitution's drafters, but to be certain those principles are interpreted at a level of generality that does not allow judges to read in their own values and preferences.

This approach sometimes leaves Bork on opposite sides of a particular question from judges normally seen as conservative. *Ollman* v. *Evans* is a good example. Bork determined the crucial principle in the First Amendment's free speech clause to be protection of political speech, and he upheld the right of political columnists to repeat hearsay about a person who had "placed himself in the political arena and become the subject of heated political debate." Most conservative jurists saw no reason to dismiss the suit.

Bork has also found a principle undergirding the 14th Amendment that allows him to reach the same result as the *Brown* v. *the Board* school desegregation case, whereas many conservative jurists, while admiring *Brown*'s result, have not been able to find any principle that would allow the result. Bork saw the amendment as "preserving some measure of racial equality against government interference"—a formulation that gives judges some flexibility in determining what kind of racial equality is called for, but does not allow them to go far beyond an examination of the drafters' intent. As applied to the *Brown* case, the principle means that if blacks and whites naturally migrate into neighborhood patterns where they would attend the same schools, government cannot intervene to thwart this tendency toward an integrated equality by segregating schools. From this perspective, Bork would be able to decide *Brown* in accordance with what most people intuitively believe to be fairness.

To quote the 1979 version of Biden: "The real issue with a judicial nominee is whether he is capable of objectively reviewing questions of law and fact. To apply any other standard would be to disqualify from the judiciary virtually any public person who has been willing to take positions on judicial issues."

The key thing about both Bork's First Amendment and 14th Amendment principles is that they have clear boundaries drawing the lines on judicial prerogative. The right to privacy stands in stark contrast. Conceivably just about any kind of behavior of which a clever jurist is solicitous can fall under its rubric. When sodomy is excluded from the protected behavior, as it was last year in *Bowers* v. *Hardwick* by a one-vote margin, it is merely arbitrary line drawing. No principled limitations on the privacy right have yet been discerned. The Bork view, of course, is that the right is not to be found in the Constitution in the first place.

The Liberals' Worst Nightmare

Part of the Biden strategy has been to encourage fellow senators to contemplate the likely results of Bork's being on the Court, and to consider whether that would be a good thing for the country. Very well; let's do. What's the worst possible scenario, given a confirmed Justice Bork, from the standpoint of the liberal agenda?

Roe v. *Wade* may well be overturned, though Justice O'Connor's vote is not predictable with any great degree of certainty. That would mean the disposition of abortion would return to the states. It is difficult to predict whether there will be significant changes in state abortion law in the near future, though changes were taking place in many states in the decade prior to the *Roe* holding in 1973. Four states had permitted abortion on demand, and 14 had allowed it under special circumstances such as rape, incest, or endangerment of the mother's life. While much political activism on both sides of the issue can be expected at the

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state level, there will probably be an amelioration of the bitter divisiveness brought about by the courts' preemption of the issue. Pro-life forces will set about the task of reforging a consensus against abortion, and if they fail they will at least have the satisfaction of knowing they weren't excluded from the political process by judicial fiat.

On race issues, it is preposterous to assert, as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has, that Bork would "deprive black . . . Americans of the gains achieved in the last 30 years." The only real question at issue is the fate of affirmative action programs and quotas. It is possible that Bork's reading of the Civil Rights Act and of the 14th Amendment would be that both prohibit quotas and affirmative action programs. But it is unlikely that a five-justice majority could be mustered in support of those positions. And if that were the case, Congress could probably undo the decisions by clarifying its intent in the Civil Rights Act, and possibly by asserting the power to enforce the 14th Amendment as it sees fit, a power specifically granted to Congress in the text.

In Bork's view, state-sanctioned segregation was allowed only by a clear misreading of the Constitution.

It is just as likely, though, that Bork would uphold the Supreme Court precedents validating affirmative action. He has said that a precedent should be overturned only when it is clearly wrong and "pernicious" as well. Given Bork's stated hostility toward racism—he has said, "Of the ugliness of racism there need be no argument"—it is at least unclear whether he would regard the ratification of programs designed to undo the effects of racism as pernicious.

On the so-called women's issues, the rhetoric is as intemperate. Kate Michelman of the National Abortion Rights Action League has said: "Confirmation of Judge Bork could jeopardize a generation of progress toward securing basic freedoms and legal equality for American women." But the only controversy in this area concerns the degree of scrutiny under the 14th Amendment the Court would give classifications based on gender. That would not change with Bork on the Supreme Court. He applies the same standard of review to gender classifications—the "reasonable basis" test of Justice Stevens—that he does to any other distinction made by a statute. Moreover, the only laws involving gender classifications likely to be challenged in the foreseeable future are those that benefit women at the expense of men. Judge Bork's habit of deference to legislatures will benefit women in those instances.

On criminal procedure issues—what about Kennedy's fear that "rogue police" will "break down citizens' doors in midnight raids"? It's the basest of demagoguery. There are no cutting-edge cases regarding the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable search and seizure provision currently in the lower courts. If some arise and reach the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that Bork's votes would differ significantly from those of Powell, who was hardly a devotee of the exclusionary rule.

On First Amendment issues: The *Ollman* case demonstrates that Bork is prepared to make a more expansive interpretation of the free speech clause than are Justices Scalia and Rehnquist. In establishment clause cases, Bork might provide the fifth vote to allow government financial aid to religious schools, and possibly on a few other issues. While he might well vote to overturn the original school prayer decision, at present only Scalia and Rehnquist would join him in so doing.

In sum: The precedents that conceivably might be overturned, or even challenged, with Bork on the Court can probably be counted on one hand. There will be no overturning of *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, for example, simply because no state is going to pass a law prohibiting contraceptives. Bork's direct impact on the resolution of genuinely sensitive political issues will be virtually unfelt. The importance of the nomination hinges rather on the contribution he is likely to make to the ongoing conversation about the proper means of resolving such issues. Bork's opponents know how persuasive he can be.

A Four-Star Choice

Several years ago, when Richard Nixon's Supreme Court nomination of G. Harrold Carswell was sent up to the Senate, it was objected that, among other shortcomings, Carswell was a mediocre jurist. Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska was pilloried for defending Carswell with the contention that, as most of the American people are mediocre, they need representation on the Supreme Court, too. Hruska's valid point was buried beneath the syntax. In 1970, it was not yet so commonly accepted that an imperial judiciary had set itself at odds with the people and their representatives.

Thanks in large part to the intellectual force of Robert Bork, that fact is more generally understood. When his friend Bork joins the court, Hruska will get the defender of the people he wanted, but certainly not the mediocrity. Bork is universally recognized as one of the finest legal minds of this era. His writings should be compiled into a civics text and made required reading at the rehabilitated academy Allan Bloom envisions.

It's a "four-star appointment," in the words of Geoffrey Stone, liberal dean of the University of Chicago law school. If it acts in good faith, the Senate cannot conclude otherwise, and will speedily bring Judge Bork onto a court that will be substantially enriched by his association. ☎

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"Resisting Radical Transformation of the Constitution," Gary C. Leedes, Professor of Constitutional Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.

"The Judicial Review of John Marshall and Its Subsequent Development in American Jurisprudence," Joseph Secola, Attorney-at-Law, and President, The Rutherford Institute of Connecticut, Inc.

"Constitutional Interpretation and the Question of Lawful Authority," Jeffrey A. Aman, Attorney-at-Law, Tampa, Florida, and H. Wayne House, Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology, Dallas Theological Seminary.

"Church-State Separation: Restoring the 'No-Preference' Doctrine of the First Amendment," Robert L. Cord, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Northeastern University.

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THE BIBLE BELT IS AMERICA'S SAFETY BELT

Why The Holocaust Couldn't Happen Here

RABBI JOSHUA O. HABERMAN

In his considerable arsenal of vituperation, H. L. Mencken reserved some of his choicest invectives for the "Bible Belt," a term he popularized during the Scopes trial of 1925. Mencken helped organize the defense of a 24-year-old biology teacher, John Thomas Scopes, who, in violation of Tennessee state law, taught the Darwinian theory of evolution in the public school. The hostile crowd that filled the courtroom in Dayton, Tennessee, and its Bible-quoting fundamentalist preachers, represented everything Mencken loathed. He described them as "gaping primates" and "anthropoid rabble." Their ideas were "degraded nonsense which country preachers are ramming and hammering into Yokel skulls." Mencken viewed the Bible Belt as a religious and cultural ghetto, America's stronghold of primitive and closed minds, intolerant and anti-progressive, an atavistic aberration of America's genius in this age of science and modernism.

Today's critics of "right-wing fundamentalism" see the Bible Belt mentality not as a mere aberration but as a formidable threat to our entire democratic system. Comfortable in what they believe to be the secular pluralism of 20th-century America, these critics are alarmed and horrified by the nationwide following of fundamentalist preachers such as Jerry Falwell, Jimmy Swaggart, and Pat Robertson. There are widespread fears that a resurgence of popular Bible study and preaching, and the growing political strength of its promoters, would lead us, step by step, to fanaticism, censorship, the suppression of dissent, the subversion of First Amendment rights, and finally, the establishment of a quasi-totalitarian Christian theocracy.

As an eyewitness to the horror and barbarism of a totalitarian regime, I hold a different view of Americans who take the moral absolutes of the Bible seriously. I fled to the United States in the summer of 1938, only months after my native city of Vienna jubilantly welcomed the Nazi troops who had overrun Austria without resistance. Vienna was a sophisticated capital, the center of modern philosophy, psychoanalysis, and artistic expressionism, but its intellectual climate was dominated by a moral relativism, bordering on nihilism, that left the Viennese defenseless against the appeal of Hitler's pagan nationalism and worship of military might.

The Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, which not only gave me shelter but also the opportunity to continue my rabbinic studies, wisely exposed me to the heartland of America with special preaching assignments in Danville, Illinois, Casper, Wyoming, and Opelousas, Louisiana, before placing me in my first full-time pulpit in Mobile, Alabama. There I discovered an ethical consensus, based on common allegiance to the Bible as the principal source of faith and morals. It was as though I had been transported from a slippery swamp, steaming with decay and deceptively overgrown by exotic and alluring but poisonous flowers, to a firm path along neatly cut lawns—much less exciting but safer and more reassuring.

The people I met in shops, service stations, and roadside diners, the families whose homes I visited, the pastors of different faiths I worked with, were perhaps less subtle and knowledgeable than their counterparts in Vienna. But they were also more open, frank, and good-natured; they seemed unshaken in their moral standards and very much more involved in the private and public practice of their religion. In Vienna I was constantly on guard with people, wondering what reality might hide behind the mask of gracious courtesy; the people I met in Mobile, at times uncouth, naive, or primitive in their religious self-expression, by and large impressed me as trustworthy. Their Biblically grounded moral standards and faith in God, deeply rooted in and reinforced by all levels of society, acted as barriers against the excesses of governmental power that can lead to totalitarianism.

Mencken vs. Tocqueville

Mencken's unflattering references to the Bible Belt were not the product of serious reflection but of a highly emotional reaction to the conduct of the Scopes trial. He may have had good reason to be infuriated by William Jennings Bryan's demagogic invocation of the Bible when presenting the State's case against a teacher who dared teach the

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theory of evolution in contradiction to the Biblical creation story. But Mencken went to excess by equating intense faith in the Bible with a primitive, illiberal, uneducated mind set. Serious historians such as Alexis de Tocqueville reached the opposite conclusion about the Bible's role in the making of America. Tocqueville saw liberty and religion, secular knowledge and the Bible prosper together in the development of American democracy:

> The philosophers of the Eighteenth Century explained in a very simple manner the gradual decay of religious faith. Religious zeal, said they, must necessarily fail the more generally liberty is established and knowledge defused. Unfortunately, the facts by no means accord with their theory. There are certain populations in Europe whose unbelief is only equaled by their ignorance and debasement; while in America, one of the freest and most enlightened nations in the world, the people fulfill with fervor all the outward duties of religion.

Unlike Mencken, who portrayed Bible believers as a less civilized subspecies of Americans, Tocqueville was impressed by the combination of intelligence, enterprise, and faith he detected in the American pioneer who clung to his Bible:

> Everything about him is primitive and wild, but he is himself the result of the labor and experience of 18 centuries. He wears the dress and speaks the language of cities, he is acquainted with the past, curious about the future, and ready for argument about the present; he is, in short, a highly civilized being, who consents for a time to inhabit the backwoods, and who penetrates into the wilds of the New World with the Bible, an axe, and some newspapers.

"On my arrival in the U.S.," wrote Tocqueville, "the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention." He made it plain that he was not referring to a direct role of the church or clergy in the nation's political administration but rather to religion's direction of "the customs of the community." He concluded that religion, "by regulating domestic life, . . . regulates the state."

Repeatedly, Tocqueville argued that democratic constitutions and institutions would be as ineffective in the United States as they proved to be in South America, were they not upheld by the moral standards and beliefs that shape the customs of the people. This moral consensus Tocqueville considered to be the indispensable anchor of democracy in America:

> Every principle of the moral world is fixed and determinate, although the political world is abandoned to the debates and the experiments of men. Thus the human mind is never left to wander over a boundless field; and whatever may be its pretensions, it is checked from time to time by barriers that it cannot surmount.

Tocqueville prophetically warned the friends of democracy not to set aside these insurmountable "barriers," not even "for the interest of society." The "barriers" he referred to are moral absolutes, which, if breached with impunity by any person, party, or governmental leader, would be like a broken dam incapable of protecting the land against floods of evil:

> Hitherto no one in the United States has dared to advance the maxim that everything is permissible for the interests of society, an impious adage which seems to have been invented in an age of freedom to shelter all future tyrants.

Twentieth Century Pharaohs

The suspension of the Bible's moral "barriers" made possible all the atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, and other totalitarian rulers. It is no accident that the Soviet State and Hitler's Third Reich both identified the Bible and its teachers as primary enemies.

In Germany, a thirty-point program drawn up by the Nazi party's official ideologue, Alfred Rosenberg, for the creation of a "National Reich Church" listed as Point

It is no accident that the Soviet State and Hitler's Third Reich both identified the Bible and its teachers as primary enemies.

Number Thirteen: "The National Church demands immediate cessation of the publishing and dissemination of the Bible."

Rosenberg was not mistaken in judging the Bible to be incompatible with Nazi philosophy. The Bible mandates a Supreme Law, to which all human creatures, even the Führer, must submit.

On the whole, the official clerical leadership of German Protestantism and Catholicism left a dismal record of compromise, submission, and collaboration with the Nazi regime. Not so the members of the dissident Confessing Church (*Bekennende Kirche)* which, following Karl Barth's staunch fidelity to Scriptural theology, felt impelled to reject "unscriptural" Nazi views. They remained one of the few centers of resistance inside the Nazi Reich and paid the price of martyrdom, most notably in the execution of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.

In the Soviet Union, the distribution of the Bible has been prohibited since the Bolshevik Revolution. Its teaching and public discussion still are punishable offenses.

A notorious episode in the Soviet war against the Bible occurred as late as last year during the supposedly more liberal Gorbachev regime. Anatoly Shcharansky, after suffering eight years of a 13-year prison and labor camp sentence on trumped-up charges of treason, was suddenly released as part of the Soviet orchestration of a favorable atmosphere for summit meetings with the United States.

In January 1986, Shcharansky was moved from the labor

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camp to Moscow for "recovery" prior to his imminent surrender to an American diplomat. The guards spotted Shcharansky's little book of Psalms and confiscated it. "I said I would not leave without the Psalms that had helped me so much," Shcharansky recalls. When the guards refused to return the contraband, Shcharansky threw himself down on the snow-covered ground and said, "Not another step," until his book was returned. Following his arrival in Israel, when Shcharansky was carried by the crowd to the Temple Wall in Jerusalem, his hands clasped the book of Psalms from which he had drawn so much faith and strength.

Biblical Roots of Our Democracy

The journalist Quentin Reynolds has written, "If I were a dictator, the first thing I'd burn would be the Bible. I'd burn it because I'd realize that the whole concept of democracy came first from the Bible."

I can cite no better illustration than America's historical experience. The Bible has been our foremost armory in the struggle for political independence and human rights.

On my arrival in the U.S., the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention.

—Alexis de Tocqueville

The 102 souls who stepped off the Mayflower were steeped in the Bible. They read and reread its laws and historical narratives. They sang its Psalms as their principal prayers. Many studied its text in the original Hebrew and chose Hebraic names for their children. The late Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., of Harvard University once wrote that a glance at the passenger list of the Mayflower might make one think that it was the crossing of the Red Sea instead of the Atlantic. As refugees from religious oppression, they rejected the authority of English law and drew up a new, Biblically inspired covenant, "The Pilgrims Code," which stated:

> It was the great privilege of Israel of old . . . that God gave them right judgments and true laws. They are for the main so exemplary, being grounded on the principles of moral equity that all Christians, especially, ought always to have an eye thereunto in the framing of their political constitutions.

Like the Hebrews of old, the Pilgrims saw themselves as in covenant with God, a covenant spelled out in the Bible. The veneration of the Scriptures as supreme law, superior to the laws of kings, potentates, or magistrates, was the germ of the all-important political philosophy—the very heart of our democracy—which recognizes "a government of laws and not of men."

Oscar S. Straus, in *The Origin of Republican Form of Government*, has compiled abundant examples of the Bible's crucial role in shaping anti-monarchical public opinion on the eve of the American Revolution. Preachers in our Thirteen Original Colonies derived from the Bible the principle of legislation with the consent of the people (Exodus 24:7), the idea of replacing autocracy with a representative form of government (Exodus 18), and the anti-aristocratic practice of qualifying common people for leadership (Exodus 18:21 and Deuteronomy 1:13). As the colonists approached their final break with the English monarchy, the most popular preaching texts were the eighth chapter of Samuel in which the prophet warns the people of the evils a king would bring with him, and the story of Gideon's refusal of the crown (Judges 8:22-23).

These preachers based the principle of human equality, enunciated in the Declaration's "All men are created equal" upon the Biblical creation story of Adam as the common ancestor of all mankind. They detected a model for the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the tribal federation of the Hebrews.

The Founding Fathers could not have mobilized a revolutionary army if the people had not come to believe that liberty was their birthright, and that it was mandated by Holy Writ. The words of Leviticus 25:10, "proclaim liberty throughout the land and unto all the inhabitants thereof," were engraved on the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia as the symbol of America's freedom struggle.

During the birth pangs of our republic, opinion molders turned a political cause into a religious cause through constant reference to Biblical metaphors, notably the Exodus story. They saw another Pharaoh in King George III and, as a people, identified with the divinely guided Hosts of Israel. The day the Declaration of Independence was adopted, a committee consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams was appointed "to prepare a proper device for a Seal for the United States of America." They recommended a design showing Pharaoh, sword in hand, seated in a chariot, pursuing the Israelites through the divided waters of the Red Sea. On the farther shore, already standing safely under the rays of a pillar of fire, were Moses and the people of Israel; Moses, extending his hand over the sea, causes its waters to overwhelm Pharaoh and his army. Inscribed around the edge of the seal were the words: "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God." Although this particular seal was not adopted, its proposed content indicates the depth of the Bible's influence upon the founders of our Republic.

Benjamin Franklin likewise associated the love of the Bible with our nation's democratic character: "A Bible and a newspaper in every house, a good school in every district—all studied and appreciated as they merit—are the principal support of virtue, morality, and civil liberty."

Let My People Go

Today's critics of the Bible Belt find fault with "right-wing fundamentalists," not on account of their ignorance but because of their alleged insensitivity to social justice. These critics should be reminded that in the vanguard of

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

Proclaiming Leviticus throughout the land

the Abolitionist Movement, which culminated in the Civil War, stood men and women with fervent faith in the Bible's mandate to free the slaves and to protect fugitives from slavery. They were the most vocal advocates of an armed struggle for elementary justice. William Lloyd Garrison, whose anti-slavery publication, "Liberator," was the mouthpiece of the Abolitionists, had a mind "soaked in the Bible." He acknowledged its motivating power: "Take away the Bible and our warfare with oppression, and infidelity, and intemperance, and impurity is removed—we have no authority to speak and no courage to act."

The Union anthem during the Civil War, "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," came "straight out of the Biblical prophets," according to Edmund Wilson. Its rousing lines—"Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord / He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored"—are a poetic rephrasing of Isaiah's vision of the day of reckoning in Chapter 63:3.

Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose *Uncle Tom's Cabin* raised not only the nation's but the world's consciousness of the scandal of slavery, acknowledged the Bible as having "fixed an indelible mark" on her imagination and judged as inestimable its formative influence.

We owe the birth of our nation to Washington, but it was Lincoln who made the issue of human rights co-equal with political freedom. His idealism and rhetoric are Biblical throughout. At the age of 10, Lincoln had already read the Bible thrice. The year before his assassination, he wrote, "I am profitably engaged in reading the Bible . . . Take all of this book that you can upon reason and the balance upon faith, and you will live and die a better man."

His Gettysburg Address has the resonance of a Biblical chapter. Its most memorable phrase comes from John Wycliffe's statement, believed to have been part of the preface to his English translation of the Bible: "The Bible is for the government of the people, by the people and for the people."

The power of the Bible to overcome racial prejudice may be illustrated by the recent case of the Reverend Jerry Falwell, whose study of the Bible and its principle of the equality of all creatures under God their Creator helped him rid himself of the anti-black feelings he harbored as a young man. "It took several years to get segregation flushed out of my soul," he remarked to a biographer. "Through my Bible reading and spiritual development, I began to confront this issue in my own life. I realized that I was completely wrong, what I had been taught was completely wrong. For me it was a Scriptural and personal

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Many Bible-believing Christians, among them Dietrich Bonhoeffer, paid with their lives for their opposition to Nazi atrocities.

realization that segregation was evil."

A year ago, the nation celebrated the renovation of the Statue of Liberty. This symbol of America's welcome to the immigrant in search of freedom and opportunity is as much a symbol of our compassion for the downtrodden as the Liberty Bell is a symbol of our commitment to political liberty. The lines from Emma Lazarus' sonnet chiseled into the pedestal of the Statue—" . . . Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, / The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me"—echo the Biblical assurance of God's love and compassion for "the afflicted, tossed with tempest, and not comforted" (Isaiah 54:11).

This year we celebrate the bicentenary of the Constitution. Its power is not in the text but in the will of the people to order their lives under law. To the student of American history it is obvious that respect for the majesty of law has its roots in the Bible. Tocqueville said, "Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot." He then explained:

> Religion is much more necessary in the republic . . . than in the monarchy. . . . How is it possible that society should escape destruction if the moral tie is not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed? And what can be done with the people who are their own masters if they are not submissive to the deity?

The most important difference between totalitarianism and democracy is not the amount of civil freedom granted to citizens within each system. Conceivably, a dictator could likewise extend similar rights to his subjects. But then he could also arbitrarily withdraw any of these rights since he recognizes no authority above himself. The crucial difference in a democracy such as ours is that not even the highest authority of the land, neither the president nor Congress, can withdraw any of the so-called inalienable rights that are perceived to be not the gift of government but of the Creator. We have absolutized certain rights and moral values as the spiritual undergirding of our political system. In America, the Bible is the repository of these moral absolutes. As James Russell Lowell acknowledged: "The Ten Commandments will not budge."

We are a nation whose devotion to the Bible is a mighty fortress against the violation of fundamental human rights by governmental power. We are a nation that sings hymns in honor of the Bible, such as this one by Percy Dearmer:

> Book of books, our people's strength,
> Statesman's, teacher's, hero's treasure,
> Bringing freedom, spreading truth,
> Shedding light that none can measure;
> Wisdom comes to those who know thee,
> All the best we have we owe thee.

As a Jew, I differ with a variety of Bible-believing Christians on theology, our nation's social agenda, and matters of public policy. I am, at times, repelled by fits of fanaticism and a narrow-minded, rigid dogmatism among fundamentalist extremists. Yet far greater than these differences and objections is the common moral and spiritual frame of reference I share with Christians, including fundamentalists. The Bible gave our nation its moral vision. And today, America's Bible Belt is our safety belt, the enduring guarantee of our fundamental rights and freedoms. ☎

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

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A Subsidy for Motherhood

Why I Now Support Social Security

John Mueller

What first attracted G. K. Chesterton to Christian orthodoxy, he remarked, was that "it was attacked on all sides and for all contradictory reasons." Fellow skeptics found the monks too meek and the Crusaders too bloody, the vestments too showy and the sackcloth too threadbare, the membership too common and the theology too exclusive. They faulted it for being too optimistic about the universe and too pessimistic about the world; for repressing sexuality too much and (according to the Malthusians) not enough. Yet the common man embraced Christianity. "Perhaps," Chesterton concluded, "this extraordinary thing is really the ordinary thing; at least the normal thing, the center. Perhaps, after all, it is Christianity that is sane and all its critics that are mad—in various ways."

I have had a similar, if less exalted conversion, to supporting Social Security. I once thought it should be phased out; I now believe conservatives should try to make Social Security work. I remained dogmatic in my skepticism until I tried to make consistent sense of my fellow skeptics' arguments. Left and right, elite opinion-makers have reached an extraordinary consensus: Social Security is fatally flawed and needs sweeping reform, if not abolition. The trouble is that the experts, even on the right, cannot agree on the fatal flaw. Martin Feldstein finds Social Security biased against capital; others claim the payroll tax falls hardest on labor. Some find Social Security's progressiveness intolerable; David Stockman faults it for being a regressive "subsidy to the middle class." Michael Boskin thinks Social Security is peculiarly biased against yuppies; Allan Carlson insists that public old-age pensions are *per se* anti-family. Yet Social Security remains overwhelmingly popular with the public—including the young, many of whom think the system won't be there when they retire.

Such divergence between the general public and the policy elite is a danger signal in a democracy: it usually means either that the public is impervious to information freely available to the policymakers, or that the policymakers are deviating from values broadly accepted by the community. The elite naturally inclines toward the first explanation. After sifting the claims, I became convinced that the elite is wrong and the public is right about Social Security—not only on social but also (given the range of choices available today) on economic grounds. I was forced to conclude that privatizing Social Security would subject the baby boom to a whopping tax increase, and materially hurt the family.

Embarrassed Yuppies

To the average person, Social Security has several attractions. It keeps old people from falling through the economic cracks, while leaving room for a flourishing private retirement system. Benefits are tied to one's work history, though the return is somewhat progressively skewed. Social Security remains the only widely portable retirement pension. And it provided municipal-bond tax advantages for the average citizen long before Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).

But a major source of Social Security's popularity, I believe, is that it is the last major institution in America to embody what used to be called the "family wage"—an adjustment of the pre-tax market wage to accommodate the responsibilities of raising a family. This is what now most embarrasses liberals about Social Security, no less than it offends yuppies. Social Security stands almost alone in accepting the traditional family (in which the father works to support the family and the mother raises the children) as normal. In addition to the basic retirement benefit based on each worker's lifetime of contributions, there is an extra 50 percent spouse's benefit. For most married women who work part-time, intermittently, or not at all outside the home, this spousal benefit is greater than the one to which they are entitled based on their own lifetime cash earnings. There is also a widow's benefit equal to 100 percent of the husband's basic benefit, and coverage of surviving dependents. To qualify, in general, the couple must remain married, the husband must be steadily employed, and the wife must give up a lifetime of earnings equal to at least one-half of her husband's. Thus the structure of Social Security—in sharp contrast to welfare—upholds intact marriage, a father's responsibilities, a mother's sacrifice.

I once thought all this weakened the free-market principle of linking effort and reward. But I found that the real

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question is *whose* effort, and *whose* reward? Adopt a narrow libertarian viewpoint—assume a nation of relationless adult individuals, all sprung full-blown like Athena from the head of Zeus—and logic leads one to seek to privatize Social Security. Accept, however, the family as the basic unit of society—acknowledge that adults begin as children, and that basing everyone's pension solely on cash earnings means forcing mothers willy-nilly out of the home—and the same economic logic leads one to want to make Social Security work.

Yet every major Social Security reform proposal would pare down or phase out the "family wage." Liberal proposals to tax or to means-test benefits would disproportionately hit the family benefits. Proposals by conservatives to privatize Social Security would hit the family twice. Social Security's benefits for the traditional family, in effect, would effectively be phased out. In addition, the whole baby boom would be forced to "pay twice for retirement," making it even harder to raise a family.

Chicken Little Privatizers

For half a century, Social Security has operated as a pay-as-you-go system: each generation pays the retirement benefits of its parents. The shift to pay-as-you-go created a windfall for the first generation of retirees, who received more than they paid in. There has been a long and fascinating, but so far inconclusive, debate about whether this windfall reduced saving. What is beyond dispute is that *ending* pay-as-you-go after 50 years would impose a large windfall *loss*. After paying Social Security taxes to support their parents, the baby-boomers would lose any benefits in return from their children. This amounts to a lifetime tax increase of several trillion dollars to this generation. Columnist Warren Brookes puts it succinctly: "The current generation would have to pay twice as much into retirement systems for a lifetime, and accept no return at all on the Social Security half of their payments." A du Pont-style income tax credit cannot lift this burden, only shift it around. If the credit is not financed with higher tax rates (no current benefit or spending cuts are proposed), a larger federal deficit sponges all saving financed by the credit, leaving nothing for private investment. Thus the claim that even traditional families would be better off, thanks to a higher return on private saving, is empty. Families lose a second time, either directly, by giving up their Social Security benefits, or indirectly, by paying higher taxes to fund a credit they do not receive.

The privatizers must finally fall back on speculating how high the Social Security payroll tax would have to rise if we had a permanent baby bust, shut off immigration, and pursued Jimmy Carter's economic policies for the next 75 years. But if the Chicken Littles are right to prophesy an economic Ice Age, the return realized from private investments will also be far less than in the past. And how, exactly, would a several-trillion-dollar tax increase improve things? Either way, it sounds like Humphrey Bogart snarling at the young couple trying to flee Casablanca for America: "You want my advice? Go back to Bulgaria!"

Allan Carlson borrows a more sophisticated economic objection from the Swedish socialists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal: Old-age pensions are intrinsically anti-family since money spent on the elderly is money not spent on raising children. Social Security removes the incentive to have children to support oneself in retirement—demographically undermining itself.

One problem with using this argument to favor privatizing Social Security is that the Myrdals claim *private* saving has the same effect on the birth rate. Money saved for retirement is also money not spent on raising children. Of course, if Social Security substitutes for private transfers between generations, it does not affect private retirement saving. But in that case, Robert Barro argues, parents simply pass any windfall on to their children. Thus the fact that older parents are now more likely to aid their adult children than vice versa does not indicate a weakening of family ties—only a rational change in financial flows. Japan is presumably the privatizers' ideal, with no social security system to speak of. Yet Japan has the same fertility rate as the United States (1.8 lifetime births per woman; the replacement rate is 2.1), and it did not experience an American-sized postwar baby boom.

The structure of Social Security—in sharp contrast to welfare—upholds intact marriage, a father's responsibilities, a mother's sacrifice.

Some argue that anticipating a less favorable "deal" than their parents from Social Security is causing the baby-boom generation to marry later and have fewer children. But those who make this argument must accept two necessary corollaries: First, Social Security must have helped produce the baby-boomers, whose parents could anticipate a windfall; second, the extra cost of privatizing Social Security would make it harder, not easier, for the baby boom to raise children.

The birth rate in industrial countries has been falling steadily since the early 19th century (in fact, one of the few interruptions of this decline in the United States, the baby boom, started after Social Security). The Myrdals were among the first to argue that this "demographic transition" has three causes: urbanization (which ends the economic value of children as unpaid farmhands and geographically scatters the extended family); industrialization (which makes widespread saving and social insurance against old age both possible and necessary); and secularization (which changes attitudes about birth control and abortion).

The first two factors are economic: they removed benefits that once offset the cost of raising children, making children a net economic cost to their parents, though not to society. In *Population: A Problem for Democracy*, Gunnar Myrdal wrote that there are two ways to address this mismatch with incentives: "either (1) the burden of supporting the aged must be laid effectively upon the individual young families (by abolishing the whole structure of social policy enacted to support old and needy persons—

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and, do not forget, by actually denying them the right to live on their own savings), or (2) a large part of the economic burden of bringing up children must be passed from the individual to society as a whole. . . . " In other words, either force families back to the conditions of a precapitalist farm household, or else introduce some kind of family policy.

Socialist Family Policy

In practice, every modern democracy relieves part of the economic burden of raising children—for example, through personal exemptions, public schools, tuition subsidies, and Social Security family benefits. The Myrdals erred in wanting a *socialist* family policy—free in-kind medical care, housing, child care, etc. Such a policy nationalizes the functions of the nuclear family. But the "family wage" structure of Social Security helps the family provide such services for itself; keeping Social Security public helps keep the American family private. The Myrdals vehemently opposed the "family wage," recognizing that you can't get government into the home unless you first force mothers out of the house. (They also objected that it only helps those who work.)

Every major Social Security reform proposal would pare down or phase out the "family wage."

Like some of the privatizers, the Myrdals erred also not in emphasizing economic factors but in undervaluing values. The Myrdals' "family policy" included proselytization of birth control, with abortion as a "last resort," to the fertile (and therefore ignorant) lower classes, to complete their "secularization." Now, urbanization and industrialization are unlikely to be reversed; but a change in values is always possible. Lord P. T. Bauer notes that in the less developed world, the "attitude to fertility control does not depend on income, status, or urbanization, but on modernization (which as [John C.] Caldwell rightly observes is really a euphemism for Westernization)." As for the West, consider: if abortion were ended in the United States with no other change in behavior, the birth rate could boom from 1.8 to about 3.0 births per woman. Ben Wattenberg, take note.

No one can argue that keeping Social Security will trigger a resurgence of traditional values; Great Awakenings are not kicked off by the retention of federal programs. But no one can doubt that officially upholding the family as the norm is important—or deny that undermining the "family wage" aspect of Social Security would be a serious financial blow to the family.

Raise Immigration Quotas, Not Taxes

From a conservative perspective, both the family and the economy would be better served by making Social Security work than by incurring the huge cost of trying to phase it out. The sky is not falling. Instead of increasing the burden of retirement saving, we should try to reduce it. Congress should not only repeal the 1988-1990 payroll tax increases; as actuary Robert J. Myers proposes, payroll tax rates should be cut for the next three decades and then adjusted as necessary, so the trust funds do not exceed, or fall short of, about one year's reserve. This would not only curb Congress' proclivities to spend the growing trust fund surplus; it would also leave today's young workers more after-tax income for raising families and taking advantage of private tax-deferred retirement saving. We should also, in Julian Simon's words, "raise immigration quotas, not taxes." One million more immigrants a year would reduce the payroll tax (and other taxes) about 10 percent every 10 years. And we should re-extend the "family wage" concept beyond Social Security. The 1986 tax reform bill was a good start, almost doubling the personal exemption to $2,000 and raising the earned income tax credit from 11 percent to 14 percent—both proposals introduced by Jack Kemp—but failed to relate the credit to family size.

What struck Chesterton about Christianity was that it fitted the common experience of mankind, as a key fits a lock. I would say the American people seem to regard Social Security more like an ordinary suit of clothes. They may agree that it is an aesthetic absurdity; but that won't stop them from wearing it. They may politely concede the apparent inconsistency of letting it out today, only to have it taken in later on; but they seem to consider this a slur on their own human proportions. To them, this extraordinary thing is really the ordinary thing, at least, the normal thing. Social Security is not propelled by the waning momentum of the New Deal; its pro-marriage, pro-homemaker, pro-children cast makes liberals increasingly uncomfortable. As long as it remains centered on the needs of the typical family, Social Security will have its own internal gyroscope. It is by nature a constant balancing act; but in coming decades we will continue to behold the critics sprawling and prostrate, Social Security reeling but erect.

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Is Social Security Pro-Family?

A Response to John Mueller

Allan C. Carlson

In turning to the "family wage," John Mueller marshals a strong conservative argument for his conversion to Social Security. The Social Security Amendments of 1939 implemented both the "pay-as-you-go" principle and shifted the program's coverage from an individual to a family basis. Codifying prevailing social assumptions, Congress skewed benefits in favor of the traditional household headed by a man in the labor force with a wife at home serving as homemaker and mother. The net transfer of income in favor of traditional families has been considerable: by the late 1970s, the benefit/tax ratio for a male worker, unmarried or with a working wife, was 1.4; for the male worker with a wife at home, 3.2.

In recent years, many liberal and libertarian critics have scored the Social Security system for such "discrimination" against singles and those in innovative family forms. Meanwhile, certain conservative groups, such as Eagle Forum, have rallied successfully (so far) to defend spouse and widow benefits as pro-family. Generally, as other components of America's family wage system have dissolved (for example, the collapse of once ubiquitous, albeit informal, job and wage preferences for male heads of households), Social Security's recognition of a mother's sacrifice has grown in significance.

Much of this new conservative celebration of Social Security derives from the law of political relativity. Alongside the social policy initiatives of the '60s and '70s, constructed on feminist and radical egalitarian premises, Franklin Roosevelt's old-age pension plan—rooted as it is in the normative family conventions of the 1930s—does have a venerable cast. However, these legally fossilized social sentiments, while attractive to beleaguered traditionalists, should not be allowed to obscure other aspects of the Social Security system that tend to undermine family autonomy and stability.

Displacing Family Bonds

To begin with, socialized old-age pensions intentionally displace the private economic bonds of families, and so contribute to the progressive destruction of society by the state. Prior to the 1930s, the natural economic bonds of the family still prevailed—working adults commonly sustained their own elderly parents and in turn could expect similar treatment from their children. In effect, Social Security turned this family responsibility over to the state. Income security in old age is no longer related to the absence or presence of children.

Today's political problem comes, in part, from a misreading of history. Liberal mythology asserts that modernity, industrialization, and urban migration made state-sponsored old-age pensions inevitable. Recent analyses by the historian W. Andrew Achenbaum and the Hoover Institution's Carolyn Weaver, though, suggest an alternative interpretation. Private institutions such as families, insurance companies, and savings institutions, they argue, dealt effectively with old age in the 1920s.

The material bonds of generations clearly remained strong in this period. Muckraking exposés in the media about the horrors of poor farms and county homes obscured the relatively small percentage of persons actually dependent on such state support. In 1929, a New York survey found that over 90 percent of the state's 604,000 elderly persons were either self-supporting (through earnings, savings, or annuities) or sustained by family or friends. Only 2 percent were in public almshouses, and a mere 1 percent received private charity. Moreover, public dependency was usually the result of the non-formation of families, where the decision to forego children left one at risk. A 1919 survey in Pennsylvania, for example, found that 64 percent of almshouse residents were childless; among the independent aged, in contrast, only 11 percent were without children. Corporate pension funds, annuities, and the legal codification of family responsibilities all evolved during the 1920s into a flexible, wholly private system of old-age support.

Only the economic crisis of the 1930s gave aggressive politicians the opportunity to supplant American traditions of personal and familial responsibility, and to introduce a program of socialized old-age support. Moreover, the primary goal of the system's architects was not to create a universal retirement program. Rather, as the historian William Graebner has shown, they hoped to stimulate economic demand by artificially raising the dependency ratio,

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and, during a period of massive unemployment, to redistribute jobs in favor of the young.

While originally cast as a supplement to private forms of old-age insurance, Social Security proceeded over the next few decades to drive out its rivals. As late as 1957, 53 percent of the elderly still reported receiving some economic support from their children, compared with only 42 percent receiving some support from Social Security. By 1980, a mere 4 percent received help from their children, while Social Security had become almost universal. Income transfers through Social Security have also worked to restructure American living patterns. The number of elderly widows living with relatives declined from 60 percent in 1960 to 33 percent in 1980.

With all Western nations except Israel and Ireland recording fertility rates well below the "zero growth" level, social security has been unmasked as a particularly effective engine for the demographic decline of a modern nation.

One can argue that the elderly have gained more independence and have more choices, that aged parents and their adult children are "happier" not living with each other, and that everyone has enhanced his or her individuality. The Finnish social democrat Kari Waerness adds that authentic emotional bonds between family members "cannot easily be combined with total economic and social dependency between adult family members." At the same time, though, the true material winner in this weakening of the economic and structural family bonds has clearly been the state, which now holds all adult citizens in real or eventual "dependent" status. As both individual autonomy and the state grow, mediating institutions such as the family lose ground.

Impoverishing Young Families

Second, the state's redistribution of income through Social Security works, over time, to impoverish young families. As the Canadian scholar John Myles has noted, the welfare state in Western societies "is by and large a welfare state for the elderly." Put another way: the elderly vote, children do not. Once society has adopted welfare state solutions to its income distribution problems, the elderly gain a political advantage that they rarely relinquish. Even in countries such as France and Sweden, which have long histories of pro-natalist policies designed to offset the costs of children to parents, benefits for the aged soared in real value between 1960 and 1980, while "family" and "child" benefits stagnated. In the United States, massive increases in Social Security benefits and coverage during this period practically eliminated measurable poverty among the old. Meanwhile, the burden of the payroll tax on young families grew. As late as 1965, the top annual tax was a modest $348 (both employers' and employees' portions); two decades later, it had climbed to over $6,000.

This enormous tax increase, which falls disproportionately on young adults in their childbearing years, coupled to a dramatic rise in the average income tax rate paid by families with children, has reduced disposable family income since the mid-1960s. Between 1967 and 1984, the total federal tax burden rose from 6 to 13 percent of income for low-income families, from 10 to 17 percent for middle-income families, and from 13 to 20 percent for families of modest wealth. Over the same period, the average pre-tax real income of families with children increased by only 4 percent; after taxes, therefore, families with children are now worse off than before.

In their recent study for the Working Seminar on the Family and American Welfare Policy, John Weicher and Susan Wachter offer a snapshot of the net effect of government-induced income transfers between generations and related economic developments (including changes in the cost and value of housing). They found dramatic movement in the distribution of wealth between 1977 and 1983. Persons over the age of 65 showed a whopping 58 percent increase in net worth over that brief six-year period; for those between the ages of 55 and 64, the increase was 33 percent. This compared with a 12 percent decrease in net worth for persons ages 25 to 34, and a 34 percent decrease among young persons ages 17 to 24.

The elderly have chalked up dramatic gains in income and wealth—gains won, it appears, at least partly at the expense of young adults in their childbearing years. The evident political power of the "gray lobby" suggests, moreover, that the politically determined flow of wealth to the elderly may be slowed for a time, but will not be reversed. The only suggestion that might break this conundrum peculiar to the welfare state is the radical proposal to expand the number of political interest groups jockeying for a share of the pie: give children the vote, to be exercised by their parents through age 16. Swedish family and child advocates have recently and desperately turned to this idea as the only way of restoring some intergenerational balance in a "rent-seeking" polity.

Anti-Natalist Incentives

Third, the anti-natalist incentive built into Social Security is powerful and growing. John Mueller attempts to wriggle out of the demographic dilemma of the welfare state by suggesting that "Social Security must have helped produce the baby-boomers, whose parents could anticipate a windfall." Yet the persons bearing children in the 1946-60 period were relatively untouched by Social Security: a majority of their parents received no benefits in this time frame, while working adults faced a relatively insignificant payroll tax (*e.g.*, a maximum of $30 in 1947) and could not have anticipated the extraordinary generosity shown by Congress between 1965 and 1980 to retirees. Moreover, those recipients who enjoyed the greatest windfall under the pay-as-you-go principle were physiologically

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

Drawing by Shelly Fischman

unable to respond to any pro-natalist incentive. It is highly unlikely that Social Security played any positive role in encouraging the baby boom.

The more likely, mutually reinforcing causes were a high demand for labor coupled with restricted immigration, a strengthened "family wage" (the real wages paid male workers in the 1946-60 period rose more rapidly than the real wages of working women), and the unique psychological and religious climates of the post-World War II era.

There is solid evidence linking the existence and growth of Social Security systems to a ruinous fertility decline. In a 1976 article for the journal *Demography,* Charles Hohm of San Diego State University showed that the existence and generosity of state old-age pension programs is inversely associated with fertility: the higher the benefit level, the lower the fertility. In a more sophisticated 1986 study for the *Social Science Journal,* Hohm and three other demographers examined data from 81 countries and still found that, after controlling for degree of industrial development, family planning practices, and other relevant factors, "the level and scope of a country's social security program is causally and inversely related to fertility levels." The research team also tested and confirmed "the reverse-condition hypothesis" that "reduced fertility levels result in subsequent increases in social security expenditures," with no apparent stopping point. From Australia to Zambia, increased state old-age benefits mean fewer births, and fewer births mean ever larger social security benefits. With all Western nations except Israel and Ireland recording fertility rates well below the "zero growth" level, social security has been unmasked as a particularly effective engine for the demographic decline of a modern nation. A system that structurally relies on a growing population and an expanding economy actually works, in a perverse manner, to undermine both. In the abstract, massive immigration might be seen as a short-term solution. Over the long run, however, a nation-state that must import its human capital as well as a growing proportion of its industrial goods may be fairly labeled a socioeconomic failure.

The political problem of the family and Social Security remains large. Americans have lived under Social Security for 50 years. Promises have been made, "contributions" collected, and plans for retirement built around the expectation of a generous state pension. Moreover, while "family" has been a much used, and abused, political word in the last decade, there is scant political consensus on the price that Americans are willing to pay to support the traditional family. Even with the nation's family system crumbling around them, politicians have to function in the realm of the possible.

The purest pro-family option would be to remove the federal government from retirement policy altogether; re-

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store the pre-New Deal world where the state did not presume to influence retirement age, to coerce individuals into structuring their lives and security any one way, or to affect the dependency structure freely formed within families. In such a world, private pension plans, continued earnings, individual annuities, and intergenerational family support would most likely reemerge, with great variations and flexibility in structure. It is also likely that a small percentage of Americans would fall through the cracks, and would need some means-tested form of state support. However, outside of a few highly orthodox libertarian enclaves, this approach is on few Washington policymaking agendas. This approach offers no guidance on how to meet the current obligations of the Social Security system without imposing a crushing double burden on today's young workers, and so defeating the whole purpose of the exercise.

The purest pro-family option would be to remove the federal government from retirement policy altogether.

Schemes to phase out Social Security by allowing individuals to "opt out" resolve the double burden problem. But, as Mueller correctly points to Gunnar Myrdal's argument, mandatory private savings for retirement would have a negative impact on fertility similar to that of Social Security. Current proposals to privatize the system commonly require that persons leaving the state plan establish their own, equivalent retirement annuity and so continue to free themselves from any possible future reliance on their own children. True pro-family privatization measures would jettison such requirements.

In addition, while the higher average return on investment that private plans produce should reduce the effective cost of retirement for most young adults (particularly singles and dual-income couples), it is unclear whether the higher yield of private plans would make up for the loss of the residual "family wage" enjoyed by traditional couples under Social Security. Privatization advocates need to consider mechanisms that would better equalize these benefits and burdens during a phased transition to a new, old order.

Tax Relief

For those electing to operate within the existing order, tax relief for families with children could help. Doubling the personal exemption to $4,000 (limited to dependent children only) and increasing the size of the Earned Income Tax Credit according to number of children, as hinted at by Mueller, could partially blunt the negative impact of Social Security on the family. But much more would be needed. Broader, direct ways of countering the anti-natalist incentive built into Social Security include the proposal of the Dutch demographer Dirk J. van der Kaa to "relink fertility behavior and economic security in old age." He would grant larger state pension benefits to couples with many children, and so use the state system to restore the reward that offspring once brought their parents.

Another, less intrusive option would be to create a universal, refundable dependent child income tax credit of, say, $600 for each minor currently claimed as an exemption, up to the total value of the taxpayers' payroll tax (both employers' and employees' portions). An extra $600 credit could be granted to a couple in the year of a child's birth or adoption. As an investment in the financial viability of Social Security, yet structured as a tax cut, this proposal could actually form the basis for a new political coalition between young and old. Both current pension recipients and young families would benefit. Funds flowing into the Social Security trust fund would not be touched, while young couples responsibly bringing children into the world would be allowed to retain more of their earned income.

Can tax relief successfully counter the anti-family incentives of the existing system? Not completely. Such measures, though, would incrementally reduce the state's financial pressure on families with children. And that is the least that must be done. ☎

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ANNOUNCEMENT

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Applicants should submit copies of three publications (or writings accepted for publication), a curriculum vitae, three letters of recommendation and a six page, double spaced research proposal on some aspect of international security affairs. Fellows must have received a doctoral degree or have equivalent experience.

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MICRO ECONOMICS

Japan's Leading Import Barriers Are Its Tiny Houses and Stores

ROBERT CHAPMAN WOOD

Japan's leading import barriers are neither her quotas on citrus and beef, nor her regulations on the marketing of foreign cigarettes, nor the "buy Japanese" policies of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. They are a set of policies that prevent Japanese citizens from buying what they most want to buy. These policies, which limit sales by many Japanese as well as foreign firms, have led to stagnation of the domestic market, and an excess of savings over domestic investment that translates into both a $100 billion-plus annual capital outflow and a trade surplus that is almost as large.

Ask the average Japanese what he would most like to buy and he will tell you it is a larger house or apartment. While the term "rabbit hutch" exaggerates the cramped living quarters of middle-class and even upper middle-class Japanese families, many Japanese occupy apartments that would fit entirely within many American living rooms. New $500,000 houses are built on 10-by-12-meter lots, the size of swimming pools at comparably priced homes in the United States.

These limitations on elbow room are less the product of Japanese geography than of a set of rules and tax preferences that discourage modern development and suburbanization in the country's major metropolitan areas. These policies were designed to preserve the character of traditional Japanese communities and to prevent urban areas from looking, say, like American suburban strips. These are understandable goals, and they are supported by many Japanese, but they keep down spending not only on housing but also on home furnishings, utilities, and automobiles.

Less Crowded Than New Jersey

Japan's population density is only a minor factor in her congestion and her people's inability to spend their money at home. Japan, with 846 people per square mile, is less densely populated than New Jersey (986 per square mile) and only 15 percent more crowded than Massachusetts (733 per square mile)—and Massachusetts is just as poor in natural resources as Japan. It is frequently said that Japan squeezes a population half as large as America's into "a nation the size of Montana." But such rhetoric only makes people forget the vast emptiness of the American West. No one expects the Japanese to live like Montanans. But the Japanese do have enough room to live like citizens of, for instance, Connecticut (population density 638 per square mile).

The city of Tokyo, of course, is more densely populated than even New York. The 8.4 million residents of Tokyo fit into a 230-square mile area roughly the size of the four boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx, which together have a population of 6.8 million. Tokyo residents could spread out more if their government didn't discourage it. Tokyo's founders chose its site precisely because it is in the middle of Japan's largest flat region, the Kanto Plain.

The effect of congestion on spending habits can be demonstrated by the U.S. government's Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Japanese government's Family Income and Expenditure Survey. In 1984, the latest year for which both governments offer statistics, median households in both countries had monthly incomes of $1,600 at the $1=Y238 exchange rate then prevailing. But spending differed dramatically. The Japanese spent about as much as Americans, or more, on items that took no space in the house or on roads. On food they spent $310 a month while Americans spent $260 a month. On reading and entertainment they spent $96 while Americans spent $83. On education they spent $39 while Americans spent $17. On personal care (grooming and such) they spent $26 while Americans spent $15.

But they spent far less than Americans on budget categories affected by crowding. Japanese households spent only $94 a month on utilities while American households spent $135; tiny Japanese houses and apartments consume far less electricity and gas. The Japanese spent only $45 a month on home furnishings and appliances while Americans spent $59. And they spent only $63 on automobiles and related costs while car-loving Americans spent $312.

The difference in automobile expenses is hardly surprising to anyone who has ever compared Japanese to American suburbs or investigated the cost of parking a car in the

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AP/Wide World Photos

Crowded Massachusetts has three times as many cars per capita as Japan.

Tokyo area. Driving is difficult in populous parts of Japan, not just in city and town centers but in surrounding areas as well. Japan has one car for every 4.6 people; there is a car for every 1.7 Americans (even in such densely populated states as New Jersey and Massachusetts). And Japanese cars are driven less. Admittedly, the United States is extreme in its commitment to the automobile, but Japan's crowding out of the car is even more extreme. (West Germany, with a population density of 632 per square mile, for example, has one car for every 2.7 people.)

Overall, the Japanese household with a $1,600 monthly income spent only $1,077. A U.S. household with a $1,600 income per month spent $1,588. The spending differences occurred exclusively in categories affected by Japan's small houses and narrow streets. Japanese have little incentive to do anything but put much of their money in the bank—perhaps hoping they will someday be able to afford one of those $500,000 homes.

Millionaires in Coolie Hats

One of the principal constraints on the size of Japanese homes, especially in the Tokyo and Osaka areas, is a set of agricultural policies that artificially elevate the value of farmland. Fifteen percent of the Tokyo metropolitan district is devoted to agriculture, while only about 30 percent is devoted to housing. The proportion of agricultural land in the nearby suburban areas of Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures is even higher. But Japanese policies interfere with the market forces that would lead to the conversion of this land into residential development.

To begin with, import protection for the country's leading staple keeps the price of rice five to 10 times higher than the world price, grossly inflating the value of paddyland. And low taxes on farmland—often as low as 1 percent of the tax on residential property—discourage to an even greater degree the conversion of rice paddies into housing developments.

In turn, the artificially limited supply of residential property pushes prices to astronomical levels. A typical valuation is Y250,000 ($1,700) per square meter, and at this price a little four-acre (15,000-square meter) farm is worth more than $25 million. Urban farmers wearing old-fashioned coolie hats are often among the richest people in Japan. When farmers need money, they just sell off a tiny portion of their land while continuing to farm the rest. Not only is farmland held off the market, but the small pieces that the farmers do sell can rarely be served by adequate roads or sidewalks.

Barriers to Urban Change

Perhaps an even more important impediment to development is the protection given occupants of old residential and commercial structures in Japan's urban areas. Tax administration favors older structures, and rent control and

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other real estate rules often make redevelopment practically impossible.

Many dilapidated old homes and retail buildings in Japanese cities occupy sites that would make ideal locations for apartment buildings housing 20 or 30 times as many people in more comfort than current buildings. These properties, when the value of land is included, are worth millions of dollars. But taxes are based only on the value of current houses and stores.

Large retail chains are perhaps the leading engine of imports into the United States. Government regulations have kept these chain stores from growing in Japan.

Moreover, real estate regulations comparable to New York City rent control extend throughout Japan. One Japanese government survey showed that people who had moved into their apartments within three years paid, on average, about three times as much per square meter as people who had lived in the same building for 18 years or more. And tenants are notoriously difficult to evict.

Slow Train to Yokohama

Suburban development has also been limited by a failure to build the roads and high-speed railroads that would make outlying areas accessible. The Japanese government rarely evicts landowners for highways without their agreement. In the 1970s, a group of farmers who did not want to sell their land for the New Tokyo International Airport in Narita managed to delay the project for a decade. After finally persuading many of the farmers to sell at prices that were exorbitant, even by Japanese standards, the government found that the remaining farmers had enlisted gangs of student "radicals" who launched everything from a sledgehammer attack on the control tower to balloons aimed at the path of airplanes taking off. For years the government took no serious action against the protesters. Finally a show of force opened the airport in 1978. Today, riot police still guard the entrance to the airport to protect against the farmers' allies.

The farmers' struggle was only the most dramatic of the scenes the Japanese government expects every time it wants to take land for a road or railroad. The slow progress of Japan's transportation system means Japan has far worse roads than other industrial nations of comparable population density. Only 5 percent of the land in Japan's largest metropolitan areas is used for roads. (In U.S. urban areas the standard is 18 percent.)

Japan's railroads, of course, enjoy a well-deserved reputation. They're clean, they always run on time, and they reach most points within 20 miles or so of downtown Tokyo or Osaka. But "on time" doesn't mean fast: while some of Japan's intercity trains remain among the fastest in the world, Japan has never gotten around to building high-speed suburban trains like the New York or Philadelphia commuter lines. Americans rarely recognize the strengths of their own transportation system. An executive working in New York typically lives in suburbs like Greenwich, Connecticut, which is over 30 miles from New York's Grand Central Station. To commute from his spacious home, he can drive (or have his wife drive him) to the station, ride comfortably on metropolitan New York's commuter rail system to midtown Manhattan, then either walk or take the subway to his office. The entire journey takes perhaps an hour and 10 minutes.

In Japan, a comparable successful executive is likely to live in one of the better sections of Yokohama or in the newer suburbs of Saitama prefecture, within 20 miles of downtown Tokyo. But his commute may take an hour and a half to two hours each day. Because of congestion and lack of parking near the station, he will probably walk to the railroad line. And the train won't move nearly as fast as the train from Greenwich. The best of Japan's suburban commuter trains are analogous in "speed" and "comfort" to the best of New York City's subway lines—say, the E and F trains to Forest Hills, Queens. They rarely achieve the speed of U.S. suburban trains.

A Nation of Shopkeepers

Restrictions on large chain stores represent another major non-tariff barrier discouraging Japanese citizens from buying products made by domestic and foreign companies alike.

Large retail chains are perhaps the leading engine of imports into the United States. Americans need not wait for foreigners to explain their merchandise to wholesalers and retailers; buyers from K-Mart and Sears travel the world in search of bargains.

Japanese entrepreneurs have been equally willing to provide bargains at big chain stores, and Japanese shoppers have been willing to patronize those retail giants that have emerged. But Japan's regulations have kept these chain stores from growing. Japan requires the builders of large stores to negotiate with neighborhood merchants before constructing or expanding in an area, which leads to restrictions on big stores' size, hours, and advertisement. One "large" store is permitted in most neighborhoods, but often the Japanese idea of a "large" store is an institution reminiscent of the pre-World War II A&P. Little competition exists between large stores except in new neighborhoods.

Japan has many more retail establishments than does the United States—some 2.6 million, one for every 47 people. By comparison, the U.S. has only one for every 126 people. To some extent, the difference illustrates the unnecessary regulatory burden that American governments, especially state and local authorities, place on small businesses. A typical Japanese store is a small wooden building, perhaps 5 by 8 meters, crowded closely against other small wooden buildings. Although the dream of being one's own boss seems just as strong in the U.S. as in Japan, the construction of such buildings is illegal in most metropolitan areas of America. Building codes raise the cost, often pro-

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hibitively, where zoning codes don't make construction illegal. For all the weaknesses of Japan's distribution system, personal service and fresh produce are far more available than in America. When Japanese restaurant chains have expanded in the United States, they must build substantially larger units than in Japan because zoning, building, and sanitation rules create dramatically higher overhead.

But marketers in Japan suffer far more from Japan's restrictions on chain stores and her congestion than they gain from liberal building and zoning codes. Because the Japanese lack roads on which they can travel to shop, they generally patronize only a few stores near their homes or offices, which offer little beyond basic goods.

The combination of little regulation on small stores and more regulation on large stores means the Japanese get more service but fewer goods than do Americans.

Lender to the World

Japan's surplus of savings results in an almost unimaginable flow of excess funds abroad for investment. The Japanese invested $132 billion more abroad last year than foreigners invested in Japan. That was nearly 7 percent of Japan's gross national product. It was more than all the foreign debt that the Third World's largest debtor (Brazil) has accumulated over decades. Though the West has focused on Japan's trade surplus, the flow of Japanese funds abroad for investment has substantially exceeded the trade surplus recently—$246 billion was invested abroad from 1984 through 1986 compared with a total trade surplus of $193 billion during the same period.

The combination of limited growth at home and a vast flow of funds overseas forces Japan to run enormous trade surpluses. Excess savings lead directly to trade surpluses through at least three mechanisms:

—The Japanese use their excess savings to buy dollars, which they invest abroad. This prevents the dollar from falling to a level where Americans could sell enough goods in Japan to close the trade gap;

—Lack of spending in Japan forces Japanese businesses to emphasize exporting; and

—Lack of spending on domestic goods in Japan prevents import of raw materials for those goods and also prevents domestic investments for which raw materials would be imported.

Thus, a savings surplus in Japan means a trade surplus—and a major contribution to a trade deficit for the United States. If the U.S. trade deficit is to shrink, Japan must find a way to invest more of its savings at home.

Reminders of the Past

Most Japanese barriers to modern consumption are designed, at least ostensibly, to preserve the country's traditions and culture; certainly there is strong Japanese sentiment for protecting farms, rickety buildings, small stores, and other reminders of the country's past. Furthermore, the Japanese have been taught since grade school that Japan is small and poor. Most believe it is out of the question for them to imagine living like Americans or Europeans, and there is little political pressure for change.

Japan's media rarely mention that other rich parts of the world such as southern New England and the Netherlands are just as small and resource-poor. Moreover, Japan has no philosophical tradition supporting the "pursuit of happiness." Her traditions support farming and businesses that become stable, layoff-proof "families." Japanese television portrays farmers and small businessmen with loving affection in serials and feature reports every day. Thus, restrictions to preserve tradition possess an air of moral righteousness. Government officials and businessmen who publicly back liberalization have an air of *nouveau riche.* Most Japanese feel that increasing consumption is greedy and could possibly destroy revered traditions.

Ask the average Japanese what he would most like to buy and he will tell you it is a larger house or apartment.

Some restrictions on market forces in Japan are probably needed to protect traditional groups against the pace of rapid economic growth. Many Japanese who work today in traditional occupations might have difficulty making a living if the market were totally freed. Elderly farmers in metropolitan Tokyo could easily live off the proceeds of selling their land for the rest of their lives. But if the rice market were totally liberalized, for instance, the elderly farmers of more remote prefectures could end up destitute. And the centuries-old tradition of rice cultivation, which most Japanese consider essential to Japanese culture, would end.

The Shibusawa Solution

But something must be done—if not just to make life better in Japan, then to avoid serious danger to the world economy. Current trends can't continue. Today, Japan's trade surplus is running as much as 5 percent of her GNP, and net investment abroad at 7 percent of GNP. Continuation of the current situation for more than another year or so would force the loss of ownership of a vast amount of U.S. property to the Japanese, probably followed by the normal ill effects of absentee landlordism and a xenophobic reaction in America.

The world should not allow this situation to continue, especially when a solution would be so beneficial to the Japanese. Many Japanese have recently come to favor intelligent liberalization of Japan's economy. They have begun to urge higher taxes on underutilized urban land, modest reductions in government support prices for rice, and improvements in urban transportation.

Clearly, Japan has plenty of opportunity to solve its problems. If Japan would convert only a few dozen square miles of obsolete Tokyo farms or buildings to the kind of well-built, densely packed housing that exists in much of upper Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, she would ease the housing shortage enormously and enable the Japanese

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to spend much more of their money. Business would work on redeveloping Japan rather than emphasizing exports. Japan would import the raw materials to build new housing, and Japanese consumers in larger houses could become a booming market for the manufacturers of every nation.

Japan already has an excellent model for suburban development in traditional Japanese style: Den-en Chofu, a district about 10 miles from Tokyo Station that was laid out as a model suburb by the statesman Eiichi Shibusawa during the 1920s. Den-en Chofu has an extraordinarily dense population by the standards of any part of the developed world except urban Japan. Yet because of its well-placed trees, tiny Japanese-style parks, and separation of major highways from shopping streets, it has earned a well-deserved reputation as the most desirable living area in Japan. Moreover, it maintains its reputation for livability even though it is reached primarily by slow train lines that typically take nearly an hour to bring riders to the center of Tokyo.

Japan's metropolitan areas have enough land and riches so that every citizen can live like a Den-en Chofu resident if the nation uses its resources well. Japan has no excuse to continue complaining that she is so overpopulated and congested that she can't possibly spend her money at home. For Japan's good as well as America's, reducing Japan's congestion and her savings and trade surpluses is as important as reducing America's budget deficit. ☎

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NUCLEAR AGE EDUCATION

The Freeze Movement Thrives in America's Schools

KEITH B. PAYNE AND JILL COLEMAN

Although the "nuclear freeze" movement met with only mixed political success in the early 1980s, it continues to have a major impact on the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Programs in "nuclear age education," "peace studies," and "conflict resolution" are mandated for students in Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and all of Oregon, and offered in local school districts across the country. In a survey by Herbert London of almost every major school district, all respondents claimed to have a formal or informal unit devoted to nuclear weapons issues. The problem is that the most popular classroom texts and accompanying teaching guides are designed to frighten students with nuclear war, cast doubt on U.S. military and arms control policy, provide a sympathetic image of the Soviet Union, and encourage anti-nuclear student activism.

Choices: A Unit on Conflict and Nuclear War, a text and teaching guide written by the National Education Association in cooperation with the Union of Concerned Scientists, has been used in thousands of classrooms since its introduction in 1983. Other popular "nuclear age" materials include *Decision Making in a Nuclear Age, Perspectives,* and *Raising Questions: Thinking About the Soviet Union* prepared by Educators for Social Responsibility, a 12,000-member organization based in Boston that was founded in cooperation with its namesake Physicians for Social Responsibility, a noted anti-nuclear organization.

These materials fail to equip students with the intellectual tools necessary to understand the public policy issues surrounding nuclear weapons. They distort history and fail to provide students with an understanding of the theory of deterrence. Given their one-sided efforts to prejudice students' minds on behalf of the anti-nuclear political agenda, they are the intellectual equivalent of nuclear winter.

Blaming America First

Most "nuclear age" curricula present the United States as primarily responsible for the Cold War, the arms race, and the dangers of nuclear war. The first lesson in NEA's *Choices* focuses on the destruction resulting from the atomic attack on Hiroshima (complete with a graphic personal account by a 14-year-old survivor and recommendations to show students grisly pictures). A note to the teacher suggests that the focus of the Hiroshima discussion "should be on this unbelievable ruin." Relatively little attention is devoted to the political and military context of President Truman's decision to drop the bomb. Rather, students are told to discuss their feelings about the destruction of Hiroshima in a way that can only encourage guilt over American actions.

ESR's *Decision Making* points a finger at the United States for the failure of arms control efforts in the 1950s. Drawing on work by Richard Barnet, founder of the Institute for Policy Studies, the text asserts that "very encouraging Soviet peace initiatives" failed to bring results because "the U.S. was preparing to arm Germany with nuclear weapons." This account of history, however, is simply false. The United States has never planned to provide West Germany with nuclear warheads (which in any case would be inconsistent with Germany's 1954 renunciation of nuclear weapons.)

Equally misleading is a discussion of negotiations to achieve a nuclear test ban. According to *Decision Making,* Soviet Premier Khrushchev "seiz[ed] the initiative" in proposing a moratorium on nuclear testing, but the U.S. was reluctant to join a moratorium until it had "completed its own series of tests." Totally omitted from the presentation are the Soviet violations of the moratorium: 40 tests within 10 weeks, including the largest single explosion ever, a 58-megaton blast on October 30, 1961. As President Kennedy observed in 1962, "We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium." However, *Decision Making* presents U.S. insistence on verification measures as a stalling tactic, while portraying the Soviets' resistance as understandable given their "habitual opposition to exposing themselves to foreign examiners."

The failure of arms control is attributed to the United States. In a speaker-student dialogue in *Decision Making,* the presumably authoritative "speaker" argues that the

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U.S. must take the initiative in disarming: "It's not 'them' that's doing it. It's us. We pay the taxes. They're our weapons. They're our missiles. The Russian people don't live in a democracy, so we who do have an even greater responsibility to stop this madness." The student in the dialogue who is suspicious of the Soviet Union and disagrees with the speaker is ridiculed as unthinking and ignorant—a "disembodied cortex."

Decision Making instructs students that the anti-Soviet "hysteria" surrounding the trials of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs was a fundamental cause of the arms race.

Victimizing Alger Hiss

Perhaps most bizarre of all, *Decision Making* instructs students that the anti-Soviet "hysteria" surrounding the trials of Alger Hiss and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was a fundamental cause of the arms race. Treating Hiss and the Rosenbergs as victims of a hostile American political climate, presenting detailed information sympathetic to the convicted spies and "startling new evidence" casting doubt on their guilt, *Decision Making* calls for the Hiss and Rosenberg cases to be reopened. Denigrating the overwhelming historical evidence implicating Hiss and the Rosenbergs, the text concludes: "We must try to measure the degree to which these perceptions of the accused, the Soviet Union, and the arms race were immutably shaped by a diet of what could in the end amount to an era of [U.S.] disinformation."

That a school text is considered a suitable forum for a detailed revisionist critique of the Hiss and Rosenberg cases is strange enough; positing a causal link between the arms competition and American "victimization" of these individuals is historical fiction clearly intended to discredit the United States.

The text goes on to draw an analogy between the hysteria supposedly surrounding the Hiss and Rosenberg trials and any negative commentary on the 1980s freeze movement. Students are asked to examine media coverage of the freeze movement in order to uncover "examples of fear and suspicion by the press or . . . government officials." The most obvious message for students is that opposition to the freeze can only be the result of biased media coverage and disinformation.

Even when the curricula make room for contrary arguments, guidance to teachers ensures the opening is limited. *Decision Making* recommends that students view two films about the strategic arms competition: "The Price of Peace and Freedom" by the American Security Council, and "War Without Winners" by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament. Teachers are cautioned to show students only a few minutes of the first film, which is critical of the Soviet Union and of arms control, because "the weight of information becomes overpowering." By contrast, the guide advises teachers to show "War Without Winners"—a film more critical of the United States and sympathetic to arms control—twice. It even recommends that the film be stopped periodically during the second screening to discuss in detail the points made.

ESR's *Perspectives* continues the "Blame America First" theme. A "fact sheet" describing Soviet and U.S. intermediate nuclear forces (INF) is so clearly slanted and inaccurate that it can easily be labeled anti-U.S. propaganda. The U.S. Pershing II is described as a "completely new weapon with vastly increased capabilities" that "threaten[s] to destroy" important Soviet targets. By contrast, the Soviet SS-20, a completely different, much more accurate and militarily effective missile than its predecessor, the SS-4, is said to represent a mere "upgrading" of outdated systems for "increased safety and better reliability."

Perspectives states falsely that "unlike the new American systems, the SS-20 is not a first-strike weapon," because it "cannot be used to hit particular military targets." Such a characterization is pure fantasy; the SS-20 has a clear capability to hit specific military targets and could therefore play an important role in a Soviet preemptive attack on Western European military installations. As MIT Professor Stephen Meyer has noted, the SS-20 may "strengthen Soviet military confidence in being able to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike."

The sins of omission may be even more significant than those of commission. *Perspectives* fails to mention the most basic facts about INF, namely that U.S./NATO INF systems were deployed at the request of the Europeans, in part, as a response to the prior Soviet deployment of the SS-20. But then, including these facts would have pinned some responsibility for the "arms race" on the Soviet Union rather than the United States, something ESR curricula are loath to do.

Encircled Russia

The second shortcoming of the "nuclear age" curricula is their portrayal of the Soviet Union in a misleading and sympathetic light.

A two-page "fact sheet" in NEA's *Choices* compares "some characteristics and security needs" of the United States and the Soviet Union. Every comparison indicates either that the U.S. already enjoys a military advantage over the Soviets, or that the Soviets are more justified than the United States in building up their military. The U.S. is shown to have more nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union, and to have preceded the Soviets in developing (and using) the atomic bomb. The fact sheet also emphasizes that the Soviets have suffered many more casualties during recent wars than the United States has, and that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, is bordered by some unfriendly neighbors. Unmentioned are the Soviets' overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons, their invasions of, and threats to invade, neighboring countries (even their own allies), and the totalitarian character of the Soviet system. Unstated are any historical reasons why so many countries bordering the Soviet Union fear their neighbor.

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The "fact sheet" provides maps of U.S. and Soviet strategic force installations and asks students to count the number and compare the location of major airfields and missile sites in the two countries. The United States is shown to have more missile launch sites than the Soviet Union. In fact, the maps are quite inaccurate and the reverse is true; the Soviet Union has more than twice as many launch sites. More important, this exercise ignores the critical fact that the Soviet Union has more ICBMs than the United States (1,378 versus 1,000). Moreover, the maps seem to show that Soviet installations are oriented toward its "unfriendly" neighbors, implying that they are "defensive," while U.S. nuclear weapons, spread throughout the interior of the country, are not.

One of the most objectionable presentations of Soviet foreign policy actions appears in *Decision Making*'s interpretation of Stalin's rationale for the postwar takeover of Eastern Europe. Soviet behavior is presented as the liberation of exploited workers from "capitalists," "rich feudal lords," and "factory owners." It claims that the leaders of the Soviet Union "genuinely believed" that occupation was the "salvation" of those workers. Stalin's actions in Poland are rationalized because he "might have reasoned that he had as much right to determine the government of Poland as white Americans had to prevent blacks from voting in Mississippi." These speculations about Stalin's motives and intentions are portrayed as fact, and provide only a benign explanation of Soviet aggression. This type of historical manipulation and rationalization is done more subtly in Soviet history texts.

Both *Choices* and *Decision Making* treat U.S. and Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons as if they were similar. Neither mentions the long hiatus in U.S. chemical weapons development, or that the Soviet chemical weapons program and the use of chemical warfare by the Soviet Union and its clients in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos demanded an American response.

Misinformation about the Soviet Union is rampant. The purportedly authoritative "speaker" in the *Decision Making* dialogue asks the students, "Where did you get the idea that the Russians won't freeze or agree to on-site inspection? We've made 17 treaties with them with no violations." No response is provided, even though the Soviet Union historically has adamantly opposed on-site inspection and has in fact violated the letter and spirit of a number of arms control agreements. Soviet violations of agreements are so well documented that the House of Representatives recently voted 418 to 0 to express its sense that the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

Decision Making similarly errs in claiming that the United States is spending large sums on strategic defense with the objective of "deploying a network of very large laser weapons in the earth's orbit within the next 10 years." The statement does not come close to the truth, and the guide makes no reference to the Soviet Union's own more extensive laser research program.

Choices also inaccurately states that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has an operational anti-satellite weapon; in fact the Soviets acknowledge an operational ASAT capability, which they have had for a decade.

These teaching guides typically take the U.S. media to task for their supposed harsh coverage of the Soviet Union. *Raising Questions* asks students to review a section of the *New York Times* index and categorize articles on the Soviet Union as being favorable or unfavorable. (Examples of "bad press" include articles on the downing of the KAL jetliner and on Soviet economic difficulties.) The purpose of the activity is to provide students with evidence that American reporting "provides a negatively biased picture of the Soviet Union."

Perspectives claims that the West has a unique "attraction to conflict" rooted in its Judeo-Christian ethic.

The exercise omits perhaps the single most important factor in evaluating press coverage of the USSR: the extensive Soviet restrictions on foreign reporters. Students are not asked, for example, to compare the detailed media coverage of the Vietnam War—"bad press" for the United States according to ESR standards—with the virtual absence of reports on the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Press bias is a recurring theme in these curricula. For example, to free students from the biases of the media, *Decision Making* directs students to flagrant sources of Soviet propaganda, among them *New Times,* an English-language magazine published by the Soviet government.

Hebrew-Christian Guilt

A remarkable passage in ESR's *Perspectives* claims that the West has a unique "attraction to conflict" rooted in its "conflict-oriented" Judeo-Christian ethic. This "Western nature" is contrasted with "Eastern philosophy, which is based on the 'harmonious unity' of 'Yin and Yang.' " A lengthy quotation from Alan Watts praises Confucians and Taoists for their "marvelous understanding and respect for what we call the balance of nature, human and otherwise—a universal vision of life as the Tao or way of life in which the good and the evil, the creative and the destructive, the wise and the foolish are inseparable polarities of existence." People nurtured in this balanced and "reasonable" Eastern life are regarded as inherently more peaceful than "those brought up with the chronic uneasy conscience of the Hebrew-Christian cultures."

It is romantic nonsense to believe that the West has been more conflict prone than the East, as any cursory review of military history, not to mention Sun Tzu's classic, *The Art of War,* would show. Even if this claim were true, however, it would tell students nothing about why wars occur or why there are periods of peace.

A second "nuclear age" explanation of conflict is that it stems from competition for scarce resources. *Choices* employs a game involving armaments and natural resources to demonstrate that, regardless of what either side believes it might gain by going to war, conflict is counterproductive

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

Worksheet 4-3

RADIATION

1. Look at the picture below and consider the effects of radiation.

a. Put an "R" everywhere you believe radiation would have an effect.

b. Which things in the picture do we depend upon? Which things do we eat? What do they depend upon?

c. For each item listed above, discuss how you could be affected by the radiation that entered that item.

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A worksheet from *Choices*

for both sides. A note to the teacher emphasizes the primary purpose of this activity: to show "that it is impossible to win by making war."

The general view in "nuclear age" curricula is that there is no legitimate role for conflict in international relations. Students are told that international conflict is similar to personal disputes, which can be resolved by compromise. *Choices* presents conflict situations such as "Rick is angry at Jerry for using his bike without asking," and emphasizes the need for negotiation, cooperation, and compromise. An analogy is drawn between personal disputes and international conflict. The implication is that the same pacific methods of conflict resolution apply to both—the key being to change our perceptions of the opponent from "enemy" to "friend."

Yet international and personal conflict are not similar. Conflict among individuals takes place in a controlled context. Children fighting over a bike are subject to many layers of authority, judgment, and power that are ready and able to enforce rules of behavior. The international arena has no set of enforceable rules; it is, in important ways, a state of lawless anarchy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan illustrates how conflict (for the victim of aggression) may at times be unavoidable, how military resistance can be necessary and legitimate. Conciliatory behavior that may be useful and appropriate "conflict resolution" for individuals may be the route to war for countries. Neville Chamberlain's concession of the *Sudetenland* to Hitler in 1938 is a sterling example of the type of conflict resolution apparently endorsed in "nuclear age" curricula, yet one that makes war more, not less, likely.

To Deter Is Human

"Peace studies" curricula devote many pages and significant attention to the effects of nuclear weapons. But they virtually ignore the reasons why the U.S. and its NATO allies maintain nuclear forces in the first place. Students cannot possibly be expected to understand the key issues in the policy debate without a thorough and accurate review of nuclear deterrence in theory and practice.

Decision Making first mentions nuclear deterrence almost one-quarter through its lengthy text. It then provides a definition of a specific form of deterrence, mutual assured destruction, without ever sufficiently explaining the general concept of nuclear deterrence.

Choices is similarly deficient. Deterrence is not discussed until page 67 of the 90-page text. There it is characterized as "peace through strength" and described as one of "six possible actions the United States and the Soviet Union could take to either limit or continue the arms race." The other five policy options are some form of arms control or disarmament, while supporters of deterrence are said to want "more weapons." The message, of course, is that deterrence is the one option that seeks to "continue the arms race." Perhaps the only thing worse than ignoring deterrence is misrepresenting it so completely.

Failing to provide an accurate and comprehensive discussion of deterrence is a fatal flaw for any text on nuclear education. Students are denied the opportunity to understand the reasoning behind U.S. nuclear policy and to conclude for themselves whether the rationale is persuasive. In the absence of such understanding, it is difficult to imagine how students could come to any conclusion but that the American development and deployment of nuclear weapons is senseless. How are they to understand the policy debate over the MX, the Trident Submarine, or even SDI without understanding the fundamentals of deterrence? The "nuclear age" curricula, unfortunately, do not provide the basis for even thinking about such issues.

Imagine There's No Country

The final common theme of these curricula is that they implicitly or explicitly encourage students to become anti-nuclear activists. While students should be encouraged to become responsible participants in the democratic process, to promote activism in support of a particular political agenda, as these materials attempt to do, is an intolerable abuse of public education.

Choices instructs students to envision "a better world" to the music of "Imagine" by John Lennon ("Imagine there's no countries, it isn't hard to do, nothing to kill or die for and no religion too"), "I Want to Live" by John Denver, "Ain't Gonna Study War No More" by Pete Seeger, or "There's a Place for Us" from "West Side Story." Students are then given 26 suggested activities to "act on their beliefs," ranging from making a list of concerns about the arms competition to writing to political representatives for their views on arms control, first use, and other national defense issues.

Decision Making tells students they "can make a difference,"and should be encouraged that "the growing success of the nuclear freeze movement suggests that individuals banding together can put pressure on elected offi-

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cials to respond to constituents' opinions." The text goes on to refer students to the Council for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze, and American Friends Service Committee to learn more about the freeze. To suggest that students should be encouraged by the anti-nuclear movement and should seek additional information from pro-freeze groups can only be seen as guiding student activism.

Perhaps the most flagrant politicization can be found in *Perspectives*. This text identifies Martin Luther King, Jr., as the foremost example of a "peacemaker" and then speculates that "If Dr. King were alive today, it is not likely that he would view Reagan as a peacemaker." It is appalling for a school text to assert what a man assassinated 19 years ago would think of President Reagan's policies today.

Perspectives goes on to suggest that "it is inaction and apathy which deepen despair, while action and commitment lead to hope." Teachers are instructed to read aloud a lengthy quotation from Jonathan Schell's anti-nuclear book, *The Fate of the Earth*, holding that the solution to the "nuclear peril" lies in the horror of nuclear weapons: "This horror at a murderous action taken against generations unborn, which exerts pressure at the center of our existence, and which is the whole reality of extinction . . . must become the deterrent."

Parody of the 1960s

The study of conflict and its avoidance in the nuclear age requires an examination of those issues, both historic and current, that are most responsible for U.S.-Soviet friction. This requires a discussion of the ideological differences between a pluralist, capitalist democracy and a totalitarian Communist system, as well as an accurate historical recounting of incidents such as the Soviet annexation and subjugation of most of Central Europe. It also requires a discussion of the theory and practice of deterrence.

Any curriculum dealing with nuclear education has a clear, yet restricted mandate: to enhance students' awareness of nuclear issues, improve their ability to think critically, and provide them with a basis for forming their own conclusions. Unfortunately, most "nuclear age" teaching materials fail to satisfy this mandate. They provide a narrow, misleading, and inaccurate interpretation of complex subjects. Rather than teaching analytical skills, these curricula attempt to shape political views among students that are sympathetic to the Soviet Union and hostile to U.S. policies and actions.

Failing to provide an accurate and comprehensive discussion of deterrence is a fatal flaw for any text on nuclear education.

"Nuclear age" materials almost appear as a parody of the "New Left" anti-war literature dating from the 1960s. But they should be taken seriously because they are sponsored by powerful and well-organized educational groups, and are the most widely recognized materials on the subject. Some educational and youth organizations (such as the San Francisco Unified School District and Camp Fire, Inc.) have resolved to work specifically with ESR in the area of peace education. What is needed now is not an equally propagandistic response from the political Right, but a factual, nonpartisan curriculum based on history and democratic values. If students are to be exposed to such a controversial subject at a tender age, they deserve no less.

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TOWARD A NEW FUSIONISM?

The Old Right Makes New Alliances

PAUL GOTTFRIED

The Spring 1986 issue of the *Intercollegiate Review* included a symposium on the state of conservatism. The seven participants, all of them self-identified Old Conservatives, expressed disapproval over the recent drift of the American intellectual Right. Amid complaints about the general spiritual decline of the modern era was the more specific criticism that the postwar conservative movement had lost its bearings. That movement, launched under the guidance of Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, Eric Voegelin, and other defenders of the Western cultural and political heritage, was increasingly without direction. The eloquent Southern historian, Clyde N. Wilson, (in a passage later grievously misinterpreted) set the dominant tone of the symposium:

> First of all, we have simply been crowded out by overwhelming numbers. The offensives of radicalism have driven vast herds of liberals across the border into our territories. These refugees speak in our name, but the language they speak is the one they always spoke. We have grown familiar with it, have learned to tolerate it, but it is tolerable only by contrast to the harsh syllables of the barbarians over the border.

Not all the contributions were equally blunt nor did they attack a single enemy. Russell Kirk directed most of his criticism at libertarians. Still, it was obvious at whom most of the shafts were directed. Neoconservatives were described as secular materialists and thinly disguised socialists who have swallowed up once-conservative foundations and publications. In November 1985, *Commentary*, the premier neoconservative journal, published a symposium on change in America since 1945 that passed over Old Conservatives (with the exception of Robert Nisbet), while inviting leftists to participate in its discussion. Several of the responses by neoconservatives in *Commentary* celebrated the social progress seen in America since 1945, while disregarding (from an Old Conservative perspective) rampant moral disintegration.

Beyond slighted pride over their treatment by *Commentary* was the more general outrage that Old Conservatives felt (and still feel) toward those who have taken over their movement (and at least some of their ideas) without paying them homage. The Intercollegiate Studies Institute, which publishes the *Intercollegiate Review* (along with *Modern Age* and other Old Conservative publications), has seen foundations under neoconservative direction withdraw funds from its programs. Even today, leading neoconservatives deny their intellectual debts to members of the older conservative movement. Neoconservatives persist in believing that, until their move to the right, American conservatism was almost exclusively controlled by bigots and philistines.

The latent hostility between the two sides came to the surface in April 1986 during and after a Philadelphia Society meeting held in Chicago. At this gathering of what originally was conceived as a debating forum for conservative schools of thought, old and new conservatives excoriated each other—and went home with obvious bitterness. Neoconservatives complained about the Old Right's anti-Semitism and scorn for those with radical backgrounds. Old conservatives noted the persistent condescension and (the Southerners among them) the anti-Southern prejudice that the neoconservatives displayed in their presence.

Frank Meyer vs. Russell Kirk

Perhaps the Old Conservatives misjudged their long-term situation. True, the neoconservatives have slighted them—and may continue to do so. Yet, the Old Conservatives—those who participated in the symposium and those who write for *Modern Age*—ignore three facets of their movement: its past history, its present composition, and its prospects for the future. Contemporary Old Conservatives like to view the postwar intellectual Right as a movement unified on essential questions. I, myself, have been guilty of exaggerating this unity. Though there may have been more philosophic cohesion among conservatives of the '50s and '60s than there is on the contemporary right, the postwar conservative movement has always consisted of contentious individuals and factions.

In the '50s and '60s, fierce and protracted debates (often turning into personal quarrels) took place between tradi-

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tionalists and libertarians. Frank S. Meyer's *In Defense of* Freedom, published in 1962, castigated the "New Hegelian" Statists of the American Right, particularly Robert Nisbet and Russell Kirk. Meyer believed that such thinkers replicated the mistakes of Edmund Burke, the great English statesman and critic of the French Revolution whom Nisbet and Kirk admire. By assigning a metaphysical reality to the state that transcends the rights of individuals, Burkean conservatives, said Meyer, denied the dignity of the individual. They also contributed to the defense of the modern collectivist state, unwittingly joining hands with the political Left. Meyer was at least as open as the writers for the *Intercollegiate Review* in hurling accusations at his colleagues on the right. Nor did those targeted desist from counterattack. Russell Kirk inveighed against Meyer for his distrust of the state and his libertarian solutions to social problems. Kirk's remarks, both in the symposium and the April 1986 Philadelphia Society meeting, suggest that his dislike for libertarians—"chirping sectaries"—continues unabated. Robert Nisbet, who has mocked libertarians and religious authoritarians since the 1950s, exhibits a similar disdain.

The Old Right brought together thinkers who disagreed, thanks to the bridge-building of *National Review* and of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Both products of the 1950s made possible a working alliance within what is today celebrated, or condemned, as the postwar conservative intellectual movement. The members of this movement included the Catholic clericalists Frederick Wilhelmsen and L. Brent Bozell; the uncompromising libertarian Murray Rothbard, who denounced American participation in the Cold War as a collectivist plot; the anti-Communist Max Eastman; Burkean traditionalists; Southern regionalists; and Yankee Republicans. Frank Meyer's construction of a "fusionist" view of history, intended to clarify the American past and help define its conservative tradition, was a desperate effort to keep his own house in order. A founder of *National Review* in 1955 and of the New York Conservative Party in 1962, Meyer produced controversy among conservatives as well as the Left. He lectured James Burnham, the neo-Machiavellian exponent of power politics and co-founder of *National Review,* for being amoral and insufficiently patriotic. His insistence that both moral absolutes and the "Western Christian concept of the person" were basic to the conservative movement caused him to quarrel with Max Eastman. Eastman resigned from the *National Review* editorial board, after he had attacked Meyer for "preliberal ecclesiastical authoritarianism."

Meyer, the fusionist, tried to forestall such rifts by proving that the American heritage consists of both traditionalist and libertarian values. The Founding Fathers, according to Meyer, had synthesized currents of thinking that had long been "bifurcated" in European politics: "the emphasis on virtue and value and order and the emphasis on freedom and the integrity of the individual." Meyer justified liberty primarily as an instrumental good, one that allowed men to will what is moral rather than having it imposed. He also grounded the principle of individual freedom in the Christian personalism that he traced to the doctrine of the Incarnation. Because Christian theology taught that God Himself assumed an individual human form and was concerned with each individual soul, it laid the basis for the awareness of the individual that distinguished Western from Oriental civilization.

The justification for individual liberty, as Meyer saw it, was bound up with a Christian and Western metaphysic. Moreover, the modern collectivist state, born of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, was drawing libertarians and Christians together with its attack on their related traditions. In Europe, the rationalists had worked through revolution to reconstruct human nature; in America, by contrast, bureaucrats and social engineers produced far-reaching change without political violence. The results, Meyer maintained, were similar in both cases: established patterns of community, property rights, and once-honored moral authorities were all subverted to make way for a metastasizing managerial state.

Twenty-five years ago, conservatives took their infighting for granted and often stayed friends despite their differences. Such tolerance is in short supply on the American Right today.

Though Meyer's fusionism, viewed as a philosophy of history, remained rough around the edges, it provided the Old Right with programmatic unity. Its yoking of capitalism and social tradition, individual freedom and the defense of the West against Communist collectivists, marked the conservative political platforms of the 1960s. Meyer's fusionism as political practice can be read into the manifestos and programs of the various state conservative parties. It informed what Barry Goldwater and his advisers presented as *The Conscience of a Conservative,* written shortly before Goldwater's presidential nomination in 1964. Whether Goldwater in 1964 represented the full range of Old Right values is open to question. What is not, however, is that most of the Old Right put aside their reservations and bickering to support his presidential bid.

Even so, members of the Old Right continued to fight about other things. The back issues of *National Review* and *Modern Age* and the proceedings of the Philadelphia Society reveal a contentiousness that has lately been ignored. Leftists, most recently Sidney Blumenthal in *The Rise of the Counterestablishment,* pay insufficient attention to the internal disagreements of conservatives. Such an oversight, however, is understandable among those who have trouble distinguishing even an anti-Communist socialist and secularist such as Sidney Hook from a Catholic traditionalist. Conservative scholars have also played up the unity while understating the rifts in their movement. Jeffrey Hart's *The Conservative Dissent* and George

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Nash's encyclopedic *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* both leave the impression that postwar conservatism is a gathering stream of ideas that ultimately flow together. The overarching unity depicted in these studies has always been problematic. Conservative wars have been with us since the 1950s. The major difference between the old and new ones is not so much a matter of degree as one of expectation. Twenty-five years ago, conservatives took their infighting for granted and often stayed friends despite their differences. Such tolerance is in short supply within the American Right today, but not because of unprecedented internal strife.

A Sense of Martyrdom

The discussants featured in the *Intercollegiate Review* symposium were half right about their present situation. They were properly concerned that the Old Right, and they as members of it, had fallen on hard times. The English political scientist Gillian Peele, in an extensive study of American conservatism during the Reagan era, does not mention the Old Right or its representatives; though she makes multiple references in *Revival and Reaction* to *Commentary, The Public Interest,* and other neoconservative publications as well as to those of the New Right and of conservative think tanks, neither *Modern Age* nor *National Review* is mentioned in her work. Regarding money and professional honors, the second generation of the Old Right (now middle-aged) is no better off than one might infer from their relative lack of political influence. Unlike neoconservatives of comparable intellectual stature, most of the participants in the symposium do not have access to foundation grants for doing research and for living comfortably. M. E. Bradford, perhaps the best known second-generation Old Conservative, earns less at the University of Dallas than do tenured secondary-school teachers in the same city.

Thomas Fleming has turned to anthropology and sociobiology to demonstrate what Kirk and other traditionalists of the '50s took as self-evident: class and gender distinctions are part of the human condition.

Old Conservatives see this deprivation as the price to be borne for preserving the heritage of the postwar Right, or, more precisely, of its traditionalist wing. A sense of martyrdom suffuses the outrage that these conservatives feel at their exclusion from the successes enjoyed by other segments of the intellectual Right. Typically they stress their close contact with the older generation of postwar traditionalists. This connection is real in some cases: Bradford, for example, was a direct disciple of Richard Weaver and Donald Davidson and thus a living link in the Southern Agrarian tradition.

Yet, other self-declared devotees of the same tradition, such as Clyde N. Wilson, Samuel T. Francis, and Thomas Fleming, embraced Agrarianism because of books and conversations with their peers. Claes G. Ryn, a Swedish political theorist, has long expressed admiration for Russell Kirk, whose writings Ryn discovered in Sweden through his professor, Folke Leander. Leander shared Kirk's (and eventually Ryn's) interest in Edmund Burke and Irving Babbitt. George Panichas, another Old Conservative, was a student of F. R. Leavis at Cambridge. Panichas' worldview, which was shaped only minimally by members of the Old Right, combines the moral understanding of literature found in Leavis and Babbitt with heavy doses of Christian Platonism. His philippics against neoconservatives include the characteristically Platonic distinction between *doxai* and *episteme,* transitory opinions and permanent knowledge grounded in the transcendent. George Carey, who participated with Panichas in the symposium, and is a co-editor of *Modern Age,* was a younger contemporary rather than student of the founders of the Old Right. Usually seen as a faithful follower of the conservative populist Willmoore Kendall, Carey actually collaborated with Kendall in preparing *The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition* in 1970. He has used Kendall's thought selectively, drawing primarily on Kendall's interpretation of the Constitution, which stresses original intention and Congressional supremacy—and only secondarily in defense of majoritarian democracy.

Dawning of the Age of Aquinas?

This selective use of first-generation Old Conservatives by the second-generation needs further examination. It is wrong to assume with their critics that this second generation merely echoes the first. Its members may voice filial pieties about their intellectual elders, but they, like the Straussians, invoke old masters even while expressing their own views. A misunderstanding of this second generation led to a confusing and confused debate between Stephen Tonsor, a conservative Catholic historian, and Peter and Brigitte Berger, neoconservative sociologists. In a speech at the Philadelphia Society in April 1986, Tonsor defined authentic conservatism, as opposed to its imperfect "modernist" neoconservative imitation, as Catholic and Anglo-Catholic Aristotelianism. True conservatives, including American ones, Tonsor maintained, accept the moral-religious worldview expressed in the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. Any attempt, he said, to found a conservative movement upon non-religious foundations opens the way to modernism, and even more ominously, to the grim nihilism of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Much of the debate between Tonsor and the neoconservatives centered on baseless accusations such as Tonsor's attribution of Nietzschean teachings to the *Commentary* circle and the neoconservative charge of anti-Semitism against Tonsor. But there was also a certain amount of agreement between the two sides. In an October 1986 *Commentary* article, the Bergers denounced the

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"absolutist battle cries on domestic issues" that they heard coming from traditionalists: "We are not able, at least not honestly, to accept any particular moral tradition *in toto* as being the recovery and unquestionable manifestation of divine will, natural law or reason." This statement of moral agnosticism clashes with the Lutheran tradition (and its Biblically based morality), which the authors profess to believe, yet the Bergers also concede the very point Tonsor made. While they may have different definitions of "authentic" conservatives, Tonsor and the Bergers do agree on a definition of Old Right conservatives. Like Tonsor, the Bergers view the Old Right as a rallying point for neo-medieval Catholics who hold a monolithic system of values as universally applicable.

Mel Bradford's "Thundering Abstractions"

Although some conservatives fit the above description, they form only a dwindling remnant of the second-generation Old Right. Indeed the Bergers' critics on the right are at least as skeptical as they are about crusading for universals. The major appeal of M. E. Bradford among Old Conservatives is not his polemics against Abraham Lincoln or his reluctance to condemn antebellum slavery. It is Bradford's relentless and perceptive attacks on "thundering abstractions" and the raising of equality to a godterm that have brought him the favor of the entire Old Right. Scorning discussion of universals, as opposed to historically rooted custom, Bradford has broken, without admitting it, from his own teacher in rhetoric, Richard Weaver. Unlike Weaver who praised Lincoln's speeches for their arguments from definition, or principle, Bradford condemns Lincoln as an inflammatory ideologue and recommends the oratory of Burke—whose arguments from circumstance Weaver despised. This difference between the two is not attributable to Bradford's more reactionary views. Though Weaver, unlike Bradford, admired Lincoln as a principled statesman, he was even more defensive of the South—and violently opposed to the federal government's efforts to end segregation.

The plain truth is that Bradford dislikes the appeal to universals divorced from historical contexts. He detests in particular the appeal to equality, which he associates with utopian politics and with a war against inherited order. Though a specialist in literature of the South and the Southwest who studied with the New Critics at Vanderbilt, Bradford has never believed that one can properly examine literature outside its cultural setting. In relating literature—and he sees political rhetoric as part of literature—to the cultural and historic, Bradford has moved beyond the New Critics, who focused on the aesthetic and syntactical aspects of literary analysis. His sensitivity to historical particularities and his intuitions about Southern character have earned him praise from America's leading Marxist historian, Eugene Genovese, as well as from the renowned constitutionalist, Forrest McDonald. Significantly, Bradford has encountered the criticism of Straussians and Thomists for his contemptuous remarks about natural reason. His recently published collection of essays, *A Better Guide Than Reason,* includes strictures against those who appeal to reason or universal truths in teaching public virtue.

AP/Wide World Photos

Old Conservatives get no respect.

Beyond ancestral custom and a few Biblical (mostly Old Testament) precepts, Bradford finds it idle to discuss speculative guidelines for social behavior. Like the philosopher Alisdaire MacIntyre (another hero to second-generation Old Conservatives), Bradford maintains that a particular ethic loses its viability as soon as it must be intellectually justified. Also like MacIntyre, Bradford is drawn to premodern cohesive societies in which people's lives are shaped by duty and ingrained loyalty.

Exemplifying the tendency of second-generation conservatives to uphold the historically specific against the abstract universal is a letter by Lee Congdon in *Chronicles of Culture.* The letter was addressed to a critic of Congdon who scolded him for disparaging the ethical rationalism of legal scholar Walter Berns. Congdon asserts:

> I believe in God's law.... I do not believe in natural law, which I take to be the product of rational imagination, ideas extrapolated from historical experience.

Congdon's comment may be, even for him, an unusually blunt dismissal of natural law and natural reason, but the source is an eminent and self-identified second-generation Old Conservative historian. In his letter, Congdon approvingly cites John Lukacs on the inevitably historical character of values. His other writings also include arguments from Russell Kirk and the Southern Agrarians about the need for situated men and rooted cultures.

Rediscovering the Social Sciences

The study of history as a means of understanding human consciousness and developing structures of order was essential for the work of Eric Voegelin (perhaps the 20th

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century's premier philosopher of history), who closely identified with the postwar conservative movement. Voegelin's *Order and History* affected profoundly the early editors of *National Review,* particularly Frank Meyer, and has been a recurrent topic in *Modern Age* since its founding. A deep historical sense, as I have argued in a recent book, pervades the traditionalist wing of postwar conservatism, though rarely until recent years did this turning to a living past come to exclude the appeal to higher or transcendent norms. Distaste for the universal ideals of the political Left and of neoconservatives has led some members of the second-generation Old Right toward a sympathetic view of an all-determining history.

The Old Right may be able to build a political alliance with libertarians if both sides can disregard their differences on family issues in order to launch a joint assault on the welfare state.

Another second-generation Old Conservative, Thomas Fleming, has turned to anthropology and sociobiology in order to demonstrate what Kirk and other traditionalists of the '50s took (and still take) as self-evident: class and gender distinctions are part of the human condition. Only vaguely present among traditionalists of the '50s and '60s, the interest in social science is far more marked among the Old Right today. Samuel T. Francis, originally a Southern regionalist, has used the radical leftist C. Wright Mills, as well as James Burnham, to explore the revolutionary aspect of the modern managerial state. Francis' references to "class hegemony" and to the "superstructure of ideas created by the ruling class" sound more like Marx and Antonio Gramsci than Richard Weaver.

The iconoclastic strain in Francis and in other second-generation Old Conservatives points to their basic difference from those traditionalists of the '50s whom they continue to praise. In reacting to liberal and, more recently, neoconservative pieties, the Old Right has acquired naturalist and positivist tendencies that sometimes offend its older representatives. Thomas Molnar, a Catholic Aristotelian, has taken exception with Thomas Fleming over the use of sociobiology to demonstrate the inescapability of hierarchy and patriarchy. Though Molnar deplores the evidence of naturalism in Fleming's writing, he himself cites works in cultural anthropology to prove that most societies, in most places, have embraced public religion and the principle of hierarchy. The Old Right has come to grasp what Robert Nisbet first observed in the 1950s, that the study of history and social theory in 19th-century Europe was largely the work of self-conscious conservatives. Contrary to the connection that the French Enlightenment drew between what was natural and what was individualistic and egalitarian, the social theorists Edmund Burke, G. W. F. Hegel, and Frederic Le Play and the historians Fustel de Coulanges, Leopold von Ranke, and Jules Michelet emphasized the role of community in the development of peoples and civilizations. It is unsurprising that those who oppose social homogeneity as a public philosophy of secular democracy would rediscover the social sciences.

It is also no surprise that the same conservatives should move toward the relativist and positivist sides of the social sciences. The espousal of the social scientific outlook among the Old Right has not been without generational tension and has, moreover, created philosophic difficulty for those engaged in this enterprise. In his dismissive remarks about natural law, Congdon also explains that "I believe in God's law and . . . can stipulate, with some measure of precision, what it enjoins." Bradford has said the same while expressing skepticism about the concept of natural reason. Fleming combines in his social analysis the teachings of Aristotle, Southern Agrarians, and the Anglican theologian Richard Hooker with the evolutionary theory of Edward O. Wilson, an atheist and materialist.

Observing the relativist tendencies in certain forms of historical thinking, Claes G. Ryn has tried to develop a "value-centered historicism," as a way of understanding the interrelationship of moral truth and shifting historical situations. Ryn has drawn on various thinkers, particularly Benedetto Croce, Irving Babbitt, Russell Kirk, and Edmund Burke, to present his view of the aesthetic and historical preconditions of moral consciousness. It is never as an isolated intellectual engaged in speculative thought, but as a member of a particular society and epoch that, according to Ryn, man acquires a sense of right. By an act of will, he chooses what is right, through imagination and natural reason: "Man participates in the synthesis of the universal and the particular as creative mediator." Francis and Fleming represent the ascending influence of the social sciences on traditionalist conservatism; Ryn (like myself) seeks to temper the conservative historicism of M. E. Bradford and, among older conservatives, James Burnham by reintroducing a historicized sense of natural reason.

Cynicism about the State

Another characteristic of the second-generation Old Right that distinguishes it from the earlier one is cynicism about the State. Unlike Russell Kirk and Robert Nisbet, for example, this second generation no longer extols an activist government even in principle. Its members, in the words of Nigel Ashford, an English political scientist, think of an expanding welfare state whenever the subject of government comes up. This observation is illustrated by the critical way that second-generation Old Conservatives responded to George Will's *Statecraft as Soulcraft,* a defense of the American welfare state that cites Aristotle's and Burke's statements on political community. Joseph Sobran, Samuel T. Francis, M. E. Bradford, and other traditionalists berated Will for applying the language of classical political theory to radically anti-traditional institutions. The Old Right is losing its fear of being identified with libertarians, who seem to be, at least objectively, reactionary. Because libertarians speak concretely of dis-

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mantling the welfare state, and thereby taking the predominantly leftist managerial class out of people's lives, Old Conservatives are less and less inclined to ridicule libertarians as moral anarchists. Although there is no evidence of real affection between the two, traditionalists below the age of 50, with no strong memories of the conservative wars of the '60s, rarely exhibit the distaste for libertarians still apparent in Kirk and Nisbet.

Though the Old Right is often pessimistic about its future, its prospects for recognition are far better than its doomsayers imagine. Its members are less isolated than they believe. Old Rightists still have a home base at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute and are able to publish freely in its periodicals. The more prominent are also featured in other publications of the Right such as *National Review* and *Chronicles*. There may also develop stronger ties between the second-generation Old Right and other groups within the conservative camp. Old Right members number many among the contributors to *Human Life Review*, *Family and Society*, and other publications supported by the New Right. On social issues, close agreement already exists between the Old and New Right, though the populist, majoritarian rhetoric and activist style characteristic of the New Right still upset many traditionalists. First-generation Old Rightists complain about the New Right's crassly democratic character, whereas the second-generation Old Rightists are more likely to criticize its Pollyanna generalizations about American society being on the verge of a great conservative awakening.

Some disagreement still persists between the two camps about the founding principles of the American government. While libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Richard A. Epstein stress the contractual and Lockean roots of the Constitution, the Old Right more typically focuses on the precapitalist—*i.e.*, Judeo-Christian and classical—contributions to the American Founding. At the 1987 gathering of the Philadelphia Society, Forrest McDonald stated that "one cannot leap from the Framers' belief in the sanctity of private property to the conclusion that they advocated either capitalism or a free market economy." At the time of the Founding, McDonald explained, "precapitalist values, attitudes, and institutions rooted in the feudal past were far from dead in America and those of mercantilism . . . were in full bloom." In what may have been a critical reference to Epstein's attempt in *Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain* to link early American attitudes about ownership to William Blackstone's *Commentaries*, particularly his defense of property in Book Two, McDonald observed that those who cite Blackstone's defense of an inviolable right to property often fail to note that the same author "devotes 518 pages to qualifying and specifying exceptions to it."

Significantly, McDonald ended his remarks about precapitalist values in early America with an assertion that could have come from a libertarian. He stated that "constitutional government and capitalism became inextricably intertwined at the outset," whatever else the Founders may have intended. Moreover, "they were born together, they grew up together, they prospered together, and—unless we return to limited government under law, and soon—they will die together." Epstein and Nozick could easily have written the same passage, though they and McDonald continue to disagree on the impact of social contract theory on the Founders. One should also note that George Carey, a second-generation Old Rightist like McDonald, cites Federalist No. 62 to show that the Founding Fathers had an active interest in promoting commercial prosperity.

A New Fusionism?

The Old Right may be able to build a political alliance with libertarians, if both sides can disregard their differences on family issues in order to launch a joint assault on the welfare state. This could happen, if the past provides a key to the future. The fusionism of Frank Meyer worked on the practical level, even if it was not entirely convincing as a historical view. Fusionism was an expression, which also became a program, of the combined willingness of traditionalists and libertarians to oppose the "modern behemoth state" while battling Soviet Communism. What draws the Old Right toward the libertarians is a shared hostility to an activist state that is committed to equalizing people.

Though Old Rightists view democracy and the related demand for equality as part of our historical condition, they find no reason to celebrate either as the essence of civic virtue. They believe in the truth of Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's observation that "democracy is in principle totalitarian, for it politicizes entire nations (men, women, and children)." What the Old Right admires in America's Founders is not their alleged democratic sentiments, but their strenuous efforts to curb and even frustrate the popular will by constitutional means. Likewise, they admire similar qualities in present day politicians.

Neo-medieval Catholics form only a dwindling remnant of the Old Right.

Congressman Jack Kemp, who identifies himself as a democratic populist and who has made overtures to civil rights activists, appeals to New Rightists and neoconservatives. Yet, despite Kemp's conservative views on family issues and, generally, on foreign policy, his standing among the Old Right is poor. Gregory Fossedal, writing in the *Washington Times* has asked with unconcealed annoyance why the Right is reluctant to back Jack Kemp. The answers Fossedal does not consider are Kemp's exuberant endorsement of the Martin Luther King holiday, his statements about "equality as a conservative principle," and his initial backing of sanctions against South Africa. Such actions may have cost Kemp dearly in terms of Old Right support, though Fossedal may be correct in stating that many conservatives equivocate when asked about their lack of enthusiasm for candidate Kemp.

Having polled more than 40 Old Right intellectuals, I have learned that the presidential candidates whom most

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of them support (usually with pained expressions) are George Bush and Robert Dole. The support for Bush and Dole reflects disenchantment with self-declared conservative politicians who rush to "sell-out," by accommodating the media and adopting the adversary's rhetoric. Bush and Dole have the merit of not raising Old Right expectations that they will then likely disappoint.

Both disillusioned political hopes and the "Christian conservative anarchist" impulse that Henry Adams found in himself abound on the contemporary Old Right.

Bush and Dole have the merit of not raising Old Right expectations that they will then likely disappoint.

"Among men and women of letters, nothing could be more invigorating than a thoroughgoing reaction: a conscious turning away from the disastrous fads and failures of recent years to that deep well of wisdom called the past." The author of these lines written last fall, Russell Kirk, is not likely to interpret a federal educational program on democracy as the "conscious turning away" from recent times he desires. On the other hand, Old Rightists will likely support changes intended to get government off their backs, to undo the process of bureaucratic encroachment on their lives and communities that they ascribe to the advancing power of democratic egalitarianism.

Though traditionalists and libertarians may disagree about the goodness of the past, they do agree about present enemies. In 1985, George Carey edited a collection of papers, *Freedom and Virtue: The Conservative Libertarian Debate,* a work in which the Old Right and libertarians air their differences with mutual respect. On foreign policy, the distance between the two sides may no longer be as great as it formerly was. The intransigent anti-militarism of Murray Rothbard's followers is by no means typical of all libertarians. Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Walter Williams, Charles Murray, and Thomas Sowell, all distinguished libertarian thinkers, advocate a strong military defense for the United States. Murray, Williams, and Sowell are also moral traditionalists who base much of their briefs against the welfare state on its socially destructive effect on the black family.

The identification of Sowell and Williams, both black social economists, with the Old Right is not as strange as it might first appear. When interviewing the editorial board of the *Southern Partisan,* a publication that extols Weaver and the Agrarian tradition, I was struck by the high regard in which Sowell and Williams are held. Its anti-egalitarian stance and sociobiological interests notwithstanding, the second-generation Old Right shows no inclination to revive racialism. The *New Right Papers* (which may as well have been called the *Old Right Papers)* included not only contributions by Wilson, Fleming, and Francis, but also one by a black Southern Agrarian, Don Anderson.

The research and polemical energy of some of the second-generation Old Right has gone largely toward discrediting the belief in natural equality, particularly between the sexes. In this they have been joined by others not usually identified with the Old Right. Michael Levin, a libertarian professor of philosophy at City University of New York, has criticized the efforts of the welfare state to obliterate sexual roles. Levin has written a book-length critique on "feminist scholarship." Levin points out that women's history, though it assigns deliberately revolutionary value judgments to its subject matter, "confirms one of the oldest and most deeply entrenched of sexual stereotypes: Women provide the stability in society while men provide the change." Levin's colleague and occasional collaborator at CUNY, Steven Goldberg, has produced a book, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy,* which traces the disparate social roles of the sexes to chemical and hormonal causes. Despite different ideological points of origin, Goldberg and Fleming have begun to correspond about their common work, and Goldberg has already published several articles in *Chronicles.*

A True Counterestablishment

In a recent *New Republic,* Marxist historian Eugene Genovese scolds Sidney Blumenthal for not paying sufficient attention to the resurgent Old Right. Blumenthal assumes that if the conservative counterestablishment, which Genovese and Francis identify as neoconservative, fails, the Left will inevitably sweep back into power. But the waning of neoconservativism, maintains Genovese, may in fact "bring forward a much harder and more radical right, with serious political prospects." Recruiting heavily from the South, this revitalized Right has already absorbed elements of the Southern Agrarian tradition, according to Genovese: "Today with the work of M. E. Bradford, it has established a political base of indeterminate but clearly not trivial proportions." Moreover, "The Northern contingent has always had a strong dose of high Romanism, but in addition to Stephen Tonsor and other Catholics, it has included Russell Kirk, and such younger scholars as Paul Gottfried." Genovese may exaggerate the social base of the Old Right and overlook its debilitating lack of funds. He is correct, however, in noting what others continue to disregard: The Old Right, far from being intellectually depleted, has "an impressive array of educators, many of whom are scholars and teachers of a high order."

Perhaps thoughtful libertarian and Old Rightist critics of the welfare state will come together in building a true conservative counterestablishment. The Old Right may never dominate this counterestablishment and may never quite lose its reputation for whimsical reaction. But conservatives—and on this point let there be no doubt—will rediscover the Old Right as an indispensable source of conservative thinking. In the end, conservatives may even find themselves returning to Frank Meyer's blend of traditional social values and resistance to managerial collectivism, whether they call it fusionism or not. ☎

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

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ABBIE HOFFMAN'S NIGHTMARE

The New Generation of Conservative Activists

BENJAMIN HART

Twenty-seven-year-old Melinda Sidak is "disgusted" when "the hippies of the '60s" (those around age 45) say that young Americans are not idealistic. "Because of their high tax and big spending policies which almost destroyed the country, our generation had to come in and fix everything. We can no longer afford the luxury of their so-called idealism, which was really just self-indulgence," says Sidak, who entered politics because of her "revulsion at the pervasive hypocrisy of the liberal establishment."

Sidak, a 1984 University of Virginia Law School graduate, clerked for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and now serves as special counsel for Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole. Sidak holds many of the stated ideals of the Woodstock generation: "I question authority, which is why I want to dismantle the state." She adds, "The mission of our generation should be to shake up settled perceptions and challenge the assumptions that created the welfare state, which continue to sap our creative energy and erode our liberties. It is the utopian Great Society liberals, not the conservatives, who are the oppressors."

Sidak is typical of many young conservatives now working in Washington's policy-making establishment. "The brightest young conservatives are no longer going into business, they're going into the political and policy war," says Morton Blackwell, president of the Leadership Institute, which trains young conservative activists for policy-making positions in Washington. He worked as an official at the White House Office of Public Liaison where he made it his personal mission to identify young conservatives, usually recent college graduates, and to place them in positions in government agencies, congressional offices, and the White House. "One of the most important legacies of the Reagan administration," says Blackwell, "will be the training of a generation of conservatives for jobs in government."

Too Radical for Reagan

Every other Wednesday evening, The Heritage Foundation hosts a meeting of conservative activists in their early 30s and younger, called the "Third Generation." Heritage Foundation senior vice president Burton Yale Pines coined the term in reference to three generations of conservative opposition to liberal policies beginning with the New Deal. (The First Generation refers to the intellectual groundbreakers who coalesced around William F. Buckley, Jr., in 1955 to publish *National Review* and who later launched the Draft Goldwater movement; the Second Generation refers to the political activists and organizers who helped elect Reagan in 1980.) The Third Generation was swept into politics on the heels of the Reagan victory. Unlike the previous generations, it entered politics not when conservatives were in opposition but when they held power. As such, the young conservative activist of the '80s must confront a central paradox: How, as 32-year-old Peter Ferrara puts it, "to earn credentials in government so that someday we might head up the agencies for the express purpose of dismantling them."

The Social Security Administration is the dragon Ferrara hopes to slay. A graduate of Harvard University and the Harvard Law School, he has held domestic policy-making positions in the White House Office of Policy Development and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Ferrara caused something of a political storm for the White House when he authored two books on Social Security, both published by the libertarian Cato Institute, and both recommending the gradual phasing out of the system by allowing people to choose where to invest their money: "a government program soon to be bankrupt, or a mutual fund that will provide a 10 percent yearly return on your investment." "The choice is obvious," says Ferrara, who has since left the White House, a move that he has found "liberating": "My ideas were too radical for this White House, so we'll have to wait for the next administration."

Another important meeting place for young conservative talent is the Federalist Society, a nationwide network of conservative law students and recent law school graduates. The monthly meetings of its Washington chapter attract more than 200 young conservative lawyers, many of them rapidly rising in government. Yale Law School gradu-

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AP/Wide World Photos

All we are saying is, Give freedom a chance.

ate and Federalist Society chairman Steve Calabresi, 29, for example, served as special assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese, was a top aide in the White House for presidential assistant Kenneth Cribb, and now clerks for Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.

Washington networking organizations such as the Federalist Society and The Heritage Foundation's Third Generation help conservatives coordinate their activities and reinforce philosophical convictions of members. Also important are the personal relationships that develop. Many young conservative enthusiasts share group houses. "The Right House" was formed by several Georgetown University students as a kind of conservative commune. Through the Federalist Society, Melinda Sidak met her husband, Greg, 31, who is senior counsel to President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers. The young Right has learned an important lesson from their left-wing counterparts of the 1960s, which is that politics should be fun, and in order to be fun it must be social. Says 29-year-old Frank Lavin, Director of the White House Office of Political Affairs, "To succeed it's critical for political allies to be friends"—even marriage partners. How else will the Third Generation spawn the Fourth Generation?

No More Bill Buckleys

One feature that distinguishes the Third Generation from its predecessors is its size. "I've been in this policy business since the Draft Goldwater movement," says Heritage Foundation president Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.: "Before the Reagan victory in 1980, all conservatives in Washington could meet for lunch." Today, estimates Louis Cordia, Heritage's liaison to the administration, there are several thousand Third Generation conservatives occupying influential positions in the administration. Many will stay in Washington, to obstruct liberal policy initiatives, if elections turn against the conservatives in 1988.

With numbers has come the opportunity for specialization. Earlier generations of conservatives had to devote their energy to laying out broad principles of government. Today's conservative movement, for the first time, has both the resources and the manpower to deploy experts on virtually every issue—tax reform, Social Security, privatization, the balanced budget amendment, abortion, Angola, the United Nations, Afghanistan, and strategic defense technology, to name a few.

"We may not see the emergence of a generalist like Bill Buckley within the Third Generation," says Patrick McGuigan, executive director of the Free Congress Foundation's Judicial Reform Project. "Back in the '50s and '60s, Buckley was one of the very few conservative apologists. But the conservative movement today has hundreds of articulate spokesmen, and so many talented writers and experts that the only way for an individual to have an impact on the debate is to become an expert on something."

McGuigan played a key role in securing the confirmations of Attorney General Edwin Meese, Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Daniel Manion. "The Manion nomination was a good example of how a small number of well-organized conservatives who knew what they were doing could begin to change the direction of the country in the judicial area," says McGuigan. "It also shows you don't have to be high profile to be effective."

Peter Young, 26, has chosen "privatization" as his area of expertise. "I view my role as the stamping out of govern-

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ment wherever it occurs," says Young, who is executive director of the Adam Smith Institute's Washington office. The London-based research foundation has been a pioneer of the privatization strategy. Margaret Thatcher's government has adopted many of the Adam Smith Institute's proposals, including plans to privatize Britain's version of the Social Security system, British airports, the post office, and the electric power industry. Young's Washington operation is introducing privatization measures that have succeeded in England to the United States.

Liberation Now!

The spread of Communism, though, probably heads the Third Generation's list of concerns. Talks on the progress of anti-Communist freedom fighters around the world generally draw the largest crowds at Third Generation meetings. The two most well-attended discussions were on Afghanistan and Mozambique. Tom Schaaf, 31, while living in Africa, saw the destruction of agriculture in Mozambique by the Marxist government. He was so moved by the thousands of starving Mozambicans, yet also encouraged by the gains made by the anti-Communist RENAMO freedom fighters, that he established the Mozambique Information Office in Washington. "This is a true national liberation movement," says Schaaf, whose work goes largely unpaid. He represents an idealistic strain within the Third Generation usually associated with left-wing causes of the '60s, and he does not hesitate to criticize the Reagan administration's support for the Soviet-backed Mozambique government. "It's outrageous," says Schaaf, "that Reagan has signed off on a policy of supporting a regime that stands for everything he has opposed his entire political life."

Grover Norquist, 30, the personification of a young man on a mission, is a Harvard MBA who chose to fight for causes rather than pursue a potentially lucrative career on Wall Street. When Congress is in session, he lobbies for the slashing of tax rates as president of Americans for Tax Reform.

But when Congress leaves town, Norquist takes off his tax cut hat, puts on his freedom fighter hat and heads off to Angola, where he has become friendly with Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-Communist UNITA forces. Norquist coordinated a meeting of freedom fighters from Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan in Jamba, Savimbi's base of operations. There they signed the Jamba Accord, drafted by Norquist, pledging solidarity to the cause of removing Soviet-backed dictatorships from their respective countries. "The purpose of this gathering was to demonstrate to the world that all the freedom fighters, from Central America to Asia and Africa, are fighting a common enemy, the Soviet Union," says Norquist, who is in the midst of writing Savimbi's biography. But what does this have to do with tax reform? Norquist's answer: "Rolling back the state is a global enterprise."

Norquist's former roommate, Steve Masty, 30, used to write a column for the *Washington Times*. Now based in Peshawar, Pakistan, Masty churns out a newsletter on developments in and around the Khyber Pass, where the mujahideen battle Soviet tanks, planes, and helicopters. "I thought our welfare state was burdensome," says Masty, "but a Soviet invasion can really mess up your life."

The freedom fighter movements have clearly captured the imagination of Third Generation conservatives, in part because they permit conservatives to go on the moral offensive. Conservatives can now be both anti-colonialists and anti-Communists, in contrast to previous decades when they often found themselves having to defend corrupt authoritarian regimes in order to oppose Marxist revolution. The emergence of anti-Communist national liberation movements attempting to evict an outside power—the Soviet Union now, instead of Europe—has injected an aura of romance into the defense of western interests, which appeals to the young and idealistic. Liberals, meanwhile, have backed themselves into the hopeless role of defenders of the status quo, including Soviet-installed colonial regimes.

"Perhaps the liberals in Congress will succeed in destroying some of the freedom fighter movements," says Roger Mahan, in reference to the ongoing Iran/Contra hearings. Mahan, the 29-year-old legislative director for Congressman Wally Herger, says, "We're going to suffer setbacks because that's the nature of politics. But the tide of events has now shifted against Moscow. The Soviets are universally loathed in the world."

Hungry for Renewal

Perhaps the fastest growing constituency within the ranks of the Third Generation is the Religious Right, or born-again Christians. "I believe there is a Christian revival going on and that this is changing the American political landscape," says 26-year-old Ralph Reed, who founded Students For America, the fastest growing political youth group in the nation. Its mission is to target Christian students for political education, and in just three years time has recruited 10,000 members on roughly 200 campuses. Based in Raleigh, North Carolina, Students for America played an important role in the reelection of Senator Jesse Helms in 1984.

"We are a generation hungry for national and spiritual renewal," says Reed. "The revival of religion within the Third Generation is changing America by producing young people who love God above everything else in their lives, and who also possess the ability to govern America into the 21st century." Reed sees the evangelical churches of today as a huge, largely untapped, reservoir of conservative political power "waiting to explode."

Reed maintains that the conservative political agenda is identical to the Christian agenda: "State domination of the individual is as contradictory to the Bible as it is to a conservative philosophy of government. God says 'thou shalt not steal,' clearly recognizing the right to private property, and he also tells us 'you have been called unto liberty.'" History has shown, Reed adds, that "whenever those running the government begin believing they are accountable to no higher authority, we see a corresponding descent into tyranny."

The Third Generation is strikingly optimistic about the long-term direction of the country. The GOP loss of the Senate in 1986 and Iran/Contra hearings represent only "short-term setbacks," says Jim Pinkerton, 29, director of

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research for George Bush's presidential effort. "These episodes certainly do not indicate that the American people want to return to the policies of Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter."

In fact, young America has been moving to the right since the mid-1970s. According to Professor Alexander Astin's survey of 280,000 college freshmen conducted at the University of California's Laboratory for Research on Higher Education, the students of the 1980s are far more conservative in their views toward social and economic issues than the generation that preceded them. In 1985, for example, 70 percent of college freshmen thought "raising a family" essential or very important, up from only 55 percent in 1974. In 1984, 85 percent believed extramarital sex wrong, up from 68 percent in the mid-'70s. Young Americans are also comfortable with the capitalist system. According to the Astin surveys, 71 percent in 1985 thought "being well off financially" was a very important goal, up from 40 percent in 1971. In addition, fewer college freshmen today think abortion should be legal and more believe the courts are too concerned about the rights of criminals.

Boring, Themeless Campaigns

An August 1986 pre-election poll by the Roper organization showed 67 percent approval for the way Ronald Reagan was handling his job as president among those ages 18 to 29, while only 46 percent of those over 60 approved, demonstrating a sharp generational gap, with America's youth far and away the most conservative age group. The same survey showed 45 percent of those 18 to 29 preferring Republican control of the Senate, while only 36 percent preferred Democratic control—which is why one of the greatest disappointments for the GOP in the 1986 elections was the meager 17 percent turnout at the polls of the under-30 vote. Are young Americans apathetic, or did they stay away for a reason?

"The 1986 Senate elections were the story of the failure of boring Republican moderates—Andrews, Gorton, Broyhill, Zschau, Santini—and of boring, issueless, themeless campaigns, without meaning to the voters," Peter Ferrara told a Third Generation audience at Heritage. "The only candidate who ran a hard-core conservative campaign was the one who was supposed to lose, but won—Steve Symms." Jeff Eisenach, 29, director of research for presidential aspirant Pete du Pont, believes, "Our task for 1988 is to give young America a reason to vote, because they won't bother if all we feed them is mush."

But Third Generation conservatives do not tie the success or failure of the conservative movement to a particular election. Nor do they see the future of their cause as hinging on whether Oliver North violated the law. Quite the contrary. They believe the pursuit of conservative policies is no longer a quixotic enterprise, but is in fact good politics. Just as the New Left of the '60s spoke of socialist advances around the world, so the young conservatives of the '80s see the progress of free market capitalism as a global movement.

Moreover, the ranks of the College Republicans continue to swell under the leadership of chairman David Miner, a close associate of Jesse Helms, and executive director Dennis Kilcoyne. While the College Democrats, according to its national office, has languished to a membership of only 15,000, the College Republican membership has skyrocketed to 100,000 on 1,200 campuses. The College Republicans have registered 300,000 new voters among college students. And they've done it by learning a lesson from their leftist counterparts of the '60s. "What we're looking for," says Kilcoyne, 24, "is the 5 percent of the C.R.s who are hard core, meaning those who will spend time recruiting members, stuffing envelopes, organizing demonstrations, manning phone banks, people willing to do the necessary grunt work."

"We want a job, a home, a family, and an opportunity to achieve all we can in life. And we don't want to raise our children in a moral vacuum. I believe this is idealism. It's just not socialism."

Idealists of the Eighties

Prior to 1978, the True Believer, social critic Eric Hoffer's term to describe the political activist, was most likely to be a leftist. The New Deal and the Great Society created a generation of welfare state administrators, while New Left radical organizations and publications, ranging from the Weathermen to the Black Panthers and the *Berkeley Barb* to *Ramparts*, dotted campuses. As a result, the political debate continued to be pushed farther and farther in the direction of socialism and various forms of economic redistribution. Instead of offering a competing vision for the world, instead of learning how policy is made, instead of taking low-paying jobs at newspapers, most young Americans with conservative inclinations opted for careers in corporate America, where they had zero impact on public perceptions, the flow of information, and government policy.

But all that has changed. The Right now has plenty of True Believers of its own—bright, committed, visionary young people. Dennis Kilcoyne shares with Melinda Sidak the view that the conservative activists of the '80s are every bit as idealistic as the liberal activists of the '60s and '70s. But he says the idealism has taken another form: "We want a job, a home, a family, and an opportunity to achieve all we can in life. And we don't want our kids raised in a moral vacuum. I believe this is idealism. It's just not socialism."

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Musical Great Awakening

Country's New Traditionalists

James Ring Adams

Country music is not only alive and well, it has launched into an artistic revival such as delighted fans haven't seen for 30 years. Every month brings forward a new performer singing good-to-excellent original material steeped in the traditional sounds of honky-tonk, gospel, or Texas swing. The musicians are dedicated to their music first and foremost, but the sudden emergence of a new, highly talented generation in a somewhat despised art form amounts to a minor social phenomenon. If you take Pat Robertson and the Tax Revolt seriously, then you had better start listening to the country music traditionalists. They're part of the same movement.

Old Hickory's Bards

Just what's going on? In anthropological shorthand, you could call it the reemergence of the country's Scotch-Irish culture. The national subconscious has always been nagged by the awareness of "another America" in the hinterlands, somewhere off the superhighways, up in the hills, underneath the bicoastal jetliners. It's an America with roots in the frontier. It's an America still drawing spiritual strength from the Great Awakenings of the first Baptists and Methodists. It's an America descended from the resettled Scotsmen who left northern Ireland in a bitter 18th century dispute over tax bills. This is the America that rose up under Andrew Jackson to avenge the slights, real or imagined, suffered at the hands of Eastern seaboard merchants of English descent. The animosity between the Scotch-Irish and the English, a major ethnic conflict in American politics, has simmered for generations, even while it was pushed well to the back of public memory. Now, for a variety of reasons, the wheel has turned, and Scotch-Irish culture in all its forms demands recognition.

These demands are particularly evident in the renewed self-confidence of country music. Although the Scotch-Irish don't have a monopoly on song-writing or performing, their genetic tradition does seem to predispose them toward nasal flats and twangs. Many of country music's greatest names have descended from the people that took the bagpipe for its national instrument.

Many country singers, however, would decline to describe themselves in such sweeping sociocultural and ethnic terms. Leading traditionalists such as Reba McEntire, 32, and Ricky Skaggs, 33, (both winners of the industry's leading honor, the Country Music Association's "Entertainer of the Year" award), seem determined to avoid categorization. These young singers are reviving a wide variety of traditions. McEntire, the redheaded daughter of an Oklahoma rancher, says her musical heroes are Southwest honky-tonkers such as George Jones and Merle Haggard. Skaggs, a Kentucky native, began his career as a bluegrass child prodigy. Best-seller George Strait, 34, a southern Texas native who wears button-downs and blue jeans, calls his style "white blues."

The range widens beyond these headliners. A lesser known but influential family singing group, the Whites (whose lead vocalist, Sharon, is Mrs. Ricky Skaggs), combines close harmony—one of the oldest styles—with the Texas swing rhythms inspired by the 1930s big bands. Dwight Yoakam, a hillbilly militant from Columbus, Ohio, mixes the nasality of his grandfather's eastern Kentucky with the over-amplified beat of the Los Angeles punk rock circuit. At a youthful 40, crossover star Emmylou Harris is almost the matriarch of the movement, and has been marketed as a folk, rock, and country artist as well as various hyphenated combinations of the three.

These singers all say, without mincing words, that they are reviving an American art form once headed toward extinction. Many will add that they are fighting a threat from within; they blame the withering of the tradition on Nashville, which, lured by the profits from crossover hits, watered down and slicked up its country product until it couldn't be told apart from bad pop music. Years of stagnation and artistic mediocrity followed, and the country audience dwindled.

Commercialized Populism

The traditionalists aren't just preserving the original country styles; they are showing that the music is still a viable, valuable part of popular culture. They avoid the rigidity of, say, the bluegrass purists, who insist on using only acoustic (non-amplified) instruments. The new coun-

James Ring Adams, *former* Wall Street Journal *editorial writer, is at work on a book on bank scandals. He frequently writes about country music.*

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try generation gives an honored place to the electric guitar. (The honky-tonk players of the '40s needed amplified instruments just to be heard above the din.) The neo-honky-tonkers do return to the more austere arrangements of the '40s, stripping away the violins and background chorales of the "Nashville sound," but they also embrace the recording technology of the '80s. Above all, they are willing to be tested by the discipline of the marketplace, and that's where they are making their most impressive points. Traditional albums are now going gold and platinum (500,000 and one million sold) in a market where sales of 300,000 are highly respectable. Concert receipts of youngsters such as George Strait and Reba McEntire are beginning to match those of the big crossover names such as Kenny Rogers and Dolly Parton. This isn't a movement of antiquarians, after all; it's a hardheaded commercial enterprise.

Country music is by definition commercial. The turning point distinguishing this genre from the preceding tradition of British folk ballads, or 19th century popular music, was the advent of the radio and the recordplayer in the 1920s. (Scholars say the first country record to sell a million copies was a 1924 rendition of "The Wreck of the Old 97" by Vernon Dahlhart, who was actually a light-opera singer.) Ever since, the electronic audience has been country music's mainstay. The new traditionalists are important, not because a few performers want to indulge in a recherché style but, bluntly, because they sell records. They've shown, in terms the recording industry can understand, that they speak for a substantial number of people.

It's tempting to fit this constituency into the demographics of the Reagan Revolution. The electoral strength of President Reagan's ideology has tracked the population shift to the South and West. These regions now command an electoral college majority sufficient to elect a president without any help from the urban, industrial Midwest and Northeast. It's only natural that regions holding the political balance of power should demand cultural respect as well.

But there's nothing in this cultural revival that should cheer the strategists of any political establishment. Travel to the Kentucky hill farms and the Texas Panhandle ranches that sustain country music, and you will encounter a populism distrustful of all political parties. Like the born-again Christians and the foot-soldiers of the tax referenda, hard-core country fans have little use for any sort of social elite.

The best way to understand this movement is to talk to its cultural leaders. Country musicians are rightly proud of their rapport with their fans. Their audiences are smaller but less fickle than those of rock or pop stars. The singers perform in closer quarters—at country fairs, dance halls and honky-tonks. Even the biggest names emphasize their plain-folks origins. Their personal histories show vividly the many varieties of traditionalism, and the singleness of its purpose.

Militant Hillbilly

No one better captures the apolitical, antiestablishment ethnicity of this movement than its star intellectual, the 30-year-old neo-hillbilly singer, Dwight Yoakam. At six-foot-two, he's an imposing, energetic performer and a prolific songwriter. His two big hits, "Honky-Tonk Man" and "Guitars, Cadillacs and Hillbilly Music," pretty well define his musical direction. His angry, articulate defense of this tradition against the diluted Nashville pap has made him much more popular with the music press than with the record companies.

Yoakam (the name is a Dutch graft on his Scotch-Irish descent) declares that his purpose is to preserve the "ethnic American form of music" developed by the "white, rural, underprivileged mass" with whom he strongly identifies. In his version of cultural history, upper class conservatives looked down on this element—"those disgusting honky-tonkers out there in those roadhouses carrying on again"—until the '60s presented them with something far worse. "The Frankenstein monster Rock 'n' Roll was in their children's bedroom." Seeking allies to counter the radical drift of '60s rock, says Yoakam, conservatives embraced the country music they previously despised.

The national subconscious has always been nagged by the awareness of "another America" in the hinterlands, somewhere off the superhighways, up in the hills, underneath the bicoastal jetliners.

This capsule sociology falls short of explaining 50 years of country music's great popularity, but it dovetails with Yoakam's portrayal of his own career. Passing over his middle-class upbringing, Yoakam emphasizes his southeast Kentucky ancestors. His grandfather, Luther Tibbs, a miner's union organizer, provides Yoakam's link to the radical turmoil of the '30s. His more sedate parents immersed him in the region's musical tradition. "I come from the last generation which could be exposed to country music just by pushing buttons on the radio," he says.

This background didn't help him much in his first assault on Nashville, however. "They told me I was too country," he claims. He left almost immediately for the country purists' mecca, Bakersfield, California. The capital of the Okie migration Bakersfield is an outpost of southwestern culture, right down to its blocks of "shotgun double" bungalows. For a time in the '60s, Merle Haggard and Buck Owens set up a studio there that became a center for honky-tonk recording. But when Yoakam started playing their music up and down the San Joaquin Valley, all he found were bar-owners who only wanted to hear familiar radio staples. Disillusioned, Yoakam then drifted to Los Angeles, where he found work in the punk rock clubs opening for groups such as Los Lobos, the Blasters, and the Violent Femmes. Here his neo-honky-tonk act found an audience.

Yoakam has several explanations for this remarkable

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Dwight Yoakam: Coal Miner's Grandson

phenomenon. Some young rock fans, the so-called cowpunks, claimed to be interested in country, and when Yoakam gave them a dose of the real thing, they proved true to their word. Beyond that, Yoakam discovered a common purpose with "roots rockers" such as the Blasters. They, too, were trying to recover basic musical styles, shedding later accretions. And at the origins of rock 'n' roll, they ran squarely into Yoakam's country tradition.

"Country music is the white parent of rock 'n' roll, just as jump blues, Delta blues, is its black parent," Yoakam likes to say. He can lecture for hours on the affinities between hillbilly country music and early rock, finding continuity even in their darker sides. The premature death of Hank Williams, says Yoakam, was the first rock tragedy.

Yoakam may go further than his peers do in embracing the uglier features of his tradition, but he best exemplifies his generation's across-the-board quest for its roots, a rebellion against the homogenization and assimilation of its parents. Yoakam's official biography conveniently skips one generation of mid-Ohio bourgeois comfort. There's an artificial quality to his veneration of the one ancestor who fits the Kentucky miner stereotype.

But Yoakam is no phony. He and his urban counterparts fit squarely into a pattern familiar to anyone who has read Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot*, which describes the efforts of second-generation immigrants to assimilate, and of the third generation to recover its distinctive ethnic traditions. Not only does Yoakam explicitly embrace the Glazer-Moynihan model, he adds that his own people were immigrants to urban Ohio. "There's a saying in Ohio," he states, "that the three R's in Kentucky mean 'readin', 'ritin', and Route 23.' I made it the title of one of my songs."

Honky-Tonk Calvinists

Yoakam may be trying to recover a fading tradition, but the Whites have been living it. If Buck White, a soft-spoken, weather-beaten Texan, isn't the First Father of the traditionalist movement, he is certainly the First Father-in-law. His oldest daughter, Sharon, married Ricky Skaggs after years of encountering each other on the bluegrass circuit and a tour together with Emmylou Harris. White and his impressive group of proteges, including Dobroist Jerry Douglas, frequently appear on Ricky Skaggs' highly successful albums. Sharon and her two sisters, Cheryl and Rosie, still perform with the family group, which has been quietly winning a reputation as the repository of a rich musical heritage.

"Buck White is interesting," says Bill Ivey, director of the Country Music Foundation, "because he does all the traditional styles." Buck absorbed all the ingredients in the southwestern musical stew—honky-tonk, Texas swing, ethnic dance hall, white blues, even rock 'n' roll—while playing around Wichita Falls, Texas, and he passed these traditions to his daughters. Buck maintained another country tradition, as well. "More than in any other form of music," says one prominent critic, "country musicians are expected to have a biography to match the genre." While

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raising his family, White held a day job as a plumber. His grandparents were sharecroppers. "All they had was an old car and a bunch of kids and they would pull cotton," he says. These people—"the people who toil," White calls them—are the backbone of the country music audience.

For the genuine article like the Whites, the cowpunks and the young, middle-class traditionalists pose something of a problem. Yoakam says, "They want to do it, but they don't know how." Sharon White confesses that she feels that some younger performers "don't know what they're singing about. Maybe they're singing about a way of life that's gone."

These traditionalists fear the more cerebral revivalists will miss something at the heart and soul of the music. This generation has certainly had a much easier life than its forebears. Yet the elusive element isn't simply the memory of the singer's (or his parents' or grandparents') hardscrabble upbringing. It's more serious, and more unsettling. Country music resonates to the religion that sustains, and torments, its people.

The Whites present the most attractive face of this religion. Decent and tolerant churchgoers, they're known for refusing to play songs that condone immorality. (And, although congressional wives don't seem to have noticed, such lyrics abound in country music as well as in rock.) But the Whites' repertoire does deal with infidelity and human frailty. "We sing from the hurtin' side," explains Sharon. The Whites regard their musical talent as a divine vocation. Yet they've spurned the suggestion that they could have greater financial success as a gospel group. They take their religion too seriously to exploit it.

But their Christianity permeates their music in a way that critics seem to find disturbing. This faith literally reaches beyond the grave, directly confronting man's mortality, the one modern taboo, as rural populations have done for generations. Country songs preach an uncompromising theology, where death is a fact of life, and the afterlife is a matter of fact. Songs such as "Band of Angels" ("Bear me away on your snowy wings to my eternal home"), inspire critics to describe Sharon's singing as "haunting," "ethereal," and "eery."

Calvinism haunts even the raunchiest of country singers. This constant religious tension, a nagging awareness of sin, underlies what Yoakam calls the "deep, dark side of country music." Hank Williams, as deep and dark a honky-tonker as they came, also wrote some of the most beautiful gospel songs of his generation.

Much of America finds this Calvinism unnerving. The bicoastal elite derides the evangelicals—to take them seriously would mean admitting that perhaps they are nourished by a side of human experience that the "beautiful people" scramble to ignore. American intellectuals also betray a guilty conscience. After all, the evangelicals were here first. The religion of the Great Awakenings is as basic an American institution as the American Civil Liberties Union. Very few religions have given up their hegemony as peacefully as did American Protestantism, and that transition was not altogether graceful. What if evangelical congregations decide to rebel against this diminished status? That is the current nightmare of American politics.

These religious struggles are very much muted in the

The Whites
"Singing from the hurtin' side"

Whites' amiable personalities, and it is not necessarily this great cultural division that has kept them from their big commercial breakthrough. But there exists a special poignancy in their Texas swing arrangement of Hank Williams' great gospel song, "House of Gold." You have a feeling Buck White means it when he keens the refrain:

> I'd rather be in a dark cold grave,
> And know that my poor soul was saved,
> Than live in this world in a house of gold
> And deny my God, and doom my soul.

Fallen Angel

The question raised by the Whites, whether the affluent, younger generation can really understand country, has one answer in the career of Emmylou Harris. Primarily a saga of personal tragedy and musical development, it foretells the growth of a traditionalist constituency among rock-oriented youth. This strand of the movement originated in the heart of the '60s youth culture, in the collaboration of Emmylou Harris and Gram Parsons.

Their story has excited so much morbid curiosity over the past decade that it is in danger of becoming the *Rolling Stone* version of *Love Story.* But Harris reopened the topic herself with her semi-autobiographical 1985 album *The Ballad of Sally Rose,* and her music gives these memories a genuine dignity.

Gram Parsons, a Georgia-bred Harvard dropout, was one of those musical geniuses who pack a lifetime of work into a decade, and then self-destruct. In 1972, he heard Harris at a club in Washington, D.C., where she worked as a folksinger. She doesn't recall being terribly impressed, but when he sent her an airplane ticket to record with him in California, she went. Parsons, by this time, had forged his distinctive blend of pure melodic line and strong allusive lyrics. Critics called the result "country-rock." ("Gram hated that term," recalls Harris. "He used to say that it

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Emmylou Harris
Gothic Revivalist

didn't take either form seriously.") At the height of the psychedelic era, the power of his work brought a freshet of country music into the heart of California rock. Harris toured and recorded with Parsons' Fallen Angels Band for only one year, but their appearances together at places such as the Armadillo World Headquarters in Austin, Texas (where they played to 12 encores) have become local legends. Parsons brought Harris and his growing following to a new appreciation of honky-tonk and hillbilly singers such as Merle Haggard and the Louvin Brothers.

As the population ages, it gravitates toward a music better suited to the rhythms and concerns of middle age.

For whatever reason, Parsons also copied the desperate conduct of his honky-tonk heroes. In 1973, he died of undetermined causes. He was 26. By all accounts, the loss devastated Harris. Her music became loaded with images of guilt, helplessness as if in the face of a natural phenomenon, and the discovery of her own resilience. "The hardest part is knowing I'll survive," she wrote in her brilliant tribute, "Boulder to Birmingham." With her 1975 album, *Pieces of the Sky,* she took up the cause of traditional music.

Her career, say those who know her, has been torn between this traditionalist vision and her label's attempts to market her as a pop or rock singer. Her occasional pure country albums were sometimes not what Warner Brothers expected, but her public loved them. Along the way, she managed to help rising traditionalists such as the White sisters, whose "angelic" voices she admires, and Ricky Skaggs. In 1985, after what she calls a period of stagnation, she reworked her past into *The Ballad of Sally Rose.*

This traditionalist manifesto gives a poetic rendition of Sally's encounter with The Singer, their estrangement, followed by his death, and her eventual return to his music. ("We called it honky-tonk Gothic," Harris jokes.) But it's also a cultural landmark, repudiating the '60s belief that the past can be ignored and reality rewritten. It gracefully embraces the weight of personal experience, the limits of mortality, and tradition itself. Its tightly rhymed lyrics sum:

> I shall not disavow
> All these ties that bind me now.
> They'll be a diamond, a diamond in my crown.

Back to The Future

Will the traditionalist movement last? Moreover, will it break out of its ethnic and regional boundaries? Its longevity seems assured, at least for this generation, by the quality of young talent attracted to the style. Where once Ricky Skaggs, George Strait, and Reba McEntire dominated the field, and some said there was no one behind them, basic country sounds now percolate through small nightclubs around the United States. The new generation has its own neo-traditionalist songwriters, who are emerging as stars in their own right. The recording companies have been won over, and are aggressively signing contracts. ("A friend told me indignantly the other day that each label now has its token honky-tonker," says Harris. "I said, good, that means more honky-tonkers are getting recording contracts.") The last resisters, complain the singers, are the big, "countrypolitan," middle-of-the-road radio stations.

Yet the main cause of the breakthrough is popular demand. The contracts, tours, and records meet a market, and the question is where this market came from. Nativist ethnicity is only part of the answer. Another element comes from the shift in generations. As the population ages, it gravitates toward a music better suited to the rhythms and concerns of middle age. ("We got a little older and found Haggard and Jones," goes the Bellamy Brothers' song, "Kids of the Baby Boom.") But with this maturity comes the trump card. Traditional music carries with it traditional values. Its younger adherents may ignore the content while reviving the style, but the form, in a way, implies the substance. And the themes of country music—love, loyalty, betrayal, even death—are not the property of any one ethnic group, no matter how deeply rooted in the country. The traditionalists possess the potential for universal appeal. I feel their impact on American culture is just beginning.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Faith of a Nonbeliever

Out of Step, *by Sidney Hook (New York: Harper & Row, $29.95).*

Reviewed by Richard Grenier

Sidney Hook is a national treasure, a measureless resource, a monument to freedom, democracy, reason, intelligence, courage. He has seen evil. He has seen good. And he has struggled tirelessly and with unsurpassed valor so that in the realm of the mind—in which we must all believe—truth and freedom shall prevail.

It is consequently with dismay and real grief that in his autobiography, *Out of Step,* I came upon the title of the next-to-last chapter, "Twilight Years," which reminded me that Sidney Hook, now 84 years old and only alive because doctors brought him back against his will from a recent and near-fatal illness, will not always be with us. What shall we do without him?

I find compelling every single page of his book, which begins before World War I (in that remote period long gone by when school histories taught that the American "national enemy" was England), and in the destitute slums of Williamsburg, Brooklyn (where Mr. Hook says most Americans under 50 today would cross with no more recognition than if it were a foreign land).

Out of Step successfully recaptures, with all the excitement, the great political-intellectual struggles of our time, in so many of which Sidney Hook was himself a dynamic participant. The book should be read by everyone, particularly the young or those who heard the confused rumblings of battle only from afar, for the struggles are of great moment to us all.

It was fashionable some years back to consider the raging intellectual battles into which Sidney Hook threw himself so wholeheartedly as "squabbles" among petty political sects of New York (predominantly Jewish) intellectuals. But what were these petty squabbles? How to combat Adolf Hitler? The future of China? The problems of socialism? The nature of the Soviet State?

A full 50 years before France's *Nouveaux Philosophes* won world attention with their discovery of the debased and repressive features of Soviet society, Sidney Hook had written extensive critiques of Stalin, Lenin, and the October Revolution. He and his friends wrote about the New Class before Djilas, about the Gulag before Solzhenitsyn. It is more with sadness than pride that Sidney Hook writes: "If the statesmen of the free world had been familiar with the substance of our 'petty quarrels,' the map of post-World War II might have been different."

Yet he is at strenuous pains to avoid the "cardinal sin" of the autobiographer: the reconstruction of the past, denying or covering up the foolishness or errors of one's previous years so as to cast oneself in a heroic mold. For Sidney Hook made mistakes. In earlier years, he freely admits, he was so carried away by his socialist ideas that he "failed to observe closely" his own country, America, and by constantly focusing on cases of distress or injustice was grievously ignorant of the country's tremendous resources, of its capacity for "democratic self-renewal," and even of the way ordinary Americans west of Staten Island felt.

(But when, in the early 1920s, a Communist organizer with a foreign accent handed him a packet of flyers calling on the "workers of New York" to rise and take power, he had the common sense to dump them in a trash can.)

Sidney Hook explains that socialism—although the most repressive regimes in the world today call themselves socialist—was embraced by him and his youthful comrades because they hoped it would strengthen, not restrain, "the prospects of human freedom." He still considers himself a maverick democratic "socialist." He is an "unreconstructed believer in the welfare state and a steeply progressive income tax," a firm supporter of voluntary euthanasia and abortion, and a proud "secular humanist."

But Sidney Hook no longer believes that the central problem of our time is the choice between capitalism and socialism, but "the defense and enrichment of a free and open society against totalitarianism." A populist in many ways, he rejects strongly the notion, quite widespread in certain elite circles in the West, that the "love of freedom" is restricted to society's literate, professional intellectuals. All too often, Sidney Hook knows full well, this class has made itself the obsequious servant of despotism. Furthermore, he insists, most human beings in the modern world prefer their choices to be not coerced but freely made.

Anathema to the Academy

It is a lugubrious comment on our era that for most of two decades, the 1960s and 1970s (things have somewhat mellowed now), a man like Sidney Hook, who has fought all his life for the common man, for freedom, free speech, the calm, reasoned exposition of all points of view, for

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intelligence, for balanced judgment, moreover a man with many "leftist" credentials, should have become anathema to such a large portion of America's academic community—largely, it would seem, because of his antipathy to a coercive state and, above all, the Soviet Union.

Sidney Hook has been in so many intellectual firestorms that it would make most people's heads spin. In America, he was involved in the Palmer raids. In Weimar in 1928, when the conventional wisdom was that Hitler was "finished" since the failed putsch of five years before, he observed at first hand the fervid German nationalism that he correctly anticipated would soon sweep the Nazis into power. In Moscow in 1929, with no knowledge of the famines and other horrors that accompanied collectivization, he recited, a good socialist, the evils of American capitalism only to have an 18-year-old Russian girl object emotionally: "Yes, but at least you are free!" Many of the Russians he knew were soon to disappear in Stalin's purges.

Back in America he saw the Depression. But then Hook witnessed the intricate workings of the pro-Soviet Popular Front and soon withdrew his last jot of sympathy for Communism during the famous Moscow Trials in 1936.

These "trials" are today considered grotesque by absolutely everyone. Lifelong revolutionary Bolsheviks and comrades of Lenin abjectly confessed that they had secretly been agents of Japan and Nazi Germany, and that they had been in the pay of British Intelligence even as they seized power in Petrograd in 1917. All this was blurted out without a scrap of material evidence. The much fulminated about "letters of instruction" to the accused from Leon Trotsky (called with little affection by Professor Hook a "Stalinist manque") were never produced in court, nor have they ever been seen by anyone.

It will therefore probably surprise most readers today that, at the time, the official Soviet version of the Moscow Trials received the overwhelming support of American "liberals." The *New Republic,* for example (now under different ownership), endorsed the "confessions" and the Soviet guilty verdicts wholeheartedly. For impugning the authenticity of the trials, Sidney Hook, not for the first or last time, was branded "an enemy of mankind," and one day a man at the counter of New York University's bookstore suddenly began shouting at him: "You have no right to wear a red tie—you Red-baiter!" To which Professor Hook replied: "Why not? Red is a color in the American flag."

Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, Whittaker Chambers, John Dewey, and Bertolt Brecht pass through Professor Hook's pages in full kit, along with the "Radical Comedians" of the *Partisan Review.* How many people, like Professor Hook, own a volume they have authored on Karl Marx that has been ornamented with marginal annotations, in Russian, by Leon Trotsky?

His Finest Hour

One of Sidney Hook's finest hours was when he took on that gaggle of Communists, hardened fellow travelers, and perverse innocents at the famous 1949 Cominform-generated Waldorf-Astoria "Peace Conference," whose declared objective, announced before the conference, was to hold the United States solely responsible for the Cold War.

Drawing by John Springs

Sidney Hook succeeded in demonstrating to virtually the entire U.S. public that the conference had been convoked not to further "peace" but to propagandize for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Professor Hook calls his book *Out of Step,* he says, because of his propensity for being "premature" in relation to dominant currents of public opinion. He was a premature anti-fascist, a premature Communist fellow traveler, a premature anti-Communist, (in radical circles) a premature supporter of war against Hitler, a premature Cold Warrior against Stalin's efforts to expand even further the Soviet empire, a premature critic of detente and appeasement, a premature supporter of civil rights in America, and a premature opponent of all forms of invidious discrimination, including reverse discrimination.

Hook is an "unreconstructed believer in the welfare state and a steeply progressive income tax," a firm supporter of abortion, and a proud "secular humanist."

And Sidney Hook, whose principal vocation has been the study of philosophy—politics has been only a sideline—has engaged in all these vast and vital intellectual combats in the name of what? He is an atheist, he says. He has no religious faith. He was born a Jew but his faith in Jewish "superstitions" and in the life to come departed early. He believes in "intelligence as the most reliable guide in solving problems—to the extent that they are soluble." He believes in the willingness to hear out one's opponent,

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in open debate, in the hopes that reasonable, rational, humane, intelligent people, an "enlightened majority," will make the right choice. He is a humanist. He believes in freedom.

Sidney Hook does not like unreasoned behavior. When angry demonstrators in the streets outside the Waldorf-Astoria shouted raucous epithets at the participants in the Cominform "Peace Conference," accusing them quite accurately of being disloyal to their country, (the demonstrators supporting, in one way, Sidney Hook), Professor Hook disapproved of such loutish, street-ruffian behavior and publicly condemned it. He calls America's present Moral Majority "fatuous," for it is no doubt irrational, and who are its members to call themselves "moral"?

How many people, like Hook, own a volume they have authored on Marx that has been ornamented with marginal annotations by Trotsky?

The problem with this rationalism, however, is that society does not have enough people like Sidney Hook. In the 1960s, with Leftist Brownshirts screaming and bullying and marauding through the university campuses of America, Professor Hook learned this to his sorrow.

Is Freedom Enough?

For Sidney Hook, "freedom," with no sustaining belief system, might be enough. But my experience is that most people want freedom *plus something more.* Dreams of racist utopias now being radically out of fashion, most people, certainly most intellectuals—with whom Professor Hook is especially concerned—yearn in a sense for the Kindgom of God. And if they do not believe it exists in heaven, then they will demand it on earth. It is not rational of them, not reasonable, perhaps not intelligent. It might even, given the nature of their particular dementia, be suicidal. But they will not be deflected.

It was along these lines that Eric Hoffer was perhaps thinking when, not long before he died, he remarked offhandedly to Tom Bethell: "You'd better get yourself some fanatics, or you're going to lose." Which is why I am rather less likely than Sidney Hook to call the Moral Majority "fatuous," or why I would be slightly less prompt than Professor Hook to repudiate coarse, unruly American crowds demonstrating against people they grossly but accurately perceive to be enemies of their country.

Yet I was struck by a word on the next-to-last page of Sidney Hook's autobiography. The word is "faith," a principle definition of which, as Professor Hook knows, is "belief not based on proof." Almost in adieu, Professor Hook writes about the world "in which I was born," the poor streets of Williamsburg, a world dark enough, he admits, but "marked by qualities of hope and faith in the promise of American life that is difficult to find even among those today who are materially better off than most of us were."

"The revival of these qualities," he writes, "is indispensable if the United States, and therefore what remains of the free world dependent upon it for security, is to find the will and courage to resist the incursions of totalitarian powers."

So Sidney Hook has a sustaining faith after all, a faith which must be revived in the young if we are to survive. He has faith in the "promise of American life," in its capacity for "democratic self-renewal," in the land of promise and opportunity in whose poor streets he was born. He has faith in America.

I suspected it, I confess, all along. For before the Brooklyn Boys High School socialist-universalist Sidney Hook, there was a diminutive Public School 145 Sidney Hook, a little fellow Professor Hook describes as a "bloodthirsty little nationalist." How, now!

Well, I will scrub the "bloodthirsty," but the "nationalist" I will not scrub. There is a strong strain of idealistic American nationalism in Sidney Hook. He believes in us. We cannot let him down.

Bloomsday

The Closing of the American Mind, *by Allan Bloom (New York: Simon & Schuster, $18.95).*

Reviewed by Jeffrey Hart

It has been said that the man who wishes to find God has already found Him. Professor Allan Bloom of the University of Chicago wishes to recover Western civilization amid the rubble. The tremendous excitement here is that maybe he has done so. His disorganized, idiosyncratic book, the ultimate heroes of which are Socrates, Nietzsche, Plato, Locke, and Publius, has sold a breathtaking 300,000 copies in hardcover, and has been at the top of the *New York Times* best-seller list for months. The book quite possibly marks a historic turning point in the rediscovery of Western thought.

The Closing of the American Mind has an unforgiving disorganization. Trying to recover something from it is like trying to recover something from Montaigne's essays. This is really Bloomsday in the Joycean sense—Allan Bloom, intelligent beyond any ordinary human measure, roaming through the specific diseases of the academy, through popular culture and popular language, coming on at the reader with a long and brilliant monologue on Nietzsche's influence on the modern world as filtered through Freud and Max Weber, plus an assessment of the British utilitarians.

Finally toward the end, we learn where Bloom is headed. He believes in intellectual and spiritual heroes who have explored the ideal territory of human thought and feeling, people who call us to our best selves, or even beyond. Professor Bloom wants the university to resemble,

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ideally, Plato's *Symposium,* in which *friends*—this is a tremendously important concept in ethical thought—discourse on the great questions of beauty, truth, love, death, immortality, and God. Thought itself is ecstasy and human completeness.

But in the foreground is the university we actually have. Bloom's description of it is horrifying. Out of his ideal love for what the university could be, Bloom has told the brutal truth about what it actually is. Bloom knows and tells his readers how this nation, and the West, is being morally and culturally gassed by its intellectual and academic elites.

Let us think first about Bloom's idea of the university—as noble, powerful and poetic as any hymns to Oxford written by Cardinal Newman or Matthew Arnold: "When I was 15 years old I saw the University of Chicago for the first time and somehow sensed that I had discovered my life. I had never before seen, or at least had not noticed, buildings that were evidently dedicated to a higher purpose, not to necessity or utility, not merely to manufacture or trade, but to something that might be at an end in itself." When he entered into his enormous idea, he found that it "protected the tradition, not because tradition is tradition but because tradition provides models of discussion on a uniquely high level." Allan Bloom knows: "The facile economic and psychological debunking of the theoretical life cannot do away with its irreducible beauties."

Bloom is so intelligent, so philosophically adept, that it must be exhilarating to take a course under him at Chicago. Okay, so Freud posits sexuality as the basis of everything, all creativity. Fine. Is repressed sexuality the basis of Freud's own thought? Next question. Mr. Marx, you say that economic interest explains all of human action. Fine. What economic interest explains your own thought, Mr. Marx? Bloom is absolutely brilliant at exposing the assumption within the answer.

A Farewell to Relativism

But first Bloom paints a vitriolic portrait of today's "student." In my own experience of teaching at Dartmouth, I would say that, with some outstanding and infrequent examples, Bloom is entirely accurate.

These opening sentences may well deserve to be ranked with the opening sentences of *A Farewell to Arms.* "There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative." Enter Professor Bloom, fully armored with all the earned weapons of Western philosophy:

> The students, of course, cannot defend their opinion. It is something with which they have been indoctrinated. The best they can do is point out all the opinions and cultures there are and have been. What right, they ask, do I or anyone else have to say that one is better than the others? If I pose the routine questions designed to confuse them and make them think, such as, "If you had been a British administrator in India, would you have let the natives under your governance burn the widow of a man who had died?" they either remain silent or reply that the British should never have been there in the first place.

As Bloom puts it in his subtitle, higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the soul of today's students. But Bloom gets it only half right with his discussion of "openness." Modern education, he writes, "pays no attention to natural rights or the historical origins of our regime, which are now thought to have been flawed and regressive. . . . It is open to all kinds of men, all kinds of life-styles, all ideologies. There is no enemy other than the man who is not open to everything." Well, that is the public face of the ideology. "Openness" applies only to the left. We are to be "open" to Castro or to Stalin, but Hitler has become a religious category, a guarantee of the existence of evil. The left always offers the possibility of a better world.

Bloom gets it only half right with his discussion of "openness." The university teaches us to be "open" to Castro or to Stalin, but Hitler has become a religious category, a guarantee of the existence of evil. The left always offers the possibility of a better world.

Bloom shows the intellectual underpinnings of this "openness." As he shrewdly points out:

> At the root of this change in morals was the presence in the United States of men and women of a great variety of nations, religions and races . . . Openness was designed to provide a respectable place for these "groups" or "minorities"—to wrest respect from those who were not disposed to give it—and to weaken the sense of superiority of the dominant majority (more recently dubbed, WASPs, a name the success of which shows something of the success of sociology in reinterpreting the national consciousness). That dominant majority gave the country a dominant culture with its traditions, its literature, its tastes, its special claim to know and supervise the language, and its Protestant religions. Much of the intellectual machinery of 20th-century American political thought and social science was constructed for the purposes of making an assault on that majority.

Like Buddhist monks in Saigon, the WASPs immolated themselves culturally. They lost their nerve completely, and the entire idea of the gentleman died. Any tom-tom beater is as good, now, as anyone. Says Bloom:

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> Sexual adventurers like Margaret Mead and others who found America too narrow told us that not only must we know other cultures and learn to respect them, but we could also profit from them. We could follow their lead and loosen up. . . . We would go to the bazaar of cultures and find reinforcement for inclinations that are repressed by puritanical guilt feelings. All such teachers of openness had either no interest in or were actively hostile to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

Young Americans, even Bloom's elite students at the University of Chicago, "know much less about American history and those who were held to be its heroes" than past generations did. There has occurred a homogenization of American culture. "Practically all that young Americans have today is an insubstantial awareness that there are many cultures, accompanied by a saccharin moral drawn from this awareness: We should all get along. Why fight?"

Bloom's great theme throughout is that ideology has invaded the academy to an absolutely unprecedented degree, *closing* the American mind, at least the academic American mind, to the truths about human nature as it actually is and has aspired to be.

It is fashionable for the elite universities to require a course in "non-Western" culture. But as Bloom shows, "if the students were really to learn something of the minds of any of these non-Western cultures—which they do not—they would find that each and every one of these cultures is ethnocentric. All of them think their way is the best way, and all others are inferior."

Right there is the intellectual turn within the turn. The very anthropological perspective that allows us for one moment to relativize and "appreciate" these cultures is itself Western and "higher." There is no Chinese anthropology that "appreciates" and "respects" Vietnamese culture. There is no Moroccan or Albanian anthropological perspective. In its academic apotheosis, Western culture is the only culture that does not celebrate its own ways and its own achievements. It keeps looking for some Zimbabwean Mozart. Bloom says: "It is important to emphasize that the lesson the students are drawing from their studies is simply untrue. History and the study of cultures do not teach or prove that values or cultures are relative. All to the contrary. . . . "

And yet we have undergone a civilizational lobotomy. "By the mid-sixties universities were offering [students] every concession other than education, but appeasement failed and soon the whole experiment in excellence was washed away, leaving not a trace." Serious reading, foreign language, and other academic requirements were jettisoned; the Ivy League, with Brown University in front of the Gadarene swine, led the way.

> A partial list of the sacrifices made by the students to morality will suffice to show its character: they were able to live as they pleased in the university, as *in loco parentis* responsibilities were abandoned; drugs became a regular part of life, with almost no interference from university authorities, while the civil authority was kept at bay by the university's alleged right to police its own precincts; all sexual restrictions imposed by rule or disapproval were overturned; academic requirements were relaxed in every imaginable way, and grade inflation made it difficult to flunk; avoidance of military service became a way of life and a principle. All these privileges were disguised with edifying labels such as individual responsibility, experience, growth, development, self-expression, liberation, concern. Never in history had there been such a marvelous correspondence between the good and the pleasant.

Nietzsche vs. Madison

Bloom's great theme throughout is that ideology has invaded the academy to an absolutely unprecedented degree, *closing* the American mind, at least the academic American mind, to the truths about human nature as it actually is and has aspired to be. The center of his book, which I doubt that many of his 300,000 purchasers have made their way through, is a brilliant University of Chicago lecture on the history of recent philosophy, though without much reference to William James (very likely the most important philosopher of our era), or to Charles Sanders Pierce (the power and subtlety of whose thought is only beginning to be felt). Nor does he say much about Whitman or T.S. Eliot or Emily Dickinson. Oddly enough, Professor Bloom, the rhapsodist of Chicago and its University, is relentlessly European in his intellectual reference.

Bloom himself seems torn between Locke, Madison, and sobriety, and the heights and depths of the Continental philosophy. He writes:

> "God is dead," Nietzsche proclaimed. But he did not say this on a note of triumph, in the style of earlier atheism—the tyrant has been overthrown and man is now free. Rather he said it in the anguished tones of the most powerful and delicate piety deprived of its proper object. Man, who loved and needed God, has lost his Father and Savior without possibility of resurrection.

Bloom thinks that the buzzwords of our articulate and semi-articulate culture come out of Nietzsche's abyss, filtered through Weber and Freud, and packaged in a carton of cornflakes. The terms "commitment" (instead of love), "life-style" (which is designed to legitimate the bourgeois as he ventures beyond good and evil), "sexual orientation" (instead of male and female), "identity"(instead of who

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you are and what you do), "relationship" (again, instead of love), represent Nietzsche turned upside down, the bourgeoisification of the proposed *Uebermensch,* the Hero as a feminized Dagwood Bumstead. In the presence of Nietzsche, talk about *values* is "twaddle." Nietzsche thought that God was dead, that there was no nature and objective structure of ethical meaning, and that therefore we had to reinvent ourselves in a heroic way. The old wide-sweeping classical conception of "nature"—that is to say, what is objectively true about human nature—was "dead."

On the strange fish that thrash about in the sea of this liberation, Bloom is consistently coruscating. His *obiter dicta* during a lecture at Chicago must themselves be worth the price of the tuition. Bloom has a mind like a whirling sparkler, but it is deeply grounded in the classical conception of "nature." For example, here is Bloom on feminism:

> The souls of men—their ambitious, warlike, protective, possessive character—must be dismantled in order to liberate women from their domination. Machismo—the polemical description of maleness or spiritedness, which was the central *natural* passion in men's souls in the psychology of the ancients, the passion of attachment and loyalty—was the villain, the source of the difference between the sexes. . . . A host of Dustin Hoffman and Meryl Streep types invade the schools, popular psychology, TV and the movies, making the [feminist] project respectable. Men tend to undergo the re-education somewhat sullenly but studiously, in order to avoid the opprobrium of the sexist label and to keep peace with their wives and girlfriends. And it is indeed possible to soften men. But to make them 'care' is another thing, and the project must inevitably fail.

Bloom is especially brilliant on the subjugation of eros, that once powerful god, in our debilitated culture. "The student who made fun of playing a guitar under a girl's window will never read or write poetry under her influence. His defective eros cannot provide his soul with images of the beautiful, and it will remain coarse and slack." Like the ancient philosophers, Bloom knows that "nature" decrees a male "lust" for knowledge, for the good and the true, for the beyond. "Aristotle said that man had two peaks, each accompanied by intense pleasure: sexual intercourse and thinking. The human soul is a kind of parabola, its phenomena are spread, displaying their tropical variety and ambiguity."

Bloom is powerfully drawn to the 19th-century German philosophers. He knows how great a thinker Nietzsche was, and Bloom honors his attack upon Socrates and "reason." After all, Nietzsche did see that "reason" in itself never built a civilization. All civilizations are rooted in religion and myth. Nietzsche looked over the brink, rationally seeing that reason was not enough. Up against John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, the agonized Nietzsche wins the purely philosophical contest by a knockout.

But from that Nietzschean brink Professor Bloom does, as he should, draw back. Without answering Nietzsche on a philosophical level, he turns from the nihilistic *Sturm und Drang* of 19th-century German philosophy, to the practical political world of the Founding Fathers:



The Saving Remnant

> Freedom of thought and freedom of speech were proposed in theory, and in the practice of serious political reformers, in order to encourage the still voice of reason in a world that had always been dominated by fanaticisms and interests. How freedom of thought and speech came to mean the special encouragement and protection of fanaticism and interests is another of those miracles connected with the decay of the rational political order. The authors of *The Federalist* hoped their scheme of government would result in the preponderance of reason and rational men in the United States. They were not particularly concerned with protecting eccentric or mad opinions or life-styles. Such protection, which we now often regard as the Founders' central intentions, is only an incidental result of the protection of reason, and it loses its plausibility of reason is rejected. These authors did not respect the many religious sects or desire diversity for its own sake. The existence of many sects was permitted only to prevent the emergence of a single dominant one.

It is not exactly clear from Bloom's book how the university can escape its present cultural and spiritual anarchy. His answer is essentially Matthew Arnold's, though informed with greater philosophical knowledge than Arnold had at his disposal. Professor Bloom puts his faith in the "saving remnant" who will lead the philosophical life within the American academy. He regards the activity of philosophy as a good in its own right, the activity of thought informed by the great books:

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> The model for all such efforts is the dialogues of Plato, which together rival the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* or even the Gospels. . . . Plato turns the personages of *The Clouds* into one of those civilization-constituting figures like Moses, Jesus or Achilles, who have a greater reality in men's souls than do their own flesh-and-blood contemporaries . . . .Socrates is the teacher of philosophy in an unbroken chain for two and a half millennia, extending from generation to generation through all the epochal changes. Plato insured this influence, not by reproducing Socrates' philosophy, in the manner of Aristotle or Kant, but by representing his action, more in the manner of Sophocles, Aristophanes, Dante, and Shakespeare.

It is the philosophic *life* to which the saving remnant must aspire, the continuing reexamination of those great questions, the activity of reexamination itself constituting the peak of civilization.

And yet the very book that looks to the university for salvation contains one of the most savage indictments of the contemporary American academy. It is conceivable but not very plausible that the civilization of the West will be revived by some impulse from these centers of moral and intellectual corruption. There are, no doubt, great isolated professors like Allan Bloom, but modern universities are, quite simply, out of business, intellectually, at least for the time being.

I have a second caveat here, and it is not a minor one. Yes, indeed, it is highly desirable to refine the great questions of love, beauty, friendship, truth, loyalty and so on, and it is highly desirable to keep the best examples of such discussion forever before us. All of this is certainly far superior to Women's Studies and all the rest of the dreck that now clogs the university curriculum.

But there will be readers who object that Western thought is not simply an ongoing conversation, ever-renewing itself. Western thought *got somewhere.* In the Agora, the public forum at Athens, there was an inscription "To the Unknown God." That is the point to which Greek philosophy, which means philosophy itself, had reached at that time. For the religious believer, however, God is not unknown. Bloom's brilliant dissection of the ills of relativism is weakened by his inattention to religious truth. ☎

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LETTERS

Harry V. Jaffa, Walter Block, Warren T. Brookes, Paul M. Fenech, Cesar A. Perales, Gov. Guy Hunt, Gov. Neil Goldschmidt, Paul Craig Roberts

Crisis of Strauss Divided

Dear Sir:

Dinesh D'Souza is a young man of great talent, energy, and ambition. He attended an eight-week summer program at Claremont McKenna College shortly after his graduation from Dartmouth, and I have watched his meteoric career ever since, with pride in the fact that I have been one of his teachers. I have read, usually with pleasure and admiration, nearly everything he has published.

In "The Legacy of Leo Strauss" (Spring 1987), however, he has simply outrun his strength. He writes, "In the bicentennial year of the American Constitution, it is time for serious men and women to come to terms with Leo Strauss." But Mr. D'Souza's article, however serious its intention, is not so in its execution. There is no excuse to write of "Socrates inaugurating philosophy" some centuries after Thales had done so, or of Lincoln objecting to "a state's right to choose" slavery—when Lincoln endorsed a proposed constitutional amendment in 1861 guaranteeing that right in perpetuity.

Mr. D'Souza asks in his subtitle, "Is America the Good Society that the Ancient Philosophers Sought?" Now this might be a good topic for discussion in a year-long graduate seminar in political philosophy. Athens, in the age of Periclean democracy, had a population of about 300,000. Of these, perhaps 30,000 were full citizens, and democratic "equality" applied only to them. Yet Aristotle thought that 10,000 citizens was too large a number for the proper cultivation of civic virtue.

Mr. D'Souza writes that "Strauss was greatly attracted to the American regime because of its closeness to the moderation and lawfulness of Aristotle's favored 'mixed regime.' " Yet how can a regime of less than 10,000 "equals" be compared to one of 240 million? In a famous aphorism, Aristotle declared, "Whatever the law does not permit, it forbids." Such a conception of law would today apply only to a totalitarian state. Not even the Soviet Union would defend it in theory, however much they might put such a concept into practice. Certainly such an attempt at the complete regulation of human behavior could hardly foster "moderation" in any modern state. Today, limited government—of the kind whose principles are set forth in John Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*—is much more akin to the spirit of "moderation," rightly understood, than any ancient model.

In the Introduction to *The City and Man* Strauss wrote that:

> The relative success of modern political philosophy has brought into being a kind of society wholly unknown to the classics, a kind of society to which the classical principles as stated and elaborated by the classics are not immediately applicable. Only we living today can possibly find a solution to the problems of today.

Mr. D'Souza writes that:

> Strauss' best known work is *Natural Right and History.* . . . In it, Strauss identifies prephilosophic life with mindless attachment to tradition and authority. Strauss sees Socrates inaugurating philosophy by challenging the "primeval identification of the good with the ancestral."

As I have already noted, Socrates did not "inaugurate" philosophy. The interval that separates Socrates from Thales may be compared to that which separates Leo Strauss from Machiavelli. Socrates may be said to have inaugurated *political* philosophy, in virtue of a change in philosophy itself.

Pre-Socratic philosophers drew the distinction between the natural and the conventional. But pre-Socratic philosophy denied that there was any ground, natural or divine, for justice or the common good. The gods themselves were human inventions—of the poet—and morality had no other foundation than opinion. The only natural good was the pleasant.

Pre-Socratic philosophy led to the contemptuous withdrawal of philosophers from any moral or political concerns. But it also led—in the persons of the Sophists and their pupils—to the praise of the tyrannical life. The philosophers sought to maximize the balance of pleasure over pain, by minimizing pain. The tyrants could maximize that balance differently, by making sure that their pleasures were at the expense of everyone else. Both tyranny and philosophy were "according to nature," but morality was not.

It was at this juncture that Socra-

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tes made his entry. Socrates denied that the good and the pleasant were one and the same. In arguing that suffering injustice was a lesser evil than doing injustice, he was defending pre-philosophic morality from the corrosion of that philosophy that had destroyed the gods, and put no sanction for morality in its place. Mr. D'Souza misses the whole point of Socrates' encounter with the Sophists.

Mr. D'Souza also misses the point of my differences with the so-called Straussians. If he had read with any attention my article, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss," in the Winter 1983 issue of the *Claremont Review of Books*, and my exchange with Thomas Pangle in the Spring 1984 issue of the same journal, he would have seen that our fundamental difference did not concern American patriotism, but the nature of the change in philosophy wrought by Socrates. In a nutshell, Mr. Pangle thinks that Socrates learned from Aristophanes the importance of concealing the amorality of philosophic activity. In short, Socratic philosophy differed from pre-Socratic philosophy, only to the extent that the former now wore a fig leaf. The distinction between the good and the pleasant belonged, not to philosophy itself, but to its fig leaf. Morality remained an illusion of fools. Elsewhere, Mr. Pangle has made clear that "the laws of nature and of nature's God" have no more moral significance than they would have had for Heraclitus—or for Pangle's Socrates.

D'Souza writes:

> Strauss argues that the pre-philosophic approach—embodied, for example, in Homer and Hesiod—is vulnerable because it has no basis for distinguishing between good traditions and bad traditions. Furthermore, its frequent appeal to revelation poses the problem of different people having different epiphanies, or different oracles giving contradictory advice; how are people to arbitrate the disputes which inevitably arise over whose theology is to prevail?

Now Homer and Hesiod were not "pre-philosophic." But the Bible, as the supreme example of revelation, is. According to Strauss, moreover, the Bible is fully aware of itself, as the alternative to unassisted human reason, as offering a guide to the great question of how to distinguish between good traditions and bad traditions. Limitations of space forbid me to quote Strauss' eloquent testimonials on this matter.

Let me only conclude by saying that Mr. D'Souza here echoes Pangle, who simply assimilates Biblical revelation to a species of Greek poetry, and fails to distinguish pagan pantheism from Hebrew monotheism. This depreciation of the Bible underlies Walter Berns's insistence that the Founding Fathers could not have been Christians, and that the natural rights philosophy of the founding is "incompatible with revealed religion." That is why Mr. Berns has denounced me as "this pest of a priest" for daring to have asked for evidence to support such extraordinary assertions—something he has been unable to do. Meanwhile, my friends (and enemies) may rest assured that I am no more a priest today than on the occasion of my bar mitzvah in 1931.

Harry V. Jaffa
Professor of Political Science
Claremont McKenna College
Claremont, CA

Dinesh D'Souza replies:

My article was about political philosophy. Strauss' predominant concern was political philosophy. In context, it is obvious that this is what Socrates inaugurated. True, Thales before him asserted that everything in the universe derived from water. This may be philosophy—it posits a universal, however absurd—but it tells us nothing about the way men ought to live in society. The Sophists and others took up the political question, but even though they are part of the "pre-Socratic" school many of them were contemporaries of Socrates. Thus the term pre-Socratic is a term of classification more than chronology.

Mr. Jaffa understands very well that Socrates, while he defended the existence of standards of right and wrong, can hardly be said to have defended "pre-philosophic morality" as a whole. For instance, the traditional view stipulated sharply differing roles for men and women, while Socrates was a feminist of sorts. Further, Socrates denied the grounding of morality in tradition and authority; indeed he wanted to banish the transmitters of that morality, the poets, from his ideal republic. None of my other remarks about Socrates are inconsistent with what Mr. Jaffa says, which is hardly surprising, since I got much of my information from Mr. Jaffa and his students.

I wish I had more space in my article to discuss the important issue of reason and revelation in Strauss' thought. Basically, Strauss held that Biblical revelation and classical reason were in agreement on the existence of universal morality and even on much of its specific content. There is indissoluble tension, however, in the source of that morality and the means used to arrive at it. What I did discuss in my piece was the application of differing understandings of Strauss on this point to the American situation. In a policy magazine this seemed to be appropriate.

Block That Welfare State

Dear Sir:

The ideas in Stuart M. Butler's "Power to the People: A Conservative Vision of Welfare" (Spring 1987) are clearly superior to those underlying the Great Society that he criticizes. Were they to be incorporated into public policy, the lot of the poor would be vastly improved.

And yet I cannot give these views my whole-hearted endorsement. Mr. Butler states quite correctly that "One mark of a civilized society is that individuals feel a moral obligation to help their neighbors in distress." But if the welfare system is run by government, its funding will result from a coercive tax system. People will be forced to contribute, forced to uphold their moral obligations. But surely a basic premise of civilization is that force should be reserved for violations of *legal* ob-

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ligations. State-run welfare, even of the "conservative" variety, is thus equivalent to legislating morality, surely a dubious proposition. This applies to "jailing" young fathers who refuse to support their children, and, even worse, imposing these obligations upon the grandparents. Free-market advocates such as Richard Epstein (*Takings*), Robert Nozick (*Anarchy, State and Utopia*), and Murray Rothbard (*The Ethics of Liberty*) have eloquently attacked the legitimacy of a state that forces its citizens to "do good" for others. I hope that Mr. Butler will indicate why he rejects their analysis.

Also, while Mr. Butler offers a radical departure from the status quo that is based on 1960s liberalism, it is hardly radical enough by even present-day conservative standards. For example, why this unseemly applause for the "growing public housing tenant management movement"? Why not, instead, borrow a leaf from Margaret Thatcher, and dismantle this ill-conceived public housing program?

Let me offer an alternative to Mr. Butler's "conservative" welfare scheme, one that I hope will be attractive to him and to conservatives of all stripes. First, stop government *creation* of poverty in the first place. As Walter Williams shows in *The State Against Blacks*, and as The Heritage Foundation has uncovered in hundreds of separate studies, government, through its tariffs, minimum wages, labor regulations, rent controls, welfare system, farm and energy programs, bailouts and subsidies to large corporations, etc., causes poverty. If the state would only cease its improper interference with the market, it could, at one fell swoop, stop poverty cold.

Let us rely on private charity to bring aid to those few people who still remain poor even after the tender ministrations of government are removed. The Salvation Army, the churches, Mormon self-help groups, the Rotary, the Lions, the Elks, etc., all far more effectively deal with poverty than do the minions of the state. Nor do these charitable mediating institutions force anyone to contribute. If the state can somehow be induced to stop impoverishing us all, and if tax moneys now spent on welfare can be returned to the people, then private charitable contributions would be more than sufficient to do the job. This proposal will not be acceptable to our left-wing intellectual friends—something Mr. Butler seems to be unduly concerned about—but it is the only workable solution compatible with our philosophical beliefs.

Walter Block
Senior Economist
The Fraser Institute
Vancouver, Canada

Mr. D'Souza misses the point of my differences with the so-called Straussians.

—Harry V. Jaffa

Dear Sir:

I agree with Mr. Butler's basic thesis of the need for a much more decentralized welfare system in which states can experiment with what works best, and are given more incentive to do what is both right and cost-effective by reducing the federal share of costs.

However, I cannot agree with his insistence on a national framework and set of goals within which the states can maneuver. Not only does this downplay the overwhelming need for total decentralization of this system, but it assumes that we all now know what ought to be done.

The fact that both adult and child poverty have declined most in those states (Texas, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina) whose welfare systems have universally been condemned (even implicitly by Butler) as inadequate should make us very humble about setting national "guidelines."

Indeed, there is abundant evidence that nations with modest welfare systems have done far better in reducing relative poverty than those with advanced systems.

So, while I welcome Mr. Butler's obvious commitment to painting conservatism with a more compassionate face, it is important to remember that the most "compassionate" economy is one that is fully employed and growing, and that almost any form of formalized welfare system, decentralized or not, tends to reduce both employment and growth.

Welfare, by definition, reduces real compassion, and while it may be a necessary and lesser evil, it is still an evil.

Warren T. Brookes
Nationally Syndicated Columnist
Detroit News
Detroit, MI

Dear Sir:

Mr. Butler correctly argues that the failure of the Great Society to eliminate poverty is matched by the failure of conservatives to convince the public of the fallacies of the welfare programs and, most importantly, of the value of conservative alternatives.

But he ignores the important benefits of decentralization in his solution. Even though he lauds the benefits initially, he rejects them for what appears to be political expediency. To declare that the welfare solution must be on a national rather than a local level is heresy. What happened to the "limited government" aspect of the conservative vision?

Why not let the states handle the problem? Why must a more centralized government be there to provide a "certain amount of coercive power" to ensure that the lower-level political entities "abide by national objectives"? Is not the major benefit of decentralization that of having the many different entities experimenting and searching and eventually finding the optimum so-

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lution rather than having one central authority determine an assuredly suboptimum solution but one to which all must conform regardless of the political, geographical, sociological or economic differences among the many states?

Of course, there was a time when national coercion was necessary to assure minorities their needs would not be ignored. But, surely with the passage and appropriate implementation of the civil rights laws, political impotence of the classes of society that are of interest here is essentially a thing of the past. I disagree with Butler that " . . . it is still not possible to depend on the states and communities to live up to their obligations . . . " It would appear that he has adopted the vision of those breathing the air of power and elitism inside the D.C. beltway rather than the vision of conservatives nationwide. There is no logical reason other then the unwitting continuation of welfarism to have "national coercion" as the driving force.

Paul M. Fenech
Associate Professor of Business
St. Edward's University
Austin, TX

Dear Sir:

Mr. Butler ably recounts some aspects of the current system that confound the efforts of welfare clients to move to more permanent self-sufficiency. Any meaningful welfare reform has to dismantle these barriers. The alternatives Mr. Butler advocates, however, will do little to alleviate poverty. Although Butler's suggestions are interesting contributions to the debate, they are largely unsupported by empirical evidence or programmatic experience, nor do they address the more fundamental factors affecting the swells and shrinkages in this nation's population.

Neither the poor, nor that subset of the poor who receive public assistance, are a homogenous or easily characterized group. Public assistance recipients differ greatly in terms of their labor force experience, educational background, and services needs. Many recipients need very little help in attaining self-sufficiency. Others, who remain on the rolls much longer and drive up program costs, require more help to develop skills that most of us take for granted and that most employers require, if they are to be successful in achieving economic self-sufficiency. For this reason, Mr. Butler's suggestion that we rely on a narrowly defined program of work requirements seems ill-advised. This approach would address only that portion of the recipients whose needs are related to lack of work experience or lack of job-search skills.

Our conviction that work requirements are no panacea is based on our own experience, which has taught us that a broader approach is needed for the majority of recipients. Such an approach—a variety of programs to meet different client situations, an emphasis on educational attainment and skill development, a strong job development effort, and a recognition that support services are essential for persons entering low-wage jobs with few benefits—is embodied in New York's newly implemented programs aimed at public assistance recipients.

Mr. Butler would call our programs "workfare imitations." He warns conservatives that programs like ours are little more than an excuse to spend more money. To the contrary, investing in comprehensive programming provides a greater opportunity for long-term savings by shortening the length of time that recipients remain dependent on welfare and by reducing the likelihood that recipients will return to welfare once they have left.

Comprehensive programming can be undertaken in a way that strengthens rather than weakens the welfare recipient's sense of obligation. We in New York have never believed that welfare is a "something for nothing" proposition. But let us be clear about what we mean by "mutual obligations." First, most recipients of public assistance are children. No one is talking about requiring children to work. But those children who are in school, like school children everywhere, have an obligation to prepare themselves for adulthood. Second, adult recipients of support have an obligation to do everything in their power to become economically self-sufficient. This includes getting an education and the training necessary for a job, looking for work, and working hard to remain employed. Third, the families of these recipients and the government have responsibilities as well. Parents, even absent parents, must take financial and moral responsibility for their children. And government must maintain a dynamic economy that provides jobs for those who want to work, a first-class educational system, and protection against discrimination.

Mr. Butler argues that, in addition to restoring the sense of mutual obligation, an effective welfare reform proposal must address the issues of decentralization and personal empowerment. Under Mr. Butler's decentralization plan, primary fiscal responsiblity for anti-poverty programs would be shifted from the federal government to states and localities. The federal government would retain responsibility for transferring money from rich states to poor states and for providing mandates for achievement of national welfare goals. States would be encouraged to apply for waivers to develop new and innovative programs at their own expense.

How this three-part strategy would work is not clear. For example, how would the federal government transfer money from richer to poorer states and target these funds to reducing poverty and welfare dependency without assuming a major financial role? How would the federal government enforce mandates without incentives? Through the use of sanctions? Even if we accept Mr. Butler's argument that a new liberalism has penetrated formerly reactionary state and local governments, it is not clear that the states with the most severe problems or those that have experienced sudden problems caused by forces beyond their control, such as market decline or massive immigration, could meet these mandates without financial support.

In developing his decentralization strategy, Mr. Butler seems to have confused centralization and inflexibility. Centralization is not by nature bad. Few would argue for a decentralized national defense policy, for example. Rather, it is the inflexibility

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that so often accompanies centralized policies that presents the problems.

The current welfare system is centrally funded, but much of the responsibility for administering the program resides with states and municipalities. In many ways, the current system is fairly flexible. For example, each state determines its own standard of need, which allows grant levels to be set in accordance with local living standards and costs. As Mr. Butler correctly points out, the current system is too inflexible with regard to the development of new and innovative programming, but we do not need a solution as extreme as his to correct this problem. Increased flexibility in programming can be accomplished by expediting or reforming waiver procedures without creating incentives to increase program inequity.

Mr. Butler argues for increasing the use of vouchers to empower the poor. Either cash or vouchers would provide the market power he advocates. We already provide cash in the form of public assistance grants and vouchers through food stamps and, one might argue, Medicaid. But cash in the limited amounts and vouchers work best in markets where the goods in demand are in plentiful enough supply to be available at reasonable prices. This is not the situation in the case of some of the commodities poor people need, particularly housing. In New York City, for example, so little housing is available that it is unlikely housing vouchers could be used. Other cities, including some in the housing voucher experiment, face similar problems. Vouchering would also be useless as a replacement for some of the services now provided to poor households. It is unlikely, for example, that vouchers could be used to purchase a job in an economically depressed labor market.

The problem with the agenda that Mr. Butler puts forth is that it is primarily concerned with problems caused by the welfare system itself. There is little evidence that the welfare system is the primary cause of poverty. Far more evidence suggests that the problems the poor face are rooted in other factors that make it difficult to function effectively in the labor market.

This does not mean that the current system does not need reform. Removing work disincentives from the welfare system, demanding that absent parents take responsibility for their children, and empowering the poor are strategies that should be pursued. But in our zeal to reform welfare, we should not lose sight of an important aspect of the larger social and economic picture. The poor face limited alternatives. For this reason, we should pursue strategies that are consistent with another principle that operates in our society: the principle of opportunity.

Cesar A. Perales
Commissioner
Department of Social Services
State of New York

Dear Sir:

Mr. Butler's article offered a thorough and convincing analysis of the current welfare system and the failure of Great Society programs to eradicate poverty in America.

A major problem of the current system is rigidity and over-centralization, which does little to help people escape dependency. We must rekindle the notion that welfare recipients have an obligation to their children, to themselves, and to society, to work toward self-sufficiency.

At present, Alabama has one of the lowest welfare benefit levels in the nation. We do not have the AFDC-UP program for two-parent families nor do we have a General Assistance program. This limitation tends to discourage the formation of two-parent families.

Mr. Butler argues for decentralized, simplified welfare programs that are undergirded by national standards regarding essential needs. But poorer states like Alabama will need federal assistance to meet the national standard and to make benefits available to two-parent as well as one-parent families.

I am somewhat concerned that welfare reform may be mandated with no additional funding for day-care, job training, and other supportive services. Alabama's welfare recipients require significant services to attain, and hold, reliable, long-term jobs. Our welfare caseload consists predominantly of families headed by single mothers, who are typically undereducated and unskilled, and have no work history. These recipients will need considerable training and support if they are to escape poverty.

I generally agree with the arguments presented by Mr. Butler and I look forward to the creation of a less centralized, more humane, and more rational welfare system.

Governor Guy Hunt
State of Alabama

Dear Sir:

Adult and Family Services, Oregon's welfare department, has studied the concepts of workfare and vouchers for several years. We concluded that neither would meet the needs of our state.

The mission of Adult and Family Services is to help families become self-sufficient, and to provide basic financial support to those families until they can become self-supporting. Because we do not see welfare as serving a permanent class of poor people we reject the voucher system for services. A method of payment that sets welfare recipients apart

While Mr. Butler offers a radical departure from the status quo that is based on 1960s liberalism, it is hardly radical enough by even present-day conservative standards.

—Walter Block

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from the rest of society does not positively contribute to self-sufficiency.

While I agree that local communities often do "know what's best," I cannot accept that national problems are always best solved by local governments. Poverty is a national problem that should be a national concern.

Governor Neil Goldschmidt
State of Oregon

to be put into place, with its emphasis on decentralization, mutual obligation and self-reliance, it gradually would improve the climate for the ideas of Epstein, Nozick, and Rothbard. It is not that I reject the analysis of these scholars, as Dr. Block contends, nor that I believe such ideas can never prevail, but simply that in the current political climate we need a less direct strategy.

Warren Brookes disputes the need for a national framework for welfare policy. Here the dispute may be more apparent than real. In fact, I do not argue that we now know what ought to be done, and that states and private institutions should be required to shape up. Indeed, as I ended the article, "a 'conservative Great Society' with dozens of new programs and requirements, reflecting a confident belief that all the answers are known, is a contradiction in terms." My point was that there is a broad national consensus about certain objectives of policy—adequate shelter and food for all citizens, for instance—although there are widely differing views as to how these goals should be accomplished. Thus the national guidelines I wrote of would not specify methods or outlays, only objectives.

Commissioner Perales raises several important points, but in some cases these are simply straw men. He is right, for instance, to dismiss the notion that the poor are a "homogenous or easily characterized group"—but I did not suggest they are. Indeed, one of my arguments for decentralization is that wide variations in the nature and causes of poverty require as much local discretion as possible. Similarly, I have no fundamental disagreement with Commissioner Perales' comprehensive description of the nature of mutual obligation. My argument was that past policy did not tend to reflect such a view. I also have to agree that vouchers can only work where the market operates effectively in responding to consumer demand. So I am not surprised that he feels that vouchers could not address the housing problems of New York: when a city destroys the housing market with rent controls it is hardly likely to respond!

One thing we can all agree upon, of course, is that the key to reducing poverty is a strong and growing economy. Any dispute we may have about welfare is minor compared with our shared view that to the extent that misplaced welfare policy undermines economic expansion, it is a threat to the poor.

Many accounts of supply-side economics emphasize writers and journalists who, though certainly eloquent advocates of the cause, lived hundreds of miles away from the daily battles on which the fate of supply-side economics rested.

—Paul Craig Roberts

Stuart M. Butler replies:

I have enough libertarian blood left in my veins to take very seriously the concerns raised by Walter Block and Warren Brookes. Yet I feel that the only way out of America's welfare mess is to recognize first the conservative principles that policy is the art of the possible, and that policy must be tailored to fit the time and place.

So while I have an instinctive attraction to Dr. Block's analysis and prescription, I cannot help but recall the occasion when I stopped for directions at an out-of-way gas station in Michigan. Pondering my destination, the attendant shrugged and remarked, "The problem is, you shouldn't be starting from here." I leave it to the readers of *Policy Review* to decide whether I am unduly concerned about the need to defuse left-wing opposition to conservative welfare reform proposals, but I do believe that although Dr. Block's proposal has much to commend it, and should be a central feature of the intellectual debate, as a political proposal, it is a non-starter *at the moment*. If the plan I propose were

Supply-Side Omissions

Dear Sir:

Thanks for Gordon Jackson's supportive article on supply-side economics ("All Supply-Siders Now?," Summer 1987). As an insider in the revolution, I would like to correct a couple of historical points. Jack Kemp, the political spokesman for supply-side economics, seldom fares well in accounts of the movement's history. Following established practice, Mr. Jackson reduces Representative Jack Kemp to "another convert" of Jude Wanniski. This is patently untrue. Representative Kemp recruited me in 1975 to help him put together a supply-side tax program. He was dismayed that policymakers had moved away from John F. Kennedy's tax-cutting initiative and were relying instead on increases in government spending to stimulate the economy. Kemp told me that if I needed any help to contact Norman Ture, who had been working on supply-side approaches to taxation since 1960.

Kemp advocated marginal tax rate cuts in signed op-ed articles in 1975, a year before he first met Jude

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Wanniski. What Kemp got from Wanniski was not the program of cutting tax rates, but aggressive marketing of the Laffer Curve, which finessed the problem of cutting spending. Kemp wanted to crowd out public sector growth with private sector growth, but cutting spending during the transition period was difficult for the Republican Party. The Laffer Curve let Republicans avoid the charge that they were trying to cut benefits for the poor in order to cut taxes for the rich.

Wanniski contributed most of the movement's early publicity. All of it was not helpful with professional economists, but it was probably the first time that the efforts of a congressional minority became a national *cause célèbre*. Wanniski certainly focused attention on the issue and helped to prevent the establishment from ignoring us.

Kemp had no legislative forum from which to advance the issue. The campaign for tax rate reduction had to be fought through the congressional committee process—often against Republican staff—and against the econometric models that informed the Congressional Budget Office's recommendations to Congress. The opposition to supply-side was never prepared to roll over dead because of an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal*, and could produce plenty of editorials of its own in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. Supply-side prevailed because it outpointed the Keynesians in an analytical, empirical, and political contest. The battle was won in autumn 1978 when the Democrat-controlled Senate threw out the Carter tax reform plan to raise taxes and passed the Nunn amendment ("son of Kemp-Roth"), which cut tax rates and limited the growth of federal spending. House Democrats voted to support the Nunn amendment in conference, but the Carter administration killed it with the threat of veto. Nevertheless, in place of Carter's plan to raise taxes, we got a cut in the capital gains tax rate.

Many accounts of supply-side economics emphasize writers and journalists who, though certainly eloquent advocates of the cause, lived hundreds of miles away from the daily battles on which the fate of supply-side economics rested. This process of reifying the movement is unfair to real people such as Steve Entin, John Rousselot, and Senator Orrin Hatch who made supply-side a reality by helping to strategize and win its economic and political battles within the congressional policy process.

Professor Paul Craig Roberts
Center for Strategic and
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Washington, DC

Editor's note:

In "Ten Years of Policy Review" (Summer 1987), a line was inadvertently omitted from the excerpt of Milton Friedman's 1978 article, "The Limitations of Tax Limitations." The correct excerpt is:

> There is an important point that needs to be stressed to those who regard themselves as fiscal conservatives. By concentrating on the wrong thing, the deficit, instead of the right thing, total government spending, fiscal conservatives have been the unwitting hand-maidens of the big spenders. The typical historical process is that the spenders put through laws which increase government spending. A deficit emerges. The fiscal conservatives scratch their heads and say, "My God, that's terrible; we have got to do something about that deficit." So they cooperate with the big spenders in getting taxes imposed. As soon as the new taxes are imposed and passed, the big spenders are off again, and then there is another burst in government spending and another deficit.

Piety & Politics
Evangelicals and Fundamentalists Confront the World
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policy REVIEW

The Soviets may intend war and complete victory. They may prefer to seek the fruits of war without risking the cost of full-scale conflict. They may continue as they are, fighting fierce local wars for one country at a time. What we must consider is that the choice is theirs.

Representative Jim Courter
The Gathering Storm

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